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Abstract
Recently, a nuclear power plant physical simulator to support instrumentation and control
(I&C) research has been constructed at the University of Western Ontario using industry-grade
sensors and actuators. This platform, known as the Nuclear Power Control Test Facility
(NPCTF), provides means to safely inject faults and examine their effects on the system. The
NPCTF may be configured into a number of nuclear power plant (NPP) types, but focus has
been placed on CANadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) type. In a CANDU based NPP,
there are two independent and separated systems with decision-making units capable of
actuating two shutdown systems. These units form the reactor protection system, and monitor
critical system variables to ensure that they remain within safe operating limits.
For this work, in ongoing efforts to further improve the fidelity of the NPCTF, a dedicated
reactor protection system has been realized. This system has been implemented through a
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commision certified safety programmable logic controller
(PLC), known as the HFC6000. This has been integrated with the NPCTF through a standard
industrial interface, and performs monitoring functions and decision logic operations. The
reactor protection system responds to contingencies by issuing trip signals to perform safety
shutdown actions.
The designed system has undergone a full verification and validation (V&V) process. Nine
CNSC design basis events have been considered under full-system testing, including the lossof-coolant-accident and loss-of-reactor-control. The designed logic achieved a 100% success
rate on 25 trials. Further, the implemented system produced no spurious trips during normal
operations.
The relationship between CANDU type NPPs and the NPCTF has been established. The work
has also concluded that the NPCTF is capable of replicating dynamic relationships among
different variables in an NPP. Through V&V tests, , the designed logic, and implemented
system using HFC6000 have been proven to be successful according to the safety system
criteria from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

Key Words: Physical Simulation, Safety Systems, V&V, PLC, Shutdown Systems, Reactor
Protection System
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1 Introduction
Nuclear power plants (NPP) have a proven capability to produce reliable and clean power
in large quantities. However, because both the energy density in the fuel in an NPP and its
radioactive by-products, NPPs present an inherent risk in their operations. For these reasons
the nuclear industry not only possesses a plethora of governing bodies and regulations, but
treats safety as top priority during all phases of an NPP’s lifespan. The ultimate foal of NPP
safety is to prevent radiological releases [1]. Thus, safety continues to be an area of continual
research and improvement within the industry.
A physical NPP simulator to support instrumentation and control (I&C) research has
been developed in the Control and Instrumentation in Electrical Systems (CIES) group at the
University of Western Ontario (UWO). This simulator, the Nuclear Power Control Test
Facility (NPCTF), is capable of simulating a wide variety of faults safely and repeatedly [2].
The NPCTF therefore presents an ideal platform for prototype testing of a number of I&C
apparatus, including verification and validation (V&V) of safety algorithms.
This thesis presents the development of a safety system for the NPCTF. This safety
system is based on a Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) NPP. This chapter presents a
brief introduction to NPPs, the relevant standards, and methods of testing, as well as outlining
the objectives, contributions, and organization of the thesis.

1.1 NPP Basics
NPPs are similar in structure to all other type thermal generating stations [3]. The
primary difference is the fuel choice: radioactive isotopes are ‘burned’, converting the mass
deficiency of nuclear fission into energy [4]. The reactor and accompanying machinery handle
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the maintenance, control, and extraction of energy from the ongoing critical nuclear reaction,
while the remaining machinery follow generic thermal plant configurations.
As shown in Figure 1.1 [5], a CANDU NPP utilizes a two loop, two building design.
The first building, aptly named ‘Reactor Building’, is vacuum sealed and houses the reactor,
primary heat transport pumps, pressurizers (not shown) and steam generators. These three
devices use heavy water (D2O) as coolant for transporting heat from the reactor to the rest of
systems and make up the ‘primary loop’.
The ‘second loop’ is mostly contained in the turbine building. Here, steam from the
steam generators drives the turbines of generators. Multiple turbines are used for increased
efficiency. Steam is condensed within a condenser and pumped (using auxiliary pumps) back
into the steam generators.
The CANDU reactor uses natural uranium in its fission reaction [3]. The coolant is
heated up to approximately 310⁰C [3]. The coolant is kept in a liquid state by the pressurizer,
which maintains pressures up to 11.05 MPa (g) [6]. The superheated, pressurized coolant is
transported to the steam generator. There, the coolant passes through as many as 16,000 tubes,
dissipating its heat and boiling the light water in the secondary loop. Afterwards, the coolant
flows back into the reactor with flow maintained by the primary loop pump [6].
The secondary loop connects the two buildings. Light water steam from the steam
generator runs through first high pressure then low pressure turbines. The turbines turn the
rotor of the generator producing the end-product electric power. The steam collects and
condensates in the condenser. The condenser utilizes an intake of cold water from an external
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source, which in Canada is often a lake or sea [6]. The now liquid water is pumped back into
the steam generator to begin a new cycle.

1.2 Safety Systems
Safety systems are utilized to prevent possible accidents. Principally, a safety system
performs four major roles [7]:
1) Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition
2) Remove decay heat from the fuel
3) Maintain a barrier to limit radioactive release to the public and plant personnel
4) Supply information necessary for the operator to monitor the status of the plant
Safety systems are divided into three groups based on the role that they perform:
Shutdown systems (objective 1), post-shutdown systems (objective 2), and safety support
systems (objectives 3 and 4).
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [8] defines the reactor protection
system (RPS) as the system responsible for maintaining a reactor within a safe operating
region. It does this by producing a shutdown (called a ‘trip’) signal when one or more physical
parameters enter an unacceptable range. This signal causes the shutdown systems to halt the
reaction. CANDU plants possess two independent mechanisms for this; referred to as
Shutdown System 1 (SDS1) and Shutdown System 2 (SDS2) [6].
.
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Figure 1.1: Configuration of a CANDU NPP
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The portion of the RPS that makes the tripping decision is simply referred to as the
‘electrical part of the RPS’ [8]. The electrical part consists of two primary portions:
1) Analog Channels: These channels process mesasured crticial system variables and
issue trip signals whenever some of these parameters exceed predetermined ranges
2) Logic Trains: These logical units receive information from the analog channels and
determine through a voting scheme wheteher it is necessary to send a trip singal to
the mechanical subsystem of the RPS that implement the actual shutdown actions.
In a CANDU NPP, this voting scheme is a two-out-of-three (2oo3) configuration such
that two of the three channels must simultaneously signal unsafe conditions for a trip to occur
[7]. This configuration requires two channels to falsely identify a problem simultaneously for
a spurious trip to happen. 2oo3 thus allows each system to be pragmatically cautious while
reducing the risk of spurious trip.

1.3 Nuclear Control and Safety Commissions
The international nuclear community cooperates globally through the IAEA, an
autonomous organization established by the UN in 1957 [9]. The IAEA recommendations are
meant to reflect the collective experience of the nuclear power community, though are not
mandatory for IAEA member countries. Instead, IAEA members are free to adopt the standards
by their discretion [10].
The IAEA has three stated missions [10]:
1) Assist its member states in the use of nuclear technology and science for peaceful
purposes
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2) Develop standards for nuclear safety and promote and achieve these standards in
regards to human health and the environment
3) Verify through inspection that member states comply with the commitments under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Another major engineering body, The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE), develops standards and methods for NPP’s design and operations [11]. IEEE’s main
body for NPP technology is the Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC) of the IEEE
Power and Energy Society (PES) [11]. NPEC protocol currently evaluates 29 categories of
equipment before approving a design and validating its construction. These range from
specific parts (#383 Cables, Splices and Connections) to capabilities of entire systems (#603
Safety Systems) [12], [13].
Potentially the most important identifier in the design of nuclear electrical systems is
IEEE 1E designation, as adopted by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(USNRC). 1E designates electrical systems related directly to safety [14]. The criteria for
defining, designing, testing, monitoring, documenting, and more for 1E systems are outlined
in the IEEE Standard 308 (2012) [14]. This standard is written and maintained by working
group WG 4.1 – IEEE 308.
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is another major international
body [15]. The IEC works closely with the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), the International Telecommunication Union, and the IEEE [15]. The IEEE and IEC
signed a cooperation agreement in 2002 and since 2008 have performed joint technological
development [16]. Guidelines relevant to nuclear engineering include IEC standards 62340,
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61513, and 60880, which cover classification of common cause failures, safety instrumentation
and control systems, and safety software respectively [17-19].
Standards are adopted or created at the discretion of an NPP’s home country. The
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) (previously known as the Atomic Energy
Control Board (AECB)) have ultimate authority in standards and licensing criteria utilized for
Canada [20]. However, because Canada has signed into the IAEA, technical collaborations
with inter-government organizations contribute to Canadian nuclear development [9]. The
CNSC’s credentials must be met or exceeded in all manners of design and operation before an
NPP can be granted a license to operate in Canada [20]. This authority was installed to the
CNSC by the Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 1997 [20]. Their standards are outlined in
part by documents such as the SOR/2000-202 and AECB Requirements for Shutdown Systems
R-8 policy statement [21], [22].
The CNSC does not specify technologies or methods; instead, CNSC’s philosophy
focuses on creating and enforcing high standards of performance and reliability [23]. The
interpretation and burden of proof that these standards have been upheld is left to the licensee.
In demonstrating their compliance, the licensee is free to choose whatever designs they deem
appropriate [23].
1.3.1

Testing for Nuclear Applications
The high standards of nuclear commissions means certification requires significant time

investment. This is especially true for computer based safety systems; systems whose failure
rates are difficult to quantify through traditional methods [24]. The certification is difficult for
several reasons: the volume of coding, manner by which tasks are carried out, verification once
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on chip, means of failure, and more. This created an impact for the inclusion of digitally
program devices into the industry [24].
One way by which this problem is relieved is through the use of simulators. Simulators
aid in validation by demonstrating the capability of a system, digital or otherwise. Simulators
are often able to simulate faults or other unusual circumstances, aiding in verification of safe
system design and implementation. Simulators may be software, physical, or a combination
of both.
1.3.2

Differences between Physical and Software Models
NPPs typically possess site-specific simulators for operator training. There are also

private companies [25-27] capable of providing simulations for products seeking certification.
These are software simulations however, and despite high accuracy models, are ultimately only
models.
Software simulation requires the system to be tested to be physically connected to a
simulator. The simulator interprets input signals, uses its model to change its internal states,
and returns the appropriate response signals back to the system being tested.
Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) consists of one or more physical components working in
conjunction with software in order to provide a more accurate, model-free simulation of plant
operations. Examples of physical components include mock steam generators, reactors, and
more [28], [29]. Many of these undergo testing to ensure fidelity to the system that they are
modeling. HIL testing is recommended by the IAEA and IEEE [30], [31]. HIL is particularly
useful in safety-critical applications such as NPPs where it is not possible for on-line testing.
HIL enables real-time simulation, thus permitting in-situ testing [28].
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Physical simulators are an extension of HIL which minimize software components.
Like HIL, they undergo testing to ensure fidelity. These provide online testing against realworld dynamics. The NPCTF is then, under this definition, a physical simulation of NPP for
supporting I&C system studies.
The NPCTF presents a unique opportunity to test equipment process I&C. Because it
uses low temperatures and pressures, one can simulate faults safely. Further, as fault insertion
is designed into the mechanical structure and electrical control of the simulator, the faults
inserted express a high degree of repeatability. The NPCTF is discussed in more detail in
Section 3.1.
Such simulator is essential to evaluate logics and implementation issues associated with
safety systems in an NPP. However, this has never been done before. The goal of this research
is to investigate how a hardware ased simulator can be used to test safety systems and to
validate & verify control logics.

1.4 Research Objectives and Scope
1.4.1

Objectives
The objectives for the current research are:
1. To design an RPS based on CANDU critical parameters’ parallels to those on the
NPCTF.


A comparison between CANDU safety logic and the operations of the
NPCTF will be performed to ensure cross-compatibility
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An analysis of the NPCTF operating characteristics will be performed.
This investigation will focus on each parameter’s interaction with reactor
power and the discovery of their normal operating ranges



A complete safety logic scheme will be designed that monitors key
system parameters under normal operations, while detecting faults and
subsequently shutting down the NPCTF

2. To implement said aformentioned RPS using industrial grade safety PLC


The design will be coded into PLC logic such that it can be operated in
real-time according to the requirements of that unit



The communication between the programed PLC unit and the NPCTF
will be constructed as necessary for each system



Simulations will be performed to validate the logic and make necessary
improvements

3. To validate the implemented design on the NPCTF


The implementation will be tested against design criteria determined
during the initial stages



The fault injection capabilities of the NPCTF will be used to validate the
designed RPS against CNSC standard design basis events as outlined in
regulatory document R-8 [22].

1.4.2

Scope
Throughout this research, it is assumed that the validation of the NPCTF as a nuclear

simulator is complete. The scope of this work will not include changes to the distributed control
system or dynamics of the NPCTF. Instead, these are used under the assumption that they are
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well performing and complete. The HFC6000, a certified nuclear safety PLC used for
implementation, is likewise assumed to be correct in all aspects of its construction.
1.4.3

Solution Technique
To achieve these objectives, a number of steps must be taken. These steps are outlined

in Figure 1.2.

The work shall begin with a literature review of the relevant CANDU

technologies and research. Following is a description of the NPCTF system. Once the system
is described, the safety control algorithm design may begin. A Matlab simulation shall be
created and continual improvements made on the design.

Once simulation results are

satisfactory, the implementation on HFC6000 may begin. The V&V process follows. This
includes opportunities for improvement by retuning the algorithm. When all criteria have been
achieved, the system will be fully realized.

Investigation of
Operating Characteristics
of a CANDU NPP

Successfully Realized
Reactor Protection
System

Comparison and
Evaluation of NPCTF
Parallels and Differences

All Criteria
Satisfied

V&V Procedure of
Proper Design and
Implementation

Design of Algorithm To
Be Implemented on HFC
6000
Continual
Improvement

Simulation of Designed
Algorithm in Matlab
Environment

Coding and
Implementation Into
HFC 6000 Ladder Logic

Figure 1.2: Thesis Workflow
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1.5 Contributions of the Thesis
This thesis has made three major contributions:
1. The investigation of the NPCTF critical parameters is completed such that the
relationships and dependence on the heater current are fully characterized
2. The cross comparison between NPCTF and CANDU operating signals and
dynamics is performed to a degree capable of permitting the design of a RPS
3. An RPS is designed to operate on the NPCTF capable of achieving specified
performance criteria: a perfect record in fault detection and no spurious trips
during validation testing

1.6 Performance Criteria
The RPS must be capable of meeting design criteria. Thus, it is necessary that these
criteria are specified such that they may be tested against. Though speed of the system is a
performance measure of a RPS, this cannot be plausibly measured using the operations of the
NPCTF. The RPS performs at rates too quick for the recording devices in question. However,
given that the recording instruments operate at 1Hz, the performance criteria are therefore:
1. The system must be capable of detecting all faults inserted without exception.
Specifically, these faults will be those outlined in CNSC regulatory document R-8
2. The system must not be the cause of spurious trips. The NPCTF, as the system under
test, must be able to perform all permissible operations without interference from the
RPS
3. All trips must occur within 1s. This will be measured by the NPCTF’s internal log and
defined as occurring from the recorded bypass to the recorded moment of complete
cessation of heater operations
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1.7 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis consists of six chapters including this Introduction. The second Chapter
presents a literature review and essential background about CANDU reactors, nuclear safety,
V&V methods, techniques for safety system design, and information about PLC including the
HFC6000. The subsequent chapter contains an in-depth investigation of the NPCTF physical
characteristics and operation. Chapter 4 is a detailed explanation of the safety system,
including the method of designing set points, the functions of the software, and techniques
used to verify its operation. Chapter 5 details the V&V process used: the reasoning behind the
tests and the means to perform these tests. Here, the results of experiment trials are presented,
analyzed, and discussed. Conclusions and future work are discussed in Chapter 6.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 CANDU Reactor
2.1.1

Heavy Water Moderator
Certain design features of the CANDU reactor affect the design of relevant safety

systems. The first is the CANDU choice of moderator: D2O (AKA heavy water). Moderators
are used to slow, through repeated collisions or ‘scattering’, the neutrons released from fission.
This is done so that the neutrons are absorbed into other fissile atoms rather than passing
through them at near-light speeds [32]. Heavy water possesses a large scattering cross-section,
a small absorption cross-section, and large energy losses per collision [32].

Amongst

moderators, heavy water possesses the best performance for the first two criteria and is
surpassed by only light water in the third.
The average log energy decrement describes energy lost per collision. It is defined as
[32]:

𝜉 = ln

𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑

(1)

where  is the average log energy decrement, and Eincoming and Escattered are the energy levels of
the neutron before and after collision. This value is almost entirely empirical as its value must
be investigated through experimentation. However, a very rough estimation can be made as
[32]:

𝜉 = 1−

(𝐴 − 1)2 (𝐴 + 1)
ln
(𝐴 − 1)
2𝐴

(2)
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where A is the atomic mass. Using either observed or estimated values, it becomes possible to
estimate the total number of particle collisions necessary to slow neutrons to appropriate
velocities. Assuming each loss is near the average log energy decrement, the total number of
collisions could therefore be calculated as [32]:
𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
ln 𝐸 ⁄
𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑁=
𝜉

(3)

where N is the expected number of collisions, and Ehigh and Elow are the starting and required
energy levels. Ultimately, the fewer collisions needed to bring neutrons to appropriate
velocities, the more easily the reaction will propagate.
The two other important factors are the scattering-cross-section and the absorptioncross-section [32]. A good moderator will have a much larger scattering than absorption cross
section, such that neutrons are slowed down but not removed from the ongoing reaction.
Combining all three crucial characteristics is the moderating ratio, MR [32]:

𝑀𝑅 = 𝜉

𝜎𝑠
𝜎𝑎

(4)

where s is the scattering cross section and a is the absorption cross section. Observing the
moderating ratio for commonly chosen moderators shows heavy water as the optimal choice.
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Material

H2O
D2O
He
Be
B
C

Table 2.1: Effectiveness of Common Moderators.
Ave. Log
Necessary
Macro Slowing
Energy
Collisions
Power
Decrement
0.927
19
1.425
0.510
35
0.177
0.427
42
9e-6
0.207
86
0.154
0.171
105
0.092
0.158
114
0.083

Moderating
Ratio
62
4830
51
126
0.00086
216

As mentioned in Section 1.1, CANDU NPPs use natural uranium as their fuel source.
Natural uranium, being significantly more inert than the enriched uranium of light water
reactors, forces improved moderator performance to maintain the ongoing reaction.
CANDU NPPs thus submerge and contain the reactor core in a vessel known as the
calandria, as shown in Figure 1.1, and again in Figure 2.2. The calandria and primary loop are
each filled with heavy water to act as the moderator and the coolant respectively. This
maximizes the likelihood a released neutron will be slowed and return to the reaction. Heavy
water thus allows CANDU NPPs to sustain a chain reaction without the need for enriched
uranium.
2.1.2

Neutron Economy
The proportional growth and decay of the number of free neutrons is referred to as the

‘neutron economy’. Maintenance of the neutron economy is critical as the power of the reactor
is directly proportional to the instantaneous neutron flux [33].
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Explicitly, this is expressed as [33]:
𝑃 = 𝐸𝑅 𝑁𝑑 𝜎𝑓 𝜙𝑉

(5)

where P is the reactor power, ER is energy released per fission (~200MeV), Nd is the fissile
density number (~1024/cm3), σf is the cross-section of the atoms, Φ is the instantaneous neutron
flux, and V is the reactor volume [33].
Released neutrons are divided into two categories based on their rate of release from
their atom [33]. The first category, ‘prompt’ neutrons, come from atoms that decompose
within 10-17s after absorption of a neutron. ‘Delayed’ neutrons are those released from atoms
that decompose more slowly. Delayed neutrons are often released in six distinct steps resulting
from the incremental decay of U235 into Sr87 [33]. From the initial absorption, these delayed
neutrons are released anywhere from 0.23s up to 55.72s. U235, the fissile isotope used in
CANDU, has a total delayed neutron fraction of 0.0065, or 0.65% [33].
This disparity demonstrates the importance of understanding the neutron economy
when designing a reactor protection scheme. With most propagations taking less than 10-17s,
neutron economy can quickly advance to dangerous levels. Additionally, with some releases
requiring nearly a minute, and many of the created radioactive by-products requiring much
longer, reactors continue to produce heat long after being shut down.
Effective multiplication factor, keff, represents the ratio between the population of the
current generation of free neutrons and the population of the next [33]. It thus follows that
when keff is greater than one: the economy is growing, and when less than one: the economy is
shrinking. The targeted value is one, referred to as ‘unity’, such that the reactor remains at
steady state [33].
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From keff the excess multiplication factor is defined as [33]:
𝑘𝑒𝑥 = 𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓 − 1

(6)

where kex is the excess multiplication factor. From here, the ‘reactivity’, ρ, is defined as the
ratio between the excess multiplication factor and the effective multiplication factor [33]:

𝜌=

𝑘𝑒𝑥
𝑘𝑒𝑓𝑓

(7)

such that increasing reactivity corresponds to positive values, and decreasing reactivity
corresponds to negative values.
The most important factors effecting the reactivity are: fuel temperature, coolant
temperature, coolant void, moderator temperature, reactor power, moderator poisons, and
fission products [2]. However, long term considerations include depletion of fuel, active
breeding, and accumulation of fission by-products (called reactor poisons) [33].
In a CANDU reactor, the reactivity in the core has to be under control at all times.
Light water channels in the reactor may be filled to decrease reactivity, and boric acid in the
moderator or cadmium control rods removed to increase reactivity [34]. These mechanisms
are controlled by the reactor control system, ensuring that the reaction remains stable. When
circumstance leads to the failure of these mechanisms, either due to their own loss of control
or the presence of faults, it becomes the role of the RPS to intervene.
These details of reactor physics are presented to demonstrate the importance of the
RPS. Two major issues arise from neutronic physics that the RPS must account for. First, the
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ongoing decaying heat of delayed decompositions require sufficiently thorough and long
lasting responses, and careful examination during start-up procedures.
Second, the exponential characteristic of the neutron economy necessitates rapid
response as reactions may quickly ‘run-away’. As a prompt neutron is released 10-17s after
initial absorption, generations of neutrons are released and absorbed rapidly. A positive value
of ρ that persists for even short periods of time greatly effects the system, as reactor power, P,
is directly proportional to the instaneous flux, Φ. This necessitates rapid action on behalf of
the RPS, as the exponential growth ultimately implicates sudden and immense increases of
reactor core temperature.

2.2 Reactor Protection Systems: Overview
All nuclear reactors possess the capability to release radiation, rupture to release
superheated steam, and/or meltdown. While a reactor cannot explode in the manner of a
nuclear warhead [35], the inherent risks of nuclear power generation demand that the RPS
remain poised to place the reactor into a safe state at any moment. The two systems to perform
this task are shutdown system 1 and 2, referred to as SDS1 and SDS2. These are controlled by
monitoring safety systems. Safety systems are not involved in the control of the NPP. Instead,
they monitor the critical parameters of the NPP, alert operators to dangerous conditions, and
determine when an intervention is necessary. The logical configuration of an NPP is shown in
Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Safety Systems and Control Systems of a Nuclear Power Plant
2.2.1

Shutdown Systems 1 and 2
Each SDS is required by law to be independently capable of halting the nuclear reaction

[36]. Also, their operation must not interfere with the capability of the other. The systems
must individually achieve an unavailability 1/1000th of a year annually. As such, their
combined unavailability is one in a million, or 10-6 [22]. This allots just 8 hours annually per
system, including maintenance, full system testing, or any off-line operations.
SDS1 is a group of 32 shutdown rods capable of immediately stopping the nuclear
reaction through the absorption of neutrons [37]. Without these neutrons, the nuclear reaction
fails to propagate and the reactor ceases to produce as much heat. These rods are a cadmium
alloy, coated in stainless steel for strength [37]. When the cadmium atom absorbs a neutron it
produces only a photon in response [38]. This photon may be absorbed but the reaction has
ultimately been interrupted.
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The cadmium rods are positioned above the reactor core, held by electromagnetic
clutches or magnetically coiled springs [37]. This can be seen in Figure 2.2. Gravity and/or
spring power rapidly forces the rods into the reactor core when released. All 32 rods are
inserted within 2 seconds [38] and possess enough negative reactivity that even the two most
effective rods may fail to insert with no consequence [33].
SDS2 is a liquid neutron absorber [37]. This is typically referred to as ‘reactor poison’
[37]. The reactor poison is considerably more destructive than the shutdown rods and its
effects on the reactor core can only be undone through special means. The reactor poison is a
gadolinium nitrate (GdNO3) mixture which, like cadmium, acts as a neutron absorber [37].
The gadolinium nitrate is kept in tanks adjacent to the reactor [37] as shown in Figure
2.2. These are kept pressurized through the helium tanks shown directly above the GdNO3
tanks. When necessary, SDS2 releases the normally open valves at the bottoms of the poison
tanks. Under the pressure provided by the helium tank, reactor poison is injected into the
moderator [37]. Theses valves are high reliability [22] and designed to be normally open (that
is, spilling into the moderator) [37]. The safety system is thus actively keeping the poison out
of the reactor. This is another fail-safe design such that the failure of the safety or shutdown
system defaults to injecting poison into the reactor.
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Figure 2.2: CANDU Shutdown Systems
The gadolinium rods of SDS1 are capable of being withdrawn from the reactor core via
chains, while SDS2 must be laboriously cleaned from the moderator [37]. Because of this, the
two systems are staggered in actuation. It is preferable SDS1 handles the shutdown
individually as recovery is faster and less expensive. Thus, SDS1 typically posesses more
conservative set points so it remains first to actuate [37]. Though both systems are available,
SDS2 is utilized as a last resort.
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2.2.2

Safety Systems
Safety systems are responsible for initializing the shutdown of the reactor (known as a

‘trip’) through the SDS [39]. CANDU utilizes at least three safety systems to control the two
SDS. The safety systems initialize trips collectively by utilizing two-out-of-three (or 2oo3)
voting logic, allowing each safety system to be prudently cautious without risking spurious
trip.
The safety systems make judgements through monitoring of trip parameters [39].
Safety systems initialize trips when parameters reach their respective trip thresholds.
Determining trip thresholds is discussed in section 2.4.
Safety systems have gone through four major generations [40]. The first generation
utilized relay logic and operator interfaces consisting of mounted meters and lights in the
control room.

Operations were recorded with multipen trend recorders and operators

controlled the plant through pushbuttons and hand switches.
The next generation began with the introduction of monitoring computers [40]. These
computers did not change the NPP’s circuitry or much of the interface, but allowed data
manipulations, statistical checks, and comparisons to be generated. This information could be
displayed to the operators [40]. The computers increased the capability to record plant
operations and could more easily track trends.

Subsequently, early warning logic was

implemented to warn of impending trip conditions.
Programmable digital comparators (PDCs) were the first to replace analog devices [39].
Instrumentation remained analog and interfacing tools remained unchanged, but signal
comparisons, decision making, and trip initiation was now digital [39]. This change was
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conservative: neutronic trips did not migrate to digital for safety concerns [40]. However,
PDC’s made digital logic evaluation and process trips possible.
Now, fully computerized shutdown systems are possible. Instrumentation remains
analog though monitoring, testing, logic, and display are fully digital [40]. CANDU safety
systems utilize 15 computers between the two SDS, each with specialized tasks including
monitoring parameters, tripping, display/testing, and monitoring the other computers [40].
Modern safety systems attempt to minimize unnecessary reliance on software. Failure
of any aspect of the software must be fully understood with reliability measures (ex. error
checking) included. Darlington, as an example, utilizes over two-thirds of its safety system’s
code to error check the implemented logic [39].

2.3 Design Methods of Reactor Protection Systems
A safety system is defined as the system responsible for autonomously initiating
shutdown in an NPP [32]. Conversely, the SDS is the body of mechanisms that are responsible
for carrying through with that task [40]. Thus, it is the safety system which holds the logic,
processes the system parameters, and discerns if and when a trip is necessary.
The importance of this task begets a number of common design criteria. Other than the
vigorous testing that must be performed during V&V, engineering principles are utilized to
mitigate issues that arise due to environment and failures of foresight [41].
2.3.1

Key Monitoring Parameters
Safety systems typically refer to the choice of monitored system variables as the safety

parameters. This term gets extended onto the variables themselves, such that critical variables
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are likewise refered to as safety paratmers. CANDU safety algorithms often examine a similar
set of parameters. These parameters are chosen due to their proven capability of detecting
faults or abnormalities in the CANDU design [37]. Common parameters for SDS1 are listed in
Table 2.2 along with which conditions abnormalities in those parameters could indicate [37].
Table 2.2: Common CANDU Safety Parameters.
Tripping Signal
Neutron Flux Level – High
Neutron Rate Log
Steam Generator Level – Low
Feed water Line Pressure – Low
Pressurizer Level – Low
Primary Line Pressure – High
Primary Line Pressure – Low
Primary Line Flow – Low
Reactor Building Pressure – High
Moderator Level – Low
Moderator Temperature – High
Manual Trip

Common Cause
Reactor power level too high
Power change too quick, unstable reactor
Loss of heat sink
Loss of heat sink
Loss of coolant
Reactor power too high for eat sink
Poor coolant flow
Poor coolant flow
Containment break
Reactor instability
Cooling issue. Reactor power level too high
Discretion of operating crew

When designing the NPCTF’s safety algorithm, these parameters were mirrored in
order to retain the CANDU parallel. Referencing Figure 3.1 in section 3.1, the equivalents in
the NPCTF for the parameters in Table 2.2 are shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: NPCTF Equivalent Signals.
CANDU Critical Signal
NPCTF Equivalent
High Neutron Power
None
High Rate of Rise of Neutron Power
None
High Coolant Pressure
Primary Loop Pressure (P1)
Low Coolant Pressure
Primary Loop Pressure (P1)
High Building Pressure
None
Low Steam Generator Level
HX Tank Level (L4)
Low Pressurizer Level
Pressurizer Level (L3)
High Moderator Temperature
Heater Outlet Temperature (T2)
Low Coolant Flow
Primary Water Flow (F1)
Low Steam Generator Pressure
HX Tank Pressure (P2)
Manual Shutdown
Manual Release Button
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Because the nuclear reactor is simulated by a heater on the NPCTF, a number of
CANDU parameters relating to neutron flux and the reactor building possess no NPCTF
equivalent. However, the NPCTF still possesses equivalents for 8 of the 11 shutdown signals.
This will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.1.
Because the redundant safety systems must still be diverse; safety systems monitor
different sets of parameters, though there exists some overlap between them. An example set
of parameters commonly used for SDS2 are listed in Table 2.4, along with failures they could
indicate [37].
Table 2.4: Common CANDU Safety Parameters.
Signal
Common Cause
Neutron Power – High
Reactor power level too high
Neutron Rate Log – High
Power change too quick, unstable reactor
Primary Line Pressure – High
Loss of flow, heat sink failure
Primary Line Pressure – Low
Leak in primary
Reactor Building Pressure – High
Steam line break
Steam Generator Level – Low
Steam/feed water line breaks
Pressurizer Level – Low
Leak in primary line
Pressure Differential in Primary – Low
Flow blockage/failure
Steam Generator Pressure – Low
Steam line break
These signals are equally valid in designing the safety algorithms to protect the plant.
However, because it is preferable to initiate the destructive SDS2 after SDS1, the set points for
initiating a trip through SDS2 are slightly less stringent [37]. Regardless, the redundancy
introduced by diverse the SDS and their respective logic increases overall system reliability.
The same principle used in the utilization of triplicated (or more) safety systems [42].
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2.3.2

Redundancy
A common CANDU safety design is two-out-of-three (2oo3) triplicated logic. This

requires two of the three safety functions to call for a trip before one can occur [42]. This
methodology possesses a number of operating benefits [42]:


Allows a single system to be tested while the other two systems remain redundant and
in operation



Should a system fail it automatically votes to ‘trip’; neither compromising safety nor
resulting in a spurious trip



Allows operators to view read-outs from each safety system, clearly showing when one
system possesses an anomalous reading



Permits the tightest possible parameter bounds without excessive risk of initiating
spurious trip
Triplication is not applied only to safety systems.

Many sensors and other

instrumentation devices make use of triplicated redundancies in order to minimize errors [35].
These redundancies may even take place at the circuit level, where primary and secondary
calculations are performed on separate processors [43]. If the calculations by two processors
do not match, chip error protocol is utilized. If the error continues, the device recognizes a
malfunction and performs predetermined actions [43].
Darlington’s redundant safety systems are fully computerized [39]. Darlington’s safety
system possesses three groups of computers, each monitored separately by independent
watchdog devices [9]. The redundancy of three groups prevents errors while the independent
watchdogs ensure errors that do occur are immediately recognized [39]. Additionally, of the
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12,000 words that make up the trip software, over 8,000 (2/3 of the total) are used purely for
self and cross checking the results of any calculation [39].
2.3.3

Diversity of Design
Common cause failures (CCFs) are antagonistic to redundancies [17]. CCFs are events

that result in failures across several systems [17]. Because CCFs by definition affect multiple
systems, they render redundancy frivolous [17]. A simple example is a power surge that results
in a measurement error by each system. CCFs are a principle concern to safety design because
they represent a possibility that all safety systems could fail from a single, unexpected source
[17].
Because CCFs cannot be predicted, the best protective measure is diversity of design
[17]. Diversity is systematically approached so that redundant or complementary systems have
as little in common with one another as is practically possible [17]. Theoretically, diverse
systems accomplishing their tasks with differing tools, methodologies, and equipment may
cause more total failures, but these failures will be from different causes and happen at different
times [17].
Diversity is a standardized IAEA concept. Many safety standards include diversity as
a necessary aspect of safety critical systems [19], [44]. In particular, the IEC 60880, 62340,
61508-2 (parts 2, 3, and 7) as well as the IAEA NS-G-1.1 and 1.3 form part of the international
community’s criteria on diversity in NPPs [45], [46].
The aforementioned standards possess requirements in the application of diversity as
well as minimum standards in quantized measures of the principle. Some, but not all of these
standards contain further requirements stating which systems must have diversity, the types of
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redundancy that apply, and recommendations on assessment [45], [46]. Detailed techniques
in the evaluation of the systems is discussed in NUREG-7007, a referenced but nonstandardized approach to diversity evaluation [47].
In general, diversity is realized from seven applicable vantages [47]:
1) Design: Methodology in approaching a task or problem
2) Equipment Manufacturer: To insure another company’s CCFs don’t enter the NPP
3) Logic Processing Equipment: To account for the inherent weaknesses of all types
4) Function: The means by which tasks are carried out
5) Life-Cycle: Stresses or environmental factors common between systems
6) Signal: In line, instrument, and when applicable: the signals themselves
7) Logic: The implemented software and machine reasoning, be it µP based, ladder, or
otherwise
Evaluation of diversity in redundant systems has several options. The most used
methodology is NUREG-A as found within the NUREG-7007 [47]. Other methods include
check-list based, RBD (or MM) based, graph-model based, and those which derive from
probabilistic metrics [49].
An important concept in these methods is the difference between inherent and intentional
diversity [49]. Intentional diversity is using the same technology or methodology in a different
way for the explicit introduction of diversity. Contrarily, inherent diversity is completely
different technologies or approaches to a problem, which would be naturally diverse [49].
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When choosing between separate options, the IAEA insists the selection of the most diverse
designs [48]. However, the IAEA recognizes that other factors (such as complexity, cost, and
maintenance) may be considered.

2.4 CANDU Shutdown Logic
As discussed, the CANDU shutdown logic is divided between conditional and absolute
trips. Conditional trips are armed when reactor power is at greater than 2% of maximum [37].
At low reactor power, the conditional trip parameters are not critical to safety. Absolute trips
remain armed at all times. The general logical structure of CANDU shutdown logic is shown
in Figure 2.3 [37].

Figure 2.3: CANDU Shutdown Logic
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Presented in Figure 2.3 are 7 of the shutdown thresholds. Each SDS utilizes three
separate and independent channels (marked D, E, and F for SDS1, and G, H, and I for SDS2).
The triplicated measurements work with 2oo3 logic, requiring two channels to exceed setpoints
before a trip is initiated and reducing the possibility of spurious trip. These channels are
exclusive to the safety systems [37].
Trip thresholds are separated for SDS1 and SDS2, with SDS2 designed to operat at
higher setpoints [37]. However, these thresholds are designed in ‘fail-safe’ such that they are
actively preventing the SDS from acting. Upon loss of signal from the safety systems, the SDS
will activate to halt the reaction [37].

2.5 Trip Set-point Determination
The safety system, using the critical operating parameters, monitors the system for if
and when breaches of predefined thresholds occur [1]. These thresholds are chosen such that
even in worst case scenarios the SDS remain capable of reversing the supercriticality of the
reactor core. An improperly placed threshold may result in system damage, release of
radiation, or worse [50].
Threshold determination fundamentally begins from the understanding that an NPP
may produce undesired effects [51]. All of these effects may be grouped together under the
term ‘damage’. The point at which a system parameter results in damage is referred to as the
‘safety limit’. Thus, safety limits should never be met or breached in order to prevent the
occurrence of damage [51].
As shown in Figure 2.4 [52], a safety margin is the breadth given to a safety limit even
in the worst case scenario. For a rising fault (i.e. one by which the parameter causes damage

32
through a very high value), the safety margin is maintained by an ‘acceptance criterion’ at its
base [52]. The acceptance criterion is the designed maximum value of the parameter. The
RPS is therefore designed to prevent the parameter from ever breaching the acceptance
criterion. If a parameter is halted before reaching its acceptance criterion, the safety margin is
said to be ‘preserved’ [52].

Figure 2.4: Definition of Margins in a Nuclear Power Plant.
Preservation of the safety margin requires the reactor to shut down well before the
acceptance criteria is met. The parameter value at which action is taken is referred to as either
the tripping set point or the tripping threshold. The tripping set point (labelled as the ‘operating
envelope limit’), the safety limit, and acceptance criterion additionally utilize significant
uncertainties are shown in Figure 2.4. Uncertainties originate from many sources, as discussed
in the next subsection.
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The decision behind the tripping threshold is mostly determined through the simulation
of a worst-case-scenario. This scenario is a ‘design basis event’ [53]. Several design basis
events must be utilized in each safety system design. The most infamous of these is the large
loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA).
The design basis LOCA is a complete shearing of the coolant inlet pipe immediately
before the reactor. This results in coolant being rapidly drained from the calandria, a massive
pressure loss, and consequent overheating of the reactor [53]. The large LOCA as a design
basis event requires the swiftest response, theoretically resulting in the most conservative
tripping set points [53].
Using the design basis event, engineers rely on modelling and simulation to evaluate
the tripping set point. These are heavy calculations that rely on high accuracy modelling and
thorough understanding of uncertainties. Uncertainty plays such a large role in the calculation
of tripping set points that the IAEA publishes recommendations on uncertainty investigations.
Historically, uncertainty is treated as pessimistically as possible in order to maximize safety
[52].
2.5.1

Uncertainty Measurements and Calculations
Tripping set point determination continue to be an area of improvement and research

in nuclear design.

New methodologies have been proposed, tending to focus on the

improvement of modelling and computations [54-56].
The unique aspects of new methodologies tend to be the means by which uncertainties
are handled in simulation. Design basis events of simultaneous multiple failures, compounded
with new theories of material, equipment, and operator failure began to drive conservative
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estimates to below normal operating envelopes. As such, new statistical approaches, such as
‘best-estimate’ became necessary.
The CNSC accepts best-estimate evaluations that utilize reasonable approximations of
operating conditions. Best-estimate embeds uncertainties into measurements and simulations
and presents statistical ranges of outcomes. Best-estimate methods now make up the general
methodology of tripping threshold determination in Canadian CANDU [57], [23]. The
CNSC’s best-estimate methodology is discussed in section 2.5.
Notably, best-estimate is very similar to the USNRC proposed methodology: Code
Scaling, Applicability, and Uncertainty (CSAU) evaluation. Proposed in NUREG/CR-5249,
CSAU uses statistical modelling of uncertainties [58]. Uncertainties are carried through the
simulation of the design basis event, remaining a statistical distribution of possible outcomes.
One other notable methodology of uncertainty estimation is the ‘partially-conservative’
methodology [59]. The partially conservative methodology is a mathematically simplified
means to evaluate the uncertainty of the NPP measurements and models. Often, the partiallyconservative approach requires only a single calculation to be made for uncertainty. In an
example given [59], this methodology produced similar results to a much more complex bestestimate evaluation. However, this methodology is not always applicable. A complete analysis
through best-estimate is subsequently required in scenarios when this methodology cannot be
utilized.
2.5.2

Methodologies without Design Basis Events
The design basis event is the most prevalent means of set point determination. By

protecting against the worst-case scenarios, less severe events are assumed to be protected
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against. This approach is taken as an NPP has too many fault and damage scenarios to simulate
and evaluate exhaustively.
However, the IAEA recognizes that the safety margin may not be possible to calculate
in some scenarios [52]. This obstacle can be circumvented by the demonstration that these
incalculable situations are less severe (and thus under the umbrella) of the design basis events.
These scenarios must still be evaluated to demonstrate that their presence will not increase the
risk or consequences of other events. This may be done qualitatively if quantitative arguments
are impossible [52].
There are also probabilistic safety targets. These complement deterministic analysis
with technical judgement and experience [52]. These are utilized when safety margins cannot
be explicitly determined and must be evaluated statistically. Probabilistic-safety-margins thus
replace traditional safety margins, defined as the breadth maintained between the safety target
and acceptance criterion.
There have been investigations to evaluate ‘worst-than-reasonably-imaginable’
scenarios [60]. These ‘Beyond Design Basis Events’ follow the same principles as the design
basis event, but place the NPP in a worse scenario that can be reasonably encountered. These
assume faster temperature increases, instantaneous coolant losses, and other conditions that are
not perceivably possible. This methodology seeks to protect NPPs from events not yet
encountered or imagined [60].
Vigorous statistical analysis of tripping set point determination may be done using
extreme value statistics and Monte Carlo simulation [61], [62]. Because these rely on statistical
analysis, they utilize CNSC adopted ISA ‘95/95’ principle: the 95th percentile worst case with
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95% confidence [63]. These methodologies are computationally heavy but intrinsically
generate confidence levels in set points they determine.

2.6 Best Estimate and Uncertainty Analysis
Canadian CANDU traditionally utilized the Limiting Operating Envelope (LOE)
methodology [23]. This was a conservative approach that focused on worst case scenarios.
The base assumption is that every key parameter is simultaneously operating at their worst
case value for the event, even when this is not possible. A number of deterministic assumptions
are also utilized [23]. These include simultaneous power losses, total failure of an SDS, partial
failure of the other, and more. The LOE method thus builds an envelope of safe operations for
the key parameters.
Recently, CANDU plants in Canada have moved towards the Best-Estimate and
Uncertainty Analysis (BE+UA) methodology [23]. This has a number of benefits including


More realistic predictions of plant behaviour, increasing confidence in predictions



Resolve many outstanding safety questions by verifying their benignity



Utilizes a more narrow range on parameters used in code validation



Realistic plant behaviours breed familiarity for operators in diagnosing events



Makes use of past analysis results, permitting incrementally improved analysis



Potential to relax certain operating parameters

The BE+UA code requires sufficient certification and demonstration of prudence in order
to be accepted by the CNSC. The methodology works with a number of generalized steps [23]:
(1) Identification of the facility, event of interest, and acceptance criteria
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All relevant traits of the facility, including its operating state, the performance of its
equipment, and location must be specified. The analyzed event must be completely identified.
This includes postulated initiating event, sequence of assumed failures, and actions of
operators. At this point, the acceptance criteria must also be stated with justification. It must
be demonstrated to the CNSC that all threats posed have been covered. Validated models must
be available to facilitate the BE+UA method for the selected criteria.
(2) Important phenomena and key parameters
Important phenomena must be identified and adequately modeled by computer codes.
The parameters are ranked according to importance to the event. Uncertainty and sensitivity
must be considered when ranking parameters [37].
High ranking parameters may use statistical uncertainties as they propagate through the
code, or may use conservative values including the 95/95 principle [37]. Medium parameters
are to be placed at their conservative values and low ranking parameters may be handled in
any method.
(3) Analytical tools
The analytical codes used must satisfy the CNSC’s criteria by demonstration of adequate
modeling of important systems, phenomena and equipment. Code must demonstrate accurate
and stable algorithms and verified interfaces for data transfer. Scaling must documented and
verified. Outputs of all sections of code that are either acceptance parameters or the input of
another code must include their bias and variance at the 95 percent confidence level [37].
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(4) Deterministic assumptions
Deterministic assumptions introduce a measure of conservatism by postulating multiple
failures and worst case scenarios.

Deterministic assumptions are to be included and

documented. Examples include LOCAs at worst case locations rather than most likely,
crediting only one SDS with proper functioning, partial failure of shut-off rods, etc [37].
(5) Analysis input parameters
For every analysis, each relevant design and modeling parameter must be discovered. The
size of the sampling set required to achieve the pre-determined confidence levels on the
parameter characteristics (standard deviation, type of distribution, etc.) must be determined
and realized. Equipment testing frequency must be decided to capture trends, covariances, and
operational data, especially the effects of ageing [37].
If operational data is to be pooled, it must be demonstrated that the other unit, even if
it is from the same facility, must be free from systematic differences. This includes design,
equipment, and operating procedures. Only information gathered from the same operating
state being analyzed is applicable [37].
(6) Quantification of uncertainties
There are three major sources of parameter uncertainties:


Operational uncertainty results from variability, trends, measurement errors,
instrument drift, etc.



Design uncertainty results from allowances, fabrications tolerances, measurement
errors, test and calibration accuracy, etc.
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Modeling uncertainties come from scaling effects, unmodeled processes,
simplifications, nodaliztion effects, numerical solution schemes, etc.

Uncertainties must be characterized quantitatively with conservative envelopes.
Distributions must be fully realized and integrated into parameter ranking and uncertainty
assessment [37].
(7) Integrated uncertainty assessment
The uncertainty of output parameters of interest must be generated. Extremely low
probability values must be included. The CNSC requires 95/95 conformance with acceptance
criteria. At this stage, confirmation of parameter ranking should be performed. Sensitivity
studies must now be performed to ensure all parameter behaviours have been identified [37].
(8) Expert judgement
Expert judgement should be minimized as much as practical. CNSC has established rules
for the use of expert judgement. These rules address the identification of areas where expert
opinions are logical and needed, the qualifications of experts, integration of judgements,
references of supporting information, and documentation of recommendations made.
Posteriori confirmation of judgement must be made when possible [37].
(9) Validation of the analysis
Sufficient demonstration must be performed to verify that non-characterized operating
states are bounded by the analysis. If operating states cannot be verified to be covered by
analysis, new analysis must be performed. Operations and procedures that have been covered
by the analysis must be documented such that unusual operations (e.g. deliberate operation
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changes due to impairment of equipment) may only persist for a limited time. Longer unusual
operations (e.g. repairs) must be analyzed separately [37].
Adequate procedures for monitoring and updating plant parameter behaviours must be
created.

Compliance with analysis assumptions should continue to be verified through

statistical observance. A ‘shelf life’ of the model should be created using these statistical
observances [37].
(10) Non-typical plant states
As BE+UA focuses on most likely states and conditions, additional assessments must be
performed. Operating procedures such as reactor upsets, equipment failures, operation with
defective fuel, fueling operations, start-up/shutdown, etc. must also be performed, or verified
to be enveloped by previous analysis [37].

2.7 Testing and V&V Methods
It is essential that all aspects of nuclear safety systems achieve high reliability
standards. To measure their compliance it thus becomes necessary to quantize reliability.
Traditionally, this was done by investigating lifetimes, probability of breakdowns, or
likelihoods of events that would lead to device malfunction. A system’s reliability must be
quantized before certification may be achieved.
Digital systems and software, such as those of computer based shutdown systems,
present inherent difficulties in the certification. Traditional failure-rate calculations cannot be
applied to non-physical systems as their failure methods are often not related to aging and wear
[24].
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However, there are analysis criteria and tools designed specifically for hardware and
software of nuclear safety systems. It is always first essential to divide software programs into
categories based upon their degree of criticality to safety. Standardized methods include
STUK’s safety classes of Finland and the IEC’s Safety Integrity Level [64], [65]. The safety
criticality determines the required reliability and necessary testing.
Once reliability requirements are found, the IEC recommends the Process Assessment
Standard 15504, referred to as ‘SPICE’ [66]. Used mostly in the prequalification phase, SPICE
assesses the capability level of each sub-process of the software [24]. SPICE follows a
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) which defines user requirements for the application [66].
After PHA, there is a Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) which traces accidents back to
their possible causes. This determines the most critical tests and evaluations, which SPICE
then investigates.
2.7.1

Canadian Requirements
Canadian requirements for safety systems are summarized in CNSC R-8 document [6].

Canadian safety philosophy focuses on high performance requirements rather than specific
methodologies [23]. The R-8 performance requirements focus on the effectiveness of the
shutdown systems, but do have some requirements for the safety logic.
The R-8 contains 15 design basis events. Each design basis event must be readily
identifiable through at least two different parameters [22]. The system must be able to operate
autonomously, and must perform in a manner such that all requirements of the SDS are met.
Further, the system must be self-diagnosing, notifying control room operators of any failures
that might interfere with its function [22].
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Canadian law dictates safety systems must adhere to the requirements for diversity and
separation [22]. There must be redundant channels which are independent and physically
separate. Like with SDS, the multiple, redundant safety systems must not be dependent upon
one another in any way, and their functioning or malfunctioning must not interfere with the
effectiveness of other safety systems [22].
2.7.2

Verification and Validation
V&V is a standardized concept in nuclear systems [45]. V&V provides a systematic

means to determine the proper design and implementation of the system. It is divided into:
Verification: The system, as it has been designed, has been successfully realized and
performs without error.
Validation: The design fulfills all user requirements, with capability demonstrated.
The V&V process is meant to provide substantial evidence that not only has ‘the work
been done right’, but also that ‘the right work has been done’. USNRC guidelines for software
V&V are outlined in NUREG-0800 [41]. This focuses on clear outlining of requirements,
objectives of testing, design best practises, and testing methods.
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Requirement

Verification

System Test

Design

Implementation

Integration Test

Validation

Component Test

Figure 2.5: Simplified V&V Diagram
The V&V process for digital systems can be summarized with the ‘V-diagram’, as
simplified in Figure 2.5. Each task on the left is related to tests on the right. Systematic testing
ensures both the implementation and the design have been performed correctly.
Following Figure 2.5, the end requirements are specified first. These are the final
criteria by against which the system will be held accountable. The design is then built off of
these requirements. Implementation of the design is then performed and the system is thus
realized.
Component testing then follows to ensure that the implementation has been performed
to standard. Once each component is verified, integration tests confirm the design has been
successfully realized. Finally, system tests examine whether the initial requirements, those
created in the first task, have been fulfilled.

44
Physical models, such as HIL systems or the NPCTF, aid the V&V process as testing
platforms. Being capable of testing components, their implementation, and their overall
success on a physical process demonstrate design capability. As the NPCTF uses its physical
dynamics, rather than modelling, less compatibility alterations need to be made, making it an
ideal V&V platform for safety systems.
2.7.3

IEEE Std. 1012
IEEE Standard 1012 is the ‘IEEE Standard for System and Software Verification and

Validation’ [31]. IEEE 1012 aids in:
a) Creation of requirements for software, and
b) Determining software conformity to said requirements
IEEE 1012 encompasses all aspects of the software including interaction with hardware
and system requirements.

Further, it outlines lifetime requirements for development,

maintenance, and reuse [31]. It contains risk/hazard analysis outlines and determinants for
integrity level (not to be confused nuclear safety integrity levels (SIL)) [31].
The IEEE 1012’s V&V effort requires documentation of objectives and methods used
to satisfy them [31]. Each desired integrity level performs the same primary activities. At each
objective, there are five to fifteen subtasks. Quantity of subtasks performed corresponds to the
desired integrity level [31]. These primary steps and their descriptions are in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: IEEE Std. 1012 Process Steps.
Task V&V Activity
Description
Software Concept
Describing the specific solution, avoiding false
1
assumptions, specifying system requirements in hardware,
software, and HMI
Software
Specifies performance, interface, data definitions, human
2
Requirements
factors, installation and acceptance, operation and
maintenance
Software Design
Uses task 2 to create a detailed design for each software
3
component. Ensures design is correct, accurate, and
complete.
Software
Design is transformed into code, structures, and machine
4
Construction
executables. Verifies this transformation is correct and
complete.
Integration Test
Each component (unit or module) is incrementally
5
integrated. Assure system requirements allocated to
software are valid.
Qualification Test
Assure the integrated software product satisfies its
6
requirements.
Software Acceptance Assure software satisfies acceptance criteria. Opportunity
7
to allow customer to accept the produce.
Installation and
Tested in target environment.
8
Checkout
Software Operation
Evaluates impact of changes in operating environment.
9
Assesses system changes and operating procedures.
Software
Changed in response to need for system maintenance.
10
Maintenance
Includes modifications, migration, and retirement.
Software Disposal
Supervises deactivation or disassembly of software
11
product. Ensures elements are properly stored or destroyed
as required.
Subtasks relate to traceability, criticality, and hazard, security, and risk analysis [43].
Each subtask in the standard further includes specific means of analysis.

2.8 Safety PLC
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) were first created in the 1970s during
manufacturing’s conversion from mechanical to digital systems. PLC make use of relay style
logic for simplicity but possess computational abilities. This allows complex commands,
diagnostics, and other functions [67].
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PLC are mechanically simple, possessing only four major components: Power Supply,
CPU, I/O, and Indicator LEDs [67]. PLC maintain a simple: take inputs, process information,
set outputs functioning. This is summarized in Figure 2.6. The IEC standardizes PLC in the
IEC 61131 [68]. Part 3 of the standard covers the standardized programming languages. These
are: sequential function charts, instruction lists, structured text, ladder diagrams, and function
block diagram [69]. These languages are interchangeable when the logic is consistent.

Figure 2.6: CANDU Shutdown Systems Control
PLC is steadily being accepted into nuclear industries. PLC are replacing relay based
systems due to superior usability, reliability, and availability [70]. The latter two aspects make
PLC particularly attractive for safety applications. The USNRC defines these terms as [70]:
Availability: The fraction of time that the system is actually capable of performing its
mission.
Reliability: The probability that a device will function without failure over a specified
time period or amount of usage.
The separation between PLC units for safety opposed to other plant operations is
defined under a single principle: Safety PLC include two processors working in parallel,
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running diverse logic for the same operations, continually cross-checking values against one
another. The advantage in this is threefold: First, all calculations are double checked, so that
there is mathematical redundancy as well as physical; second, diverse logic prevents CCFs that
could occur through incorrect or incomplete logic; and third, two processor units allows one
of the units to take over should a failure occur.
Commonly, the IEC Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is used to evaluate these systems [68].
Based on the probability of ‘failure on demand’, an SIL is given. Safety PLC reach levels of
3 and 4, whilst other units are typically 1 or 2. SIL rates are given in Table 2.6.

SIL
1
2
3
4

Table 2.6: Safety Integrity Levels
Probability of Failure on Demand
10-1-10-2
10-2-10-3
10-3-10-4
10-4-10-5

The USNRC standardizes safety PLC requirements in NUREG-6090 [70]. This
standard covers criteria for intelligence, I/O structure, power supply, communications, error
handling, and more. It also lists a number of recommended features, including [70]


Module hot-swapping



RAM battery back-up and battery monitor



System battery back-up



Redundancy



Fault tolerance



Acceptable system availability



Clearly defined fail-safe modes
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In order to minimize the V&V required, software and hardware is kept to a minimum.
CANDU 600 units utilize PLC that lack operating systems, interrupts, keyboards, displays
other than LEDS [67]. The software used consists of only 3000 words of EPROM and 100
words of RAM. It runs a single endless loop that passes every 35ms, in which every other pass
is comprehensive self-test.
Since 1982, Canada has used PLC units in three of their plants, utilizing thirty-six
systems in total [67]. There has since been no spurious trips nor failures to trip due to PLC
malfunction. Self-checking features have always notified operators of hardware failures, with
failure-to-repair time taking less than two hours in each instance [70].
USNRC approval for safety systems has been achieved by only four PLC devices [71].
These devices are Westinghouse Common Q, AREVA TELEPERM XS (TXS), Invensys
Triconex, and HFC6000. These four devices have met USNRC highest criteria in reliability
and availability are thus considered safe enough to utilize in the RPS.

2.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides the necessary background for the proposed work. Several key
topics are introduced and discussed for relevance to RPSs.
First, an explanation of the CANDU reactor is given. Using the neutron dynamics of
the reactor core, the importance of the protection scheme is demonstrated. Primarily, why the
system must respond quickly, as well as why it must continue to operate, are explained using
the concepts of runaway and decay reactions.
Next RPSs for CANDU plants are discussed. The two systems, SDS1 (cadmium
shutdown rods) and SDS2 (gadolinium nitrate injections) are presented mechanically alongside
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their controlling units. The design methods for these systems are then presented. Necessary
design features such as monitoring parameters, redundancy, and diversity of design are
reviewed to complement the challenges they exist to meet: damages, failures, and CCFs
respectively.
The methodologies of choosing tripping set points are given. The design basis event is
presented alongside standard methods of determining uncertainty. These lead into BE+UA
analysis, the current methodology used in Canada. This leads into testing and V&V methods.
This section visits the Canadian requirements, discussing the CNSC R-8 regulatory document.
Further, the American equivalent for software (the NUREG-0800) shows the necessary steps
for V&V in software systems.
Finally, safety PLC are discussed. Their performance in Canada since 1980 show these
units to be highly reliable and available when utilized in CANDU NPP. Their desirable
qualities working with nuclear safety are listed, making their selection as the control units for
the RPS logical.
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3 Cross-Comparison of NPCTF and CANDU NPP Signals
3.1 NPCTF Overview
The NPCTF is a physical recreation of a thermal power plant scaled down for IC
research [72]. Though pressures, flow rates, and temperatures are reduced, the design produces
similar responses to full NPP [2]. The NPCTF may operate in different configurations though
the third generation CANDU is the default [72]. The system is capable of safely injecting
faults and other conditions safely. The physical simulation replicates these scenarios so that
control, safety, or other systems may be tested against them [72].
From a themal-hydrolic point of view, the NPCTF is a double loop thermal plant [72].
The water heater replaces the boiler as the thermal source. The steam generator has been
replaced with a high efficiency heat exchanger. Primary loop temperature drop across the heat
exchanger is measured, and the pneumatic system drives the turbine proportionally [72].
Pressure is maintained through a pressurizer, and a water chiller acting as the condenser
completes the major components.
The NPCTF is capable of simulating a wide variety of thermal plants. Thus, the
pressurizer, the chiller, or both may be disabled or bypassed [2]. Initialization may load control
schemes specific to these configurations. This customizability increases the variety of designs
available for equipment or design testing. An exact schematic can be seen in Figure 3.1 [72].
Note the primary loop is filled with water as coolant while the turbine loop utilizes air supplied
from an external source.
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Figure 3.1: The NPCTF Schematic.
Electrically, the NPCTF is controlled through an ABB AC 700F controller [72], [73].
However, the ABB may be disabled and control turned over to an external system through a
junction box [72]. This junction box includes all analog signals from the NPCTF in 4-20mA
sources and all digital leads in short/open configuration [72]. The inputs for the system work
possess same specifications. In total, there are 90 I/O ports by which to control or monitor the
NPCTF [72].
As previously stated, the NPCTF is capable of safely simulating faults. This trait makes
it an ideal platform with which to perform safety system V&V. The NPCTF allows the user
to override the control system, opening or closing nearly every valve [72]. Additionally, there
are manual release valves that drain into containers [72]. The ABB controller may deactivate
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any major system or force values through the commands of the external controller [72]. This
simulates emergency conditions such as pipe breaks, clogs, equipment failures, sensor misreadings, and more.
The NPCTF uses industrially standard devices for near all components (examples given
as [74-76]). Most NPCTF valves are Belimo B2 series, 2-way control valves [77]. These
valves are driven by LF24-SR actuators [77]. These give 4-20mA readings of their current
position and may be configured as normally open or normally closed. The full range actuation
time is 150 seconds [77]. This rate is important as it characterizes response times, insertion of
valve-based faults, and overall system dynamics.
As stated, the main controller is an AC 700F by ABB. This possesses a Class 1
Division 2 certificate under ISO 9001 [73], [78]. The AC 700F operates according to the IEC
61131 (programmable controllers) standard and verified under part 2 (equipment
requirements) [73], [68], [79]. The controller is drastically quicker than any of the mechanical
components of the system with response times as quick as 2ms [73]. This allows stable control
even during the presence of most faults.
The controller has not been configured to operate the NPCTF optimally. Rather, its
programming provides characteristics more similar to that of an NPP [2]. As an example, the
shrink and swell phenomenon is simulated with the steam generator tank. More on this
phenomenon is in section 3.2: Key Operating Characteristics.
During the work performed, the NPCTF was configured as a CANDU NPP (i.e. two
loops with both pressurizer and chiller). The faults inserted were physically manifested such
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that real, rather than simulated, dynamics were observed. This allowed a more thorough V&V
of the safety algorithm through exposure to more valid NPP failures.
3.1.1

Comparison of CANDU NPP and NPCTF Parameters
The NPCTF is a high fidelity mock-up, but it is not an NPP. There are differences that

must be recognized during the design and testing phases. Each major aspect of the NPCTF
has been compared with its CANDU equivalent. These differences are summarized in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1: Comparison of Major Features between CANDU and NPCTF.
Item
Typical CANDU Range
Typical NPCTF Range
Source Outlet Temperature
310⁰C
30⁰C
Pressure
1,400 PSI(g)
7.25 PSI(g)
Main Pump
1.17MW
22W
Primary Flow Rate
38,000 l/min
6 l/min
Temperature: CANDU fuel bundles operate around 2000⁰C [6]. However, the
coolant’s greater volume means CANDU reactors have inlet and outlet temperatures of about
265⁰C and 310⁰C respectively [6]. The NPCTF does not have fuel bundles, but has standard
20⁰C inlet and 30⁰C outlet temperatures [2].
Pressure: The primary line of CANDU reactors are pressurized at, using Pickering as
an example, 1,400PSI(g) [6]. This is heavy water in the primary line but has nearly identical
fluidic dynamics. By comparison, the NPCTF uses light water at pressures centering at
7.75PSI(g).
Main Pump: Many CANDU systems use multiple pumps in the primary loop. Plants
like Bruce use four 9,000HP pumps, while Pickering uses 12 pumps at 1,570HP, about
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1.17MW [11]. It’s worth noting the primary pump is the largest ‘in-house’ load for the station.
The NPCTF uses a single primary pump that runs up to 22W [80].
Primary Flow Rate: With Pickering as an example, there is a nominal CANDU
flowrate of 10,100 gallons per minute (~38,000 litres/minute) [6]. Often measured in lbs/hr,
this represents 61,300,000 lb/hr. NPCTF primary flow rates nominally centre at 6 l/min.
The NPCTF possesses a single heater, steam generator, and pump in the primary loop.
It operates at lower temperatures and uses light instead of heavy water in the primary line. No
steam is generated in the NPCTF; instead, a high efficiency heat exchanger [81] connects the
chiller and primary loops. The primary loop’s incoming and outgoing temperatures are used
to calculate energy loss which determines the simulated turbine speed.
The heater simulates a nuclear reactor but has different operating characteristics.
Current has been used as a rough parallel for neutron activity. However, control of current is
much quicker than control of neutron economy. Control rods make slow changes while the
heater current is capable of quick responses that maintain constant heat [82].
The heater shutdown does not follow the same neutron activity dynamic of an NPP.
Typical NPP shutdown curves appear below in Figure 3.2 [82] for a LOCA scenario when both
the reactor protection system does and does not shutdown the reaction. Notice that in the
shutdown scenario the LOCA occurs at on second, the trip is initiated at 1.44s, and normalized
reactor power, though beneath 0.25 by 3s, does not manage to reach 0 by the end of the
simulation. Contrarily, the NPCTF completely shuts down the current when shutdown is
detected.
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Figure 3.2: Typical Shutdown Curves of a Nuclear Reactor.

Figure 3.3: The Current Drop of NPCTF

3.2 Key Operating Parameters on NPCTF
As stated in section 2.3: Design of Reactor Protection System, CANDU safety systems
typically use eleven key parameters to monitor the health of the system [37]. The NPCTF
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lacks a nuclear reactor and thus not every parameter is paralleled. However, many CANDU
parameters do have equivalents in the NPCTF, as displayed in Table 3.2:
Table 3.2: Parallel Parameters between CANDU Shutdown Systems and the NPCTF.
CANDU Critical Signal
Absolute/Conditional NPCTF Equivalent
High Neutron Power
Absolute
None
High Rate of Rise of Neutron
Absolute
None
Power
High Coolant Pressure
Conditional
Primary Loop Pressure (P1)
Low Coolant Pressure
Conditional
Primary Loop Pressure (P1)
High Building Pressure
Absolute
None
Low Steam Generator Level
Conditional
HX Tank Level (L4)
Low Pressurizer Level
Conditional
Pressurizer Level (L3)
High Moderator Temperature
Absolute
Heater Outlet Temperature
(T2)
Low Coolant Flow
Conditional
Primary Water Flow (F1)
Low Steam Generator Pressure
Conditional
HX Tank Pressure (P2)
Manual Shutdown
Absolute
Manual Release Button
CANDU separates absolute and conditional tripping parameters. Absolute parameters
remain active at all times, while conditional are disabled during start-up and shut-down. This
prevents spurious tripping while flow, pressure, or water-levels are reaching their operating
ranges.
All parameters on the NPCTF have been designed to display dynamics similar to their
respective equivalents [2]. However, there remains some discrepancies. To investigate each
parameter, the NPCTF was first operated for nearly 50 non-continuous hours.

This

investigated steady state operations in addition to transients. These properties were then
statistically analyzed for trends so the dynamics of safe operation could be characterized.
From this point in the investigation, the NPCTF was assumed to operate at one of three
defined operating points: 25⁰C, 30⁰C, and 35⁰C heater outlet temperature. Though any value
in this range is possible, specifying operating ranges greatly simplified the investigation and
design. The found properties of the six key parameters are given in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.6.
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3.2.1

Primary Loop Pressure
Primary loop pressure is designated at P1 in the NPCTF schematic. It is monitored by

an American Sensor Technologies AST4100 compact pressure sensor [72]. The AST4100
sensor has an accuracy of < +/- 0.5% BFSL, including non-linearity, hysteresis, and nonlinearity [74]. The 4-20mA range has been formatted to give a range of 0-25PSI(g).
Within the NPCTF, the primary loop pressure experienced little change across all
operating conditions. As the pressurizer maintains the primary loop pressure, the range stayed
consistently between 7.2PSI(g) and 10.55PSI(g). 44 hours of operations is shown in Figure
3.4.

Figure 3.4: Operating Characteristics of Primary Pressure.
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Primary loop pressure varies very little, even through several operating point
transitions, as demonstrated in Figure 3.4. This general stability lead to the primary loop
pressure being designated as a heater-independent parameter in the safety system design. The
maximum and minimum values at various points for a single 5 hour operating period with each
set-point met atleast once are shown below in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Maximum and Minimum Values of Primary Pressure Related to NPCTF
Operating Point.
Heater Set Point
Minimum Value
Maximum Value
7.545 PSI(g)
8.022 PSI(g)
25⁰C
7.885 PSI(g)
8.116 PSI(g)
30⁰C
7.675 PSI(g)
8.203 PSI(g)
35⁰C
3.2.2

Pressurizer Level
The pressurizer’s water level is designated as ‘L3’ in the NPCTF schematic [72]. This

parameter is measured by an American Sensor Technologies AST5100-Wet low differential
pressure transmitter [72]. The AST5100 possesses a <+/- 1.0% of FS accuracy and has been
configured in the 0-10 inch (0.0-0.254m) H2O (25mbar) option [75]. The level in inches is
converted to a percentage of the maximum level of the pressurizer (i.e. 0-100% full) before
transmission in 4-20mA.
The pressurizer level is also heater-independent. The pressurizer’s level did respond
to transients, though these were highly transient. Pressurizer level over 44 hours is shown in
Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Operating Characteristics of Pressurizer Level.
Pressurizer level performs many quick drops, as shown in Figure 3.5. When operating
point changes occurred, a water level drop would develop then quickly clear.

This

characteristic was later included into safety system design. When the system was free of faults,
the minimum pressurizer level was 49.2% and the maximum was 52.3%. The histogram in
Figure 3.5 shows how water level operated principally at 50% or 50.4%, with strays from these
two values occurring rarely. Pressurizer level also dropped dramatically during the presence
of faults, as will be shown later. The maximums and minimums during a normal operations
trial are shown below in Table 3.4. Note that start-up transients have not been included.
Table 3.4: Maximum and Minimum Values of Pressurizer Water Level Compared to
Heater Operating Points.
Heater Set Point
Minimum Value
Maximum Value
49.595
50.405
25⁰C
50.318
50.492
30⁰C
49.798
50.405
35⁰C
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3.2.3

Primary Water Flow
Primary water flow is the flow rate of the NPCTF’s coolant through the primary loop

[72]. This water flow is responsible for transportation of heat in the primary loop. The flow
rate is designated as F1 in the NPCTF schematics [72] and is measured by Lake Monitors’
FlowStat – Turbine Flow Sensor [76]. The flow sensor was configured to measure in
litres/minute with a range of 2-60 l/m. Using the 1/2 inch porting, the flow sensor possesses
+/- 2% FS accuracy [76].

Figure 3.6: Example of Flow Characteristics of Primary Loop.
As with loop pressure and pressurizer level, the primary flow rate is heaterindependent. However, flow rate exhibits considerable jitter. The jitter is fairly uniform around
a midpoint in a Gaussian white noise fashion. However, there are rare occurrences of large
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spikes momentarily observed during operations. These are solitary and do not indicate a
disturbance when observed transiently.
Flow rate over 44 hours is shown in Figure 3.6. The jitter manifests as a thickness in
the first subplot. As shown, the jitter is consistent and the flow average flow rate remains does
not deviate greatly during normal operations. The maximum and minimum flow rates for
various heater operating points during an example trial are shown below in Table 3.5. Note
that this Table again excludes outliers.

Heater Set Point
25⁰C
30⁰C
35⁰C
3.2.4

Table 3.5: Flow Rate in Relation to Heater Set Point
Minimum Value
Maximum Value
6.201
6.627
6.234
6.817
6.237
6.822

HX Tank Pressure
HX tank pressure (P2 in the NPCTF schematic [72]) is the final of the four heater

independent parameters. Like the primary loop pressure, the HX tank pressure was measured
by an American Sensor Technologies AST4100 [72], [74].
The HX tank pressure possessed considerable noise though remained within a tight
envelope during operation. Though exhibiting tumultuous start-up, HX tank pressure was
found to be largely independent of other conditions in the NPCTF. The maximum and
minimum values as related to heater operating point are listed in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: HX Tank Pressure vs. Heater Operating Point.
Heater Set Point
Minimum Value
Maximum Value
4.890
5.252
25⁰C
4.767
5.187
30⁰C
4.753
5.136
35⁰C
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HX tank pressure’s independence from heater current is visually demonstrated in
Figure 3.7. Note the range on the y-axis.

Figure 3.7: Example of Operating Characteristics of HX Tank Pressure.
3.2.5

Heater Outlet Temperature
Heater outlet temperature (T2 [72]) was the main reference points for the state of the

system. The temperature was measured by the intempc MIST03 Temperature Sensor [72], an
RTD with a built-in programmable transmitter [83]. Like all of the NPCTF sensors, it outputs
4-20mA linearly for measurements ranging from 0-50⁰C in the model chosen. The NPCTF
utilizes three of these sensors at the heater output, mimicking an NPP’s triplicated
measurement for reactor heat.
Heater temperature was the reference utilized for operating point changes. When at
specific operating points, heater outlet temperature remained fairly consistent. This is partially
demonstrated by Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Actual Heater Temperatures at Operating Points.
Heater Set Point
Minimum Value
Maximum Value
24.638
25.550
25⁰C
29.354
30.758
30⁰C
34.013
34.910
35⁰C
This consistency was maintained by the ABB controller’s direct control of heater
current. Values listed in Table 3.7 are only valid for periods when the heater temperature has
been given sufficient time to settle into its operating point. It should be noted that the heater,
even at the set point of 35⁰C, is incapable of achieving a temperature of 35⁰C under normal
operating conditions. The heater itself is a 7.5kW Gaunmer process C15P3N18T2 circulation
screw-plug heater [84].
Transition time between operating points was crucial for characterizing the NPCTF.
Using the defined operating points, maximum observed transition times between the 25⁰C,
30⁰C, and 35⁰C set points are listed in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Transition Times for Heater Outlet Temperature.
Transition
Time (s)
178
25⁰C -> 30⁰C
1011
30⁰C -> 35⁰C
1242
25⁰C -> 35⁰C
20
35⁰C -> 30⁰C
57
30⁰C -> 25⁰C
166
35⁰C -> 25⁰C
The direction and magnitude of the step strongly influenced the time required for
transition. The largest upwards step, 25⁰C to 35⁰C, requires nearly 21 minutes to complete,
while the smallest downward step lasted at longest 20s.
These times were utilized in the design of the safety system under the assumption that
an unusually long transition could indicate a fault.

As examples, transitions upwards

progressing too slowly may indicate reactor issues, while too slowly downwards may indicate
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coolant leaks. Transitions briefer than expected could likewise indicate concerns with coolant
flow.

Figure 3.8: Demonstration of Transition Steps between Heater Outlet Set Points.
Figure 3.8 shows the measuring method for transition time. The transition is defined
as commencing when the operating point is changed (time = 0s in Figure 3.8) until the heat
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arrived at and stayed within the maximum and minimum values observed during settled
operations without exiting the range again.
3.2.6

HX Tank Level
The HX tank level (L4 [72]) possessed the most complex characteristics amongst

parameters investigated. Steam generators present inherent difficulties in their control [75].
The HX tank level, like the pressurizer level, was measured by an AST5100-Wet low
differential pressure transmitter [75] and likewise converted to a 0-100% of full range
measurement.
Steam generators exhibit the ‘swell and shrink’ phenomenon [85]. This phenomenon
creates strong inverse response characteristic from the steam generator level as the result of
strong compressive forces acting on the water/steam barrier in the tank. This is a two-step
process [85]:
1) Decreasing the level of the steam generator: steam flow rate increases and thus
pressure decreases. The two phase fluid composite expands and swell occurs. (a
sudden increase in level)
2) Increasing the level of the steam generator: steam flow rate decreases and steam
bubbles within the two phase fluid composite collapse under the pressure increase.
The liquid water flows to occupy the void and shrink occurs (a sudden decrease in
level)
The NPCTF mimics this effect as the heat and pressure is insufficient to produce a twophased liquid. Its control characteristics imitate swell and shrink to increase fidelity to an NPP.
The general set points the level are listed in Table 3.9.
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Table 3.9: The HX Tank Level Operating Points Related to Heater Outlet
Temperature Operating Point.
Heater Set Point
Minimum Value
Maximum Value
48.901
68.895
25⁰C
51.505
75.608
30⁰C
74.421
81.912
35⁰C
The control loop of the HX tank level targeted a specified fraction (typically 80%) of
the heater current’s own percentage of maximum output. I.e. operating at 70% of maximum
current would set the operating point for HX tank level at 0.8x0.7= 56% of its maximum value.
However, multiple simulated effects resulted in difficulty attaining these targets.

Figure 3.9: Swell and Shrink in HX Tank.
HX tank level is stable when settled but may settle at any point in a wide range for any
given operating point. The eventual safety algorithm importantly had to also compensate for
the simulated swell and shrink phenomenon. An example operation of HX tank level can be
seen in Figure 3.9.
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As the HX tank level is dependent on heater current, it too was measured for transition
times. The maximum observed times under normal conditions for each step is shown in Table
3.10:
Table 3.10: Maximum Transition Times for HX Tank Level.
Transition
Time (s)
218
25⁰C -> 30⁰C
171
30⁰C -> 35⁰C
255
25⁰C -> 35⁰C
492
35⁰C -> 30⁰C
457
30⁰C -> 25⁰C
494
35⁰C -> 25⁰C
These times do not include the inverse response characteristic, which typically persists
for two to eight minutes. Notably for the downwards transitions, the transition time required
after the inverse response is independent of the step size. These processes were predictable
though highly variable. These times have been used to aid the safety system in discerning
whether the HX tank level is transitioning in a manner consistent with safe operations.

3.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter investigates the operating characteristics of the NPCTF. First, the NPCTF
is discussed in detail. Its thermal-hydraulic configuration is discussed, alongside its fault
insertion capabilities. The I/O and other communication devices are presented due to their role
in the connection between the NPCTF and the designed control system. Next, CANDU NPP
are compared to the NPCTF to quantify differences. The primary discovery is that though the
NPCTF is substantially scaled down, this scaling is internally consistent, validating tests
performed upon it.
The key operating parameters for the NPCTF are then discussed in detail. For each of
these parameters, operating ranges are given, alongside minimum and maximum values
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observed. The parameters are split into two distinct groups: Heater-Independent (those whose
operating points do not change with heater current) and Heater-Dependent (those whose
operating points do change with heater current). The heater-independent variables are primary
loop pressure (P1), pressurizer level (L3), primary water flow (F1), and HX tank pressure (P2).
The dependent parameters are heater outlet temperature (T2) and HX tank level (L4). For the
heater dependent parameters, maximum observed transition times are discussed.
In summary, this chapter presents the necessary information for the design of the RPS.
By observing the characteristics of the NPCTF under normal operating conditions, the
implemented algorithm will be able to distinguish when conditions are aberrant and thus in
need of a shutdown.

69

4 Implementation of Reactor Protection Systems Using
HFC6000
4.1 Overview of HFC6000
The HFC6000 (HFC) is a PLC nuclear safety system developed by HF Controls [86].
The HFC is designed to perform functional safety control and is designed though not limited
in scope to nuclear applications [87]. The HFC is the most recently developed product in
Doosan’s safety system product line. It was released in 2005 alongside its process control
sister system, the ECS-1200 [86]. The system has three different models: FPC08, SBC06, and
SBC04 [87]. The major difference between these three models is their eponymous main
processing units. The remaining configuration is customizable according to the needs of the
project [87].

Figure 4.1: HFC6000 Front Pane
For the work performed, the SBC06 model was used. The SBC06 is a multiple loop
controller [88]. SBC06 models are able to access up to 1024 I/O points, dealt with through
two I/O independent interface channels. The HFC and its previous iterations have been tested
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in the USA and Korea continuously since 2001 [87]. The HFC itself began testing in the
United States in 2003. Meanwhile, all updates, additional details, and any new parts have been
continuously verified [86].
The HFC boasts a number of important features related to safety. Because it is an
exclusively safety based system, all of its control, data, and communication links are dedicated
[87]. It has considerable personal redundancy, and is hardened to nuclear and electromagnetic
radiation.
Importantly, each of the processors are duplicated to achieve redundant control. On
each remote controller, two main processors are tied to a single piece of dual port memory
(DPM) [88]. The processor keeps status of being primary or secondary within its twin pairing
so that the slave processors respond accordingly and the couple effectively as a unit. Should
the processor be in primary mode, all of its public memory data is constantly transferring to
the DPM, while in secondary mode the DPM contents are constantly imported into public
memory [88]. This ensures constant congruence and a smooth transition can occur in case of
failover.
The DPM also defines the HFC as a safety PLC. Because the cross-checking processors
use parallel calculations, considerable reliability is added. The safety PLC is now able to verify
its own decisions with a parallel unit receiving the same signals, decreasing the likelihood of
error. This represents not only redundant hardware, but redundant calculations as well. Further,
because of the failover characteristic, a spontaneous failure in a safety PLC does not
immediately compromise the health of the system.
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For a full discussion and diagram of the HFC/NPCTF interface refer to Section 4.4 and
Figure 4.20. Discussion of the interface and functioning of the HFC requires first a discussion
of the relevant hardware and implemented software.
4.1.1

The SBC06 Processor Board
Each SBC06 remote includes an Intel386 [89] system processor (SYS), with at least

two dedicated communication processors [88].

SYS acts as the master while the two

communications processors (ICL and C-Link) act as slaves.

The ICL controls the

intercommunication link: the link which interacts with I/O modules by transferring data to and
from instrumentation and control devices [88]. The C-Link controls the communication link:
the data exchange between intelligent devices [88]. Finally, the SYS is responsible for
coordinating the other processors, running the applications, and monitoring the overall system
status [88].
The SYS requires an application program [88]. This program contains five files: the
I/O Configuration Table, the Equations File, the Block Request Table, the Blocks List, and the
Block Data File. These files are written by the engineer and are the main software body of the
system. The five files make up four structures (the blocks list and block data file are a single
structure) which are created on an engineer’s work station [88]. Once compiled using the HFC
utilities, the structures are either burned into a PROM or loaded onto a flash memory depending
on the safety level the application is controlling [88]. The function of each file is as follows:


Equations File: Contains the logic of the system through a series of sequential
statements typically displayed as ladder logic. Equation statements will each
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perform a mathematical operation or make a call to one of the analog block
algorithms


I/O Configuration Table: An exhaustive list of the I/O hardware included in the
system. The ICL may have a maximum of 64 slave station addresses, with
digital locations and necessary data types for devices are stored in the I/O
configuration table.



Block Request Table: Specifies what information the remote will broadcast to
other devices over the C-link and information received will be written into the
station public memory.



Blocks List: Stores the structure of analog database points (called CQ4 blocks
in the HFC system) so that they may be called by the equations file.



Block Data File: Contains the static data about the blocks. This static data
includes the types of algorithm used and internal configuration parameters
required by each.

In the C-link, each node is referred to as a ‘remote’ and given a specific number. Each
C-Link processor’s remote regulates, interfaces, receives, and validates messages sent over the
C-link using a Master-For-a-Moment token passing method [88]. C-Link processor only
interacts with the other processors in the same controller only through the Public Memory [88].
The C-link uses a network interface chip transmission buffer to store outgoing and incoming
data before broadcast or transfer [88].
The ICL processor uses a proprietary design to control communications between a
controller and its respective I/O modules [88]. The ICL processor works as master with all IOs
operating as slave nodes, constituting a closed and single network. The ICL will always be the

73
instigator in communication with its devices [88]. In regular communication, the ICL will
request updates from input channels or send digital images to the output channels. The ICL
can also send ‘special messages’ which include diagnostic requests, secondary loop back
requests, memory read/write commands, and more [88].
4.1.2

The I/O Cards
Each I/O card uses an onboard 16 bit processors [90]. These processors contain

firmware code written in EPROM for initialization, diagnostics, ICL communication, I/O scan,
and data processing functions. These processes are nearly identical for all I/O regardless of
types, with the exception of the scan and data processing functions which are unique and based
on the type of I/O [90]. I/O modules include onboard LEDs for visual status indication, jumpers
for configuration options, signal processing capabilities for each input, and similar card edge
connectors.
The I/O typically runs a single string of routines [90]. First, the I/O scan, in which input
channels are read or the current image from memory is written to output channels. Data
processing is next executed if necessary. After, self-diagnostic routines constantly check for
errors or unintentional changes in code and memory until the next schedule I/O scan.
4.1.3

Engineering Workstation (EWS)
The Engineering Workstation (EWS) is the combined hardware and body of software

responsible for writing and compiling software to the HFC [91]. It gives the user a single set
of tools to create, read, or modify all application software in the system and is capable
automatically documenting all worked performed by engineers or operators on the EWS [91].
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There are limited database structures that can be created and recognized by the HFC.
These structures are outlined in Table 4.1[91].

Point Type
BL
CO
DI
DO
DG
FL
MS
RR
ST
TI
VA

Table 4.1: Valid Equation Point Types.
Definition
Structure
Block Value
8 Bytes
Counter
2 Byte Integer
Digital Input
2 Byte Quality Word
Digital Output
2 Byte Quality Word
Digital Group
6 Byte Data Structure
Flag
1 Bit
Message
2 Byte Quality Word
Remote Status
1 Bit Flag within 5 Byte Field
CQ4 Strategy
11 Byte Structure
Timer
1 Byte Status and 2 Byte Integer
Value
2 Bytes (Integer)
4 Bytes (Floating Point)

These point types constitute the data structures that are usable within the equations list
program. The coding may be configured as either structured text or ladder logic in compliance
with IEEE Code 61131-3 [69].
These are written and operated using the Equations Editor (EE) custom software [91].
The equations editor gives the engineer access to the five files of the SBC06 discussed
previously. To facilitate debugging or observation of code, the EE may ‘Monitor’ activities.
When active, the EE will show the values of all blocks, inputs, outputs, flags, counters, etc.
while the program runs. These values are only updated per second for the benefit of the
operator/engineer [91].
The EWS includes the Memory Editor application which allows an operator to read
from the remote directly [91]. The user is thus able to read statuses (with knowledge of the bit
field of the point type), observe digital and analog inputs and outputs, and write directly to the
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remote. The Memory Editor is also able to requests statuses from devices and take roll calls
of all modules, remotes, and blocks on the C-link [91].

4.2 Soft Boundaries
As outlined previously, the heater-independent parameters possess a degree of
variability. Particularly, the nature of pressurized flow causes the primary flow rate to be
inherently noisy [32] and pressurizer level produces quickly fading transients in response to
operating point changes. In order to adequately provide protection for the NPCTF, the history
of operations was used as a basis for creating ‘soft boundaries’. These boundaries would only
result in a trip if a breach persisted for several moments.
Soft boundaries allow operating bounds to remain stringent without needless risk of
spurious tripping.

To determine the appropriate ‘softness’ for boundary breaches,

investigations of NPCTF operating history were examined. Hypothetical tripping thresholds
were investigated for expected breaching frequency and maximum lengths. From these,
tripping set points and permissible breach lengths were decided.
The soft bounds approach is also used in CANDU tripping logic [33]. In CANDU, the
primary loop over pressure condition uses two tripping set points [34]. At the first set point, a
relief valve is opened and a timer is set. If the relief valve does not clear the issue within three
seconds of initial breach, a trip occurs [34].

Contrarily, the second tripping set point

immediately initiates a reactor trip [34].
Following this precedence, it was determined that set points shall utilize three second
buffers. Especially safety-sensitive bounds such as reactor power (paralleled through C2) and
moderator temperature (paralleled through T2) should never be given soft boundaries.
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However, the heater-independent parameters do not present the same immediate action
requirement. Thus, three second soft boundaries are reasonable to recognize the presence of
faults without compromising system safety.
4.2.1

Primary Line Flow (F1)
Primary line flow, as all pressurized flow measurements, is inherently noisy [32]. The

primary line flow was chosen to, like CANDU [33], utilize only a lower limit. Too little flow
is a danger due to inadequate cooling to the reactor, though a high flow rate possesses no
inherent dangers so long as pressure is maintained.
Table 4.2: Breaching Characteristics of Primary Flow Rate as a Function of Lower Boundary
Point.
Boundary Breaches/Day Longest
Time
(l/min)
Breach
Breaching/Hour
5.6
0.00
0
0.00
5.625
0.00
0
0.00
5.65
16.59
1
0.69
5.675
99.52
1
4.15
5.7
442.23
1
18.43
5.725
1559.10
1
64.96
5.75
3875.63
2
161.71
5.775
7751.26
2
325.04
5.8
12876.38
2
541.35
5.825
21860.54
2
928.13
5.85
33349.21
5
1482.85
5.875
45385.22
7
2299.48
5.9
52705.24
10
3326.21
5.925
54087.42
16
4569.94
5.95
53180.71
27
5822.43
5.975
50936.06
41
7094.72
6
48492.36
94
8381.07
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Figure 4.2: Breaching Characteristics of Flow Parameter as a Function of Lower
Boundary Point.
The characteristics of the flow rate in relation to the boundary point are shown in Table
4.2 and Figure 4.2. As Table 4.2 shows, operating history suggests that normal operations will
never breach a set point of 5.625 l/min. However, to tighten the operating limits and utilize
CANDU paralleled 3s maximum breaching, the set point was set at 5.75 l/min. A theoretical
3875 breaches are expected to occur at daily this set point though none longer than 2s. The
flow rate is anticipated to be below this boundary set point for an expected 162s every hour.
A 3s breach of this set point creates a strong indicator for the presence of a fault. The
5.75 l/min limit is demonstrated for the primary flow in Figure 4.3. Sample points from faulty
trials are included in Figure 4.3 to display characteristics of primary flow during adverse
conditions. As shown, many faults, though not all, would disrupt flow and could thus be
identified.
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Figure 4.3: Characteristics of Primary Flow Rate in Healthy and Faulty Operating
States.
4.2.2

Primary Line Pressure (P1)
For primary line pressure, the set points that would be needed if soft boundaries were

not an option would be 7.2 PSI(g). However, as proof of concept, a two second boundary
could be placed at 7.25PSI(g) as shown in Table 4.3. This 0.05PSI(g) difference leads to an
average of almost 28 breaches per day, with an estimated average of only 1.61s of breaching
per hour. Indicative of primary line pressure’s characteristics, an additional 0.0725PSI(g)
would have increased the longest permissible breach from 2s to 11s. The exact progression of
the boundary in relation to its breaching characteristics is shown in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
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Table 4.3: Breaching Characteristics of Primary Line Pressure as a Function of Lower
Boundary Point.
Boundary Breaches/Day Longest
Time
Breach
Breaching/Hour
7.150
0.00
0
0.00
7.175
0.00
0
0.00
7.200
0.00
0
0.00
7.225
5.53
1
0.23
7.250
27.64
2
1.61
7.275
33.17
2
1.84
7.300
204.56
4
11.75
7.325
619.22
11
41.47
7.350
1288.19
27
109.65
7.375
1730.49
27
198.11
7.400
2095.38
85
308.69

Figure 4.4: Breaching Characteristics of Primary Line Pressure as a Function of Lower
Boundary Point.
The 7.25PSI(g) lower soft boundary was matched to an upper soft boundary of
10.5PSI(g). This was found using the information in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5. The operating
history necessitated a maximum breaching time of 2s. This turned the only two second timer
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used in the safety algorithm. The next reasonable boundary, 10.45 PSI(g) have forced a
maximum permissible breach of at least 9s. This is too long for fault detection. While the
boundary could be set 10.525 as a hard limit, the 10.5PSI(g) point still saw a theoretical 22
breaches per day that could incorporated into the protection scheme.
Table 4.4: Breaching Characteristics of Primary Line Pressure as a Function of Upper
Boundary Point.
Boundary Breaches/Day Longest
Time
Breach
Breaching/Hour
10.200
93.99
76
29.26
10.225
105.05
55
25.57
10.250
116.10
28
22.58
10.275
99.52
22
17.97
10.300
99.52
17
13.82
10.325
93.99
17
10.14
10.350
60.82
17
8.29
10.375
38.70
17
6.22
10.400
16.59
17
4.38
10.425
16.59
16
4.15
10.450
11.06
9
3.46
10.475
27.64
1
1.15
10.500
22.11
1
0.92
10.525
0.00
0
0.00
10.550
0.00
0
0.00
10.575
0.00
0
0.00
10.600
0.00
0
0.00
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Figure 4.5: Breaching Characteristics of Primary Line Pressure as a Function of Upper
Boundary Point.
Notice that the breaches per day decreases when the boundary is moved from
10.475PSI(g) to 10.45PSI(g). This is due longer breaches being considered a single instance,
whilst noise along boundaries are counted as many short boundary trespasses.
The primary line pressure was therefore granted a 3.25PSI(g) operating envelope. The
total operating range compared against the heater current is shown in Figure 4.6. The upper
boundary was a poor indicator of faults in the data collection trials, as it was never breached
during fault insertion. The lower boundary was the opposite, with sudden pressure drops being
a common result of faulty conditions.
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Figure 4.6: Characteristics of Primary Pressure in Healthy and Faulty Operating States.
4.2.3

HX Tank Pressure (P2)
Though HX tank pressure was not prone to responding to inserted faults, steam

generator pressure is part of CANDU’s safety system design. HX tank pressure, as steam
generator pressure’s parallel on the NPCTF, was necessary to include. It must be noted that
the high pressures, temperatures, and potential for primary-to-secondary leaking in steam
generators make their monitoring vital [38]. Table 4.5 and Figure 4.7 show the breaching
characteristics of the HX tank as a function of its lower operating bound.
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Table 4.5: Breaching Characteristics of HX Tank Pressure as a Function of Lower Boundary
Point.
Boundary Breaches/Day Longest
Time
Breach
Breaching/Hour
3.100
0.00
0
0.00
3.125
0.00
0
0.00
3.150
0.00
0
0.00
3.175
0.00
0
0.00
3.200
0.00
0
0.00
3.225
11.46
8
3.58
3.250
5.73
60
14.33
3.275
5.73
60
14.33
3.300
5.73
61
14.56
3.325
5.73
61
14.56
3.350
5.73
62
14.80
3.375
5.73
63
15.04
3.400
5.73
64
15.28
3.425
5.73
66
15.76
3.450
28.65
68
20.78
3.475
114.61
134
100.04
3.500
143.26
281
172.63
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Figure 4.7: Breaching Characteristics of HX Tank Pressure as a Function of Lower
Boundary Point.
As is shown, HX tank pressure does not exhibit a significant noise nor is it prone to
quickly fading transients. HX tank pressure keeps steady values that change slowly. Thus, the
soft boundary principle could not be applied and traditional set point for tripping was set. As
can be seen, from the chosen lower set point of 3.2PSI(g) a rise of just 0.025PSI(g) moves the
longest recorded healthy breach to 8s with an expected 11.5 breaches per day. These breaches
were determined to be too long to be safely considered and thus the 3.2PSI(g) hard set point
was necessary.
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Table 4.6: Breaching Characteristics of HX Tank Pressure as a Function of Upper Boundary
Point.
Boundary Breaches/Day Longest
Time
Breach
Breaching/Hour
5.550
17.19
88
30.56
5.575
28.65
43
22.21
5.600
17.19
34
11.94
5.625
5.73
13
3.10
5.650
0.00
0
0.00
5.675
0.00
0
0.00
5.700
0.00
0
0.00
5.725
0.00
0
0.00
5.750
00.00
0
0.00

Figure 4.8: Breaching Characteristics of HX Tank Pressure as a Function of Upper
Boundary Point.
The upper boundary presented similar breaching characteristics, as shown in Table 4.6
and Figure 4.8. The inherent nature of HX tank’s pressure required 5.65PSI(g) to be chosen as
a hard upper set point. A pressure as high as 5.65PSI(g) had never been met or breached during
healthy operation. Because of this, it is believed that breaches of this bound are abnormal
enough to provoke immediate response.
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Figure 4.9: Characteristics of HX Tank Pressure in Healthy and Faulty Operating
States.
The final operating range permitted HX tank pressure to operate between 3.2PSI(g) and
5.6PSI(g). Operation history shows that the HX tank’s pressure would not exhibit behaviour
in response to other conditions on the NPCTF. The HX tank pressure also was not a strong
indicator of faults in the system, as demonstrated in figure 4.9. However, for the reasons
discussed, boundaries on safe operations must remain.

The safety system therefore

immediately responds to pressures outside of the previously observed envelope.
4.2.4

Pressurizer Tank Level (L3)
Pressurizer tank level was arguably the best indicator for the existence of faults in the

NPCTF (as will be demonstrated section 5.5: Experiment 2: Emergency Scenarios). The
pressurizer level remains stable during normal operations. However, when the operating point
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on heater outlet temperature is changed, the pressurizer tank level produces a quickly fading
transient.
The pressurizer tank level remains near its operating point of 50%. The investigation
showed a drop of 0.5% to lower boundary produced 2s maximum healthy breach. This is shown
in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.10 with the 49.5% boundary theoretically producing less than six
breaches daily. The pressurizer level’s variations, even at the transients, was slight enough
than an additional 0.1% produced no historical record of a breach during healthy conditions.
The consistency in the breaches per day in the second column of Table 4.6 show that
pressurizer transitions tended to dip the pressurizer level to near 49.425% before returning to
the operating point.
Table 4.7: Breaching Characteristics of Pressurizer Tank Level as a Function of Lower
Boundary Point.
Boundary Breaches/Day Longest
Time
Breach
Breaching/Hour
49.350
0.00
0
0.00
49.375
0.00
0
0.00
49.400
0.00
0
0.00
49.425
5.59
1
0.23
49.450
5.59
1
0.23
49.475
5.59
1
0.23
49.500
5.59
2
0.47
49.525
5.59
6
1.40
49.550
78.28
6
4.66
49.575
2918.82
12
184.76
49.600
5764.96
69
797.50
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Figure 4.10: Breaching Characteristics of Pressurizer Tank Level as a Function of
Lower Boundary Point.
The upper boundary produced similar characteristics as a 51.5% threshold gave
identical characteristics in breaches per day, longest breach, and estimated time breaching per
hour. The same number of breaches per day is expected for boundaries from 51.425% to
51.6%. This indicates the parameter would only occasionally travel from its operating point
before steadily returning. Choosing the 51.5% soft boundary comfortably placed a 3s timer on
breaches. This is outlined graphically and in detail with Figure 4.11 and Table 4.8 respectively.
From these, it is possible to deduce that the pressure’s progression back to the operating point
slowed as it neared its previous value.
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Table 4.8: Breaching Characteristics of Pressurizer Tank Level as a Function of Upper
Boundary Point.
Boundary Breaches/Day
Longest
Time
Breach
Breaching/Hour
51.350
229.26
31
53.82
51.375
201.30
5
11.88
51.400
22.37
5
1.86
51.425
5.59
3
0.70
51.450
5.59
2
0.47
51.475
5.59
2
0.47
51.500
5.59
2
0.47
51.525
5.59
1
0.23
51.550
5.59
1
0.23
51.575
5.59
1
0.23
51.600
5.59
1
0.23

Figure 4.11: Breaching Characteristics of Pressurizer Tank Level as a Function of
Upper Boundary Point.
As demonstrated in Figure 4.1.11, when a fault occurs, the level of the pressurizer tends
to drop as the pressurizer attempts to maintain pressure in the system. The level’s deviation
from its normal operating bounds between 49.5% and 51.5% was almost always indicative of

90
a fault. It is visible in Figure 4.12 that increases in pressurizer level due to faults is not as
common of a characteristic.

Figure 4.12: Characteristics of Pressurizer Level in Healthy and Faulty Operating
States.

4.3 Description of Implemented Monitoring Software
The development of the safety algorithm necessitated several steps to be created. First,
the investigation of NPCTF operating characteristics was performed with results as discussed
in section 4.1. This was done over fifty hours of non-continuous operation on the NPCTF. The
NPCTF uses a data-logger that samples each system parameter every second on a 72 hour
continuous loop [2].
The data logger exported the recordings to a CSV file where they were converted to
excel then read by Matlab. The data logger works on a continuous loop such that the most
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recent sample point is the exact moment the data is extracted. As not all NPCTF recordings
can be converted to CSV simultaneously, corrections for time difference were performed.
Matlab scripts were written to sort the data into usable and organized portions. Using
current to the heater as a reference, a parallel to neutron power on CANDU systems [93], points
of activity were isolated and similar operations grouped. Initial results were presented in
section 3.2: Key Operating Parameters. This allowed statistical analysis after a high-level
overview sorted the data by type (healthy, faulty, steady state, transitional, etc.).
Later, the sorting algorithm was utilized to investigate the faults’ theoretical responses
from the safety algorithm. Though signals from internal calculations on the HFC could not be
recorded, these Matlab simulations provided a framework to estimate the algorithms
functioning. For more on this, see section 5.1 Matlab Simulation and Verification Tests.
Observation was performed primarily on CANDU safety parameter parallels.
However, control valves were also observed. The safety algorithm created imitates CANDU
safety logic, though has been built for the NPCTF, for which bounds, settling times, and
responses to state changes are all based.
4.3.1

Algorithm Overview
The algorithm utilizes operation history on the NPCTF to anticipate future operations.

Though safety systems do not participate in control of an NPP [94], their development requires
knowledge of normal operations as discrepancies between observed and anticipated may
indicate faults. However, because safety systems are not control systems, it is not able,
responsible, or accountable for correcting perceived errors [94].
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The NPCTF flow of operations is therefore imitated in the safety algorithm. The safety
systems expectations of operations are used determine when faults exist. The overall flow of
the safety system as it monitors the NPCTF is described functionally in Figure 4.13

Evaluate
Current

Start-Up

Transition?

NonTransitive
Bounds

Transitive
Bounds

Shutdown

Fault?

Figure 4.13: Overview of Safety Algorithm.
Figure 4.13 shows the general overview of the major operating features of the
algorithm. The major operations are as follows. Each is further expanded upon in the
following subsections.


Start-Up: Handles low power state of NPCTF. Recognizes when operations have
begun through monitoring of current. When operations are determined to have begun,
start-up procedures pass off to the main operating loop.
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C2 Tracker: Distinguishes the NPCTF’s operating point. Performs this task utilizing
C2 signal as parallel to CANDU neutron power. Relies on several seconds of memory
and thus requires substantial memory. C2 tracker is responsible for noticing and
characterising the current spikes which precede transitions. May jump to shut down if
C2 begins to deviate from normal ranges.



Non-Transitive Building: Builds boundaries using flags set by C2 tracker and other
subsections. Heater-independent parameters are first calculated. Calculates heaterdependent boundaries if transition flag is inactive, otherwise jumps to transitional
boundaries subsection.



Transitive Boundaries: Collection of four blocks in 4.13: Heat Up, Heat Down, Level
Up, and Level Down. Each contains two stages that anticipate and monitor heaterdependent parameters through transitions. Use calculations requiring flags from C2
Tracker and one another.



Check Boundaries: Parameters are compared against their tripping set points. If one
of the five soft boundaries is breached, a timer begins. If a timer expires or one of six
hard boundaries is bypassed, a trip signal is sent. If a trip is not necessary, the program
jumps to the C2 tracker.

4.3.2

Start-Up Procedure
Start-up procedures are the necessary first tasks. Their collective duties are to initialize

the program then stand-by until power output dictates a jump to operations. Like CANDU, the
NPCTF continues to monitor C2 and T2 in this low power state. However, conditional bounds
are not yet being checked against.
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Figure 4.14: Functional Block Diagram of Start-Up Procedures.
The flow chart of the start-up subsection is shown in Figure 4.14. It contains three
major sections:


Initialization: All data blocks on the HFC are configured and initiated appropriately.
This includes analog inputs, which must have scan times and remote numbers
designated. Flags, counters, and digital inputs are set to logic low to protect against
aberrant start values. All timers must be created and given pre-set values. Default
tripping set points are set, though only absolute set points will be checked against.



Start-Up Monitoring: Current is monitored for magnitude above 25% of its maximum
value. This is below the lowest operating range but indicates operations are beginning.
CANDU plants utilize a 2% full-power threshold to distinguish active to inactive states
[94]. After approximately two minutes above 25%, transients of start-up are finished
and normal operating procedures may begin. It must be noted the 35⁰C operating point
is unobtainable after two minutes and may not be the initial state.



Absolute Threshold: Heater current and temperature are monitored. As absolute
thresholds, excessive heat or current require observance at all times.

Heater
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temperature (T2) is compared against the upper bound of 30⁰C as this is the highest
possible initial operating point.
4.3.3

Boundary Procedure
After start-up, the safety system runs a single continuous loop.

The boundary

procedure is responsible for setting operating limits and comparing these against system
parameters. The general overview of the boundary procedure is shown in Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.15: Functional Block Diagram of Boundary Checking Procedure.
The boundary procedure assumes that the appropriate flags have been set by the C2
tracker so it can build the appropriate bounds or know to outsource this to other subprograms.
The procedure operates as follows:


Non-Transitive Bounds: As the heater-independent parameters utilize persistent
operating bounds, they are set first. These boundaries are declared at each iteration as
a safeguard against corrupted or lost data.



Transitive Boundaries: The ‘spike’ flag indicates a transition state in the NPCTF. If
this is active, the boundary routine jumps to the heat transition. After both temperature
and HX tank level boundaries have been set, a jump returning to the boundary
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procedure is performed. If the flag is inactive, the heater-dependent parameters are set
according to operating point.


Boundary Test: The parameters are compared against their created threshold. For soft
boundary breaches, timers continue to decrement. Soft-bounds not breached reset their
respective timers. If timers have expired or hard thresholds have been breached, a trip
will occur. Should no trip be necessary, the algorithm jumps to the C2 tracker.

4.3.4

Heater Current (C2) Tracking
The heater current (C2) tracking subroutine requires significant data, approximately

25% of total memory used. The C2 tracker utilizes heater current history to perform three
major tasks: First, it determines the present operating point. Next, it notices, characterizes, and
tracks operating point transitions. Finally, it observes C2 for drift of aberrant behaviour. An
overview of its functioning is presented in Figure 4.16 and expanded upon below.

Figure 4.16: Functional Block Diagram of Current Tracking Program within Safety
Algorithm.
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Block Shift: A memory shift of C2 recordings is performed. Each recording is
shifted one stage with the oldest being overwritten. A new recording is placed
into the first memory location.



Spike/Transition Detection: C2 will always spike in response to an operating
point change. As such, current spikes signal transitional procedures. Should
no spike flag be active, C2 is compared to the second-most recent measurement
to determine directional change. A C2 spike check is then performed. If a new
spike is found, the direction is already known and the flag is set. This flag
remains set until cleared manually.



Current Drift: In CANDU, reactor control mechanism keep neutron power
stable [12]. As parallel, the algorithm monitors C2 to ensure unintentional drift
does not occur. C2 is compared to a look-up table for appropriate measurements
based on operating point. If outside this range, a counter is incremented. This
counter monitors for 2s of non-continuous drifting and trips upon occurrence.
Drift is automatically false during transitions.



Operating Point Determination: During transitions, it is necessary to
determine the new operating point. Current is considered settled if two minutes
non-continuous are spent within that range. This uses a penalty method:
decrements occur when the range is exited. Upon settling, the appropriate flag
is set. This flag is used in boundary and drift checks.

4.3.5

Heat Transition Algorithm
As heater temperature varies with set-point, proper handling of its transitions is

required. Monitoring ensures a safe and predictable progression. The handling for temperature
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transitions is similar for increases and decreases in set point, allowing a single sub process to
be used. This process is shown functionally in Figure 4.17.

Figure 4.17: Functional Block Diagram of Heat Transition Program within Safety
Algorithm.


Initialization: Initialization is performed on behalf of both transitional
subprograms. Flags from the C2 tracker determine the most likely step being
taken. Timers are set and started for all transitions, regardless of likely step.
Upon completion, the ‘stage 1’ flag is set so initialization is not repeated.
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Bounds: Bounds are established using step flags, transition timers, and stage
flags.

As transitions occur near quadratic fashion, the general boundary

transition formula used is:
𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 −

(𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙)
1
(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)2
2
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟

This permits smooth transitions between two operating states. The ‘factor’ is a
constant that jumps the transition part way to the next boundary immediately.
This was necessitated by the quick change at the beginning of transitions. The
factor was 3.5 for leading bounds (upper in upwards steps and vice versa) and
1 for the lagging. This value was found empirically to perform in all
investigated transitions. When multiple steps were possible, the highest upper
and lowest lower bound plausible were used until the correct step was
identified.


Current Settling: Current must settle for the transition to continue, though this
is quick compared to other parameters. When detected, the flags are reevaluated so step-uncertainty may end. The stage 2 flag is set and temperature
settle tracking may begin.



Temperature Settling: Heater temperature is monitored for settling within the
projected range. This requires 40s within the final range, using a penalty
method. When temperature has settled, a flag is set, and tripping thresholds are
built using values of regular boundary operations.

(8)
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4.3.6

Level Transition Algorithm (Up)
HX tank level transitions required different subsections based on direction of step. This

is due to magnitude difference of inverse response characteristic (IRC) and overshoot.
Upwards HX tank level transition have smaller IRCs and greater overshoot. A flow chart of
the level transition algorithm (up) is presented in Figure 4.18.

Figure 4.18: Functional Block Diagram of Level Transition (Up) Program within
Safety Algorithm.


Test for Settled Current/Stage 1: Upwards steps begin with a delay or small IRC. The
lower boundary is lowered slightly to accommodate possible IRC. Upper boundary is
unchanged. Current settles within 40s and signals the beginning of stage 2.
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Bounds: Using flags set by the C2 tracker, transitional bounds are built. No uncertainties
exist as current has already settled. The lower bounds progress according to:
𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 = 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 −

(𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙)
(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒

(9)

This guides the lower boundary smoothly, and requires no factor term. The upper
boundary is immediately set to 10% over its maximum value to accommodate
overshoot. HX tank level variability and overshoot make a transitive upper boundary
implausible.


Level Settling: The level is monitored for settling. This is defined as 2 minutes noncontinuous within final range with penalty for exiting. The penalty and length required
prevents falsely flagging settling while overshoot persists. Overshoot may persist for
several minutes. When the conditions are satisfied, the settled flag is set and thresholds
are calculated using normal boundary procedures.



Transition Finish: When both heat and level flags are active, the transition is finished.
All flags and counters of both transitions are reset, including the transition indicating
spike flag.

4.3.7

Level Transition Algorithm (Down)
The level transition algorithm (down) is separated due to the significant IRC exhibited.

The IRC is so pronounced that the stages of the level-down subroutine are separated by its
completion. The process is shown in Figure 4.19.
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Figure 4.19: Functional Block Diagram of Level Transition (Down) Program within
Safety Algorithm.


Initialization: The initial HX tank level is recorded so it may be compared against
later. The stage 1 flag is set so this value is not rewritten.



Inverse Response Characteristic/Stage 1: The IRC dominates the first stage and
must be cleared before progressing. The upper threshold is raised by 20% to give space
for the IRC, while the lower is unchanged. A timed delay occurs before checking for
completion of the IRC, as there is a delay before the IRC manifests.

After the delay,

the HX tank level is compared against the value recorded during initialization. When
HX tank level is below this point, stage 2 begins.
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Bounds Building: Using flags set by the C2 tracker, transitional boundaries are built.
This utilizes the same linear equation from the upwards transition for the upper
boundary, while the lower boundary immediately takes it final value. Overshoot is
negligible and thus not considered.



Level Settling: The level is monitored for settling. This is defined as 2 minutes noncontinuous within final range with penalty for exiting. When the conditions are satisfied,
the settled flag is set and thresholds are calculated using normal boundary procedures.



Transition Finish: When both heat and level flags are active, the transition is finished.
All flags and counters of both transitions are reset, including the transition indicating
spike flag.

4.4 Overall System Diagram
The overall connection between the HFC, the NPCTF, and its relevant communication
are outlined in detail in Figure 4.20. Note that while the HFC initiates the shutdown during
the implementation, this is done through the NPCTF’s onboard computer. Further, because
the shutdown action of the heater is handled digitally, the shutdown of the heater is again
handled through the onboard controller. The separation of heater dependent and heater
independent parameters, as well as the flow of logic when characterized in hardware are shown
graphically in Figure 4.20.
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Figure 4.20: HFC and NPCTF Hardware/Software Logical Diagram
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4.5 MATLAB Simulation of Developed Software on NPCTF
Operations
A simulation on Matlab was performed to ensure overall functionality. This was
performed using the operations history of the NPCTF then building a mock replication of the
safety logic to upon it. This permitted incremental improvements, calibration, and analysis of
theoretical internal states.
Safeguards were taken to ensure conversion between HFC and Matlab was seamless as
possible. Variable names and permissible values were identical between the two sets of code.
An ‘update’ script was used increment time while ensuring counters, timers, and other blocks
kept within the maximum ranges available. Flagging was implemented, then identical logical
statements of the HFC ladder logic were created.
Importantly, unlike HFC ladder logic, Matlab does not permit coding jumps. Jumping
was instead imitated through careful looping (which HFC does not permit) and additional
flagging to enable or disable segments of code.
Simulations were an extension of the initial sorting algorithms used to investigate the
NPCTF characteristics and design the safety logic. The faux coding made obvious certain soft
boundaries or conditions that were either too stringent or lenient. It further revealed errors in
jumping logic that would have been otherwise missed.
One product of the simulations is the penalties used in determining settling. As stated
in section 4.3, there is a penalty utilized when transitive parameters strays from their final
boundaries. This necessity was discovered through Matlab simulation, as premature settled
flags resulted in spurious tripping. The penalty was chosen as the optimal solution as longer
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settling periods or resetting timers resulted in inappropriately long transition periods. These
prolonged transitions caused spikes from new set point changes to go unnoticed, subsequently
causing spurious tripping.

Figure 4.21. Theoretical Boundary Evaluation during Transition
In Figure 4.21, the heater temperature is shown in its transition in blue, the heater
current in black, and the algorithmically calculated boundaries in striped red. The simulation
software made visible the values of the theoretical boundaries at any given moment. The figure
demonstrates the progression transitions: the current spike is detected, boundaries frame their
respective parameter, and the transition is cleared after settling.
In Figure 4.22 the simulated status of flags during a transition is shown. This allowed
the theoretical state logic of the coding to be observed and debugged. This capability exposed
flaws in logic statements as discussed earlier. As an example of the safety algorithm’s process
and interpreting of transitions, an example is giving in Figure 4.22.

107

Figure 4.22: Level Transition Flags Simulation.
In the example, the transition flag, direction flag, and 25⁰C -30⁰C transition flag all go
‘high’ in the same clock cycle (tall black, short black, and green respectively), at approximately
8500 seconds.. It can be seem through the high status of the direction flag that the algorithm
recognizes the jump as positive. The algorithm makes the default assumption that the upwards
transition from a 25⁰C indicates a 25⁰C -30⁰C transition. This is an incorrect assumption,
though is satisfactory for the first stage of the transition.
At approximately 8600 seconds, the current to the heater has settled to its new operating
range. The algorithm therefore forces the 25⁰C -30⁰C transition flag to go low, and
simultaneously raises the 25⁰C -35⁰C flag as a correction. This transition continues in the
correct state until approximately 9500 seconds.
At this point, nearly 17 minutes after the beginning of the transition, the transition flags
are cleared by the algorithm. The transition has ended and the algorithm has returned to
monitoring the direction and operating point of the current in its typical method. The Matlab
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simulation, through examples such as this, provide insight into the operations and logic of the
system much more quickly and thoroughly than would be possible otherwise.
The factor term discussed in section 4.3.5 heat transition was created due to simulation.
As demonstrated in Figure 4.23, the initial drop by the heater temperature during the operating
point change necessitates the factor term. It may be readily observed the heater temperature
would surpass the lower boundary early in its transition without the factor term. The term was
calibrated by observing the minimum fraction successful in all investigated scenarios. The final
value was chosen as 3.5, rounded out from approximately 3.2.

Figure 4.23: Sudden Drop in Heater Temperature.
As will be discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.5, the set points and timers of simulation were
used to demonstrate the HFC’s logic during live trials. Tripping parameters and state processes
discussed in chapter 5 were determined through the Matlab simulation.
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4.6 Theoretical Shutdown Time
A system shutdown as initiated by the RPS will follow through a number of discrete
steps. The total time for this produces a maximum theoretical time between breach of trip setpoints and a full system shut off. These steps, along with their maximum required time are as
follows:
1. Parameter breaches set-point: Each safety parameter is read by industry grade analog
sensors as discussed previously in this chapter. This breach is t=0ms and it is assumed,
for this purpose, that the sensor produces an instaneous response
2. The HFC reads the new signal: The HFC analog inputs have been programmed to read
all analog inputs every 100ms. In the worst case scenario, the breach takes place
immediately after one reading, requiring a full 100ms until it is detected.
3. Processing and output: The SBC06 response time is listed at 50-100ms [90]. The worst
case scenario, given that the output of the shutdown signal would occur on the same
cycle as detection, is thus 100ms.
4. The NPCTF controller detects the shutdown signal: Once received, the shutdown signal
must be recognized in the interface by the NPCTF’s ABB controller. The controller
has a 2ms refresh rate, and this is taken as the maximum time required [73].
5. Rod drop: The rod gripper is deenergized and the shutdown rod falls towards the
shutdown sensor. This distance is 40cm. Thus, it is assumed the descent requires
approximately. At 40cm, this time is approximately 285ms.
6. Detection of dropped rod: This is again handled by the ABB controller. With the same
2ms refresh rate, it is then assumed the heater can be shutdown instaneously from this
point.
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The total time is then 489ms with HFC response time taking at maximum 200ms. This
is beyond the resolution of the NPCTF’s capability to record, which is 1s. It is then taken that
the total time of shutdown, including rod drop and heater shutdown, will be within one
recording cycle of the NPCTF.

4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter focuses on the design and implementation of the RPS. The HFC is
presented as the choice of PLC unit with details of use its design and relevant applications
expanded upon. Following, thresholds for the heater independent parameters are given after
expansion of their breaching characteristics. The primary flow rate is chosen to have a lower
boundary at 5.75 l/min with a 3s timer; the primary line pressure has a 7.25PSI(g) lower
boundary and a 10.5PSI(g) upper boundary with 3s and 2s timers respectively; the HX tank
pressure is given 3.2PSI(g) and 5.65PSI(g) lower and upper boundaries; and pressurizer tank
level is given a 49.5% and 51.5% lower and upper boundaries, each with 3s timers.
Next, the implemented monitoring algorithm as implemented on the HFC is presented
logically. The algorithm is a single loop after start-up, with 6 major subprocess including the
initialization/start-up. These major subprocesses are: start-up, boundary procedure, heater
current tracking, heat transition, level transition (up), and level transition (down). The various
flags and pieces of information passed between these subprocesses control the creation of
boundaries such that faults may be identified.
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5 Verification and Validation
5.1 Summary of Tests Performed
V&V procedures necessitated several stages of testing. The V&V procedures further
aid in discerning the source of errors: faulty code, equipment failures, incorrect
implementation, or poor design. Revisiting the Figure 2.4 of Section 2.6, the following stages
have been performed:
Requirements: A full RPS for the NPCTF is to be realized. This is to parallel a
CANDU safety system. The requirements are discussed in chapter 1. Specific safety aspects
of CANDU are discussed in section 2.3: Design Methods of RPSs.
Design: The safety system is designed using characteristics found during investigation.
The investigation is discussed in chapter 3.
Implementation: Safety software has been developed for the HFC to operate on the
NPCTF, creating the safety system. The software is the subject of chapter 4.
It now follows that the testing procedures must also occur. They are discussed in this
chapter as follows.
Component Test: The sensory equipment of the NPCTF and communication with the
HFC have been tested and verified. These tests are outlined in section 5.2.1.
Integration Test: Response testing has been performed on the HFC using controlled
inputs. These tests verified software section by section. These tests are discussed in section
5.2.3.
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System Test: The full system has been validated through standard operations and
AECB design basis events. The design basis events, standard operations, and the system’s
response are discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 respectively.

5.2 Verification Tests
V&V procedures necessitated several stages of testing. Not all of these stages will be
discussed. However, emphasis is placed on the NPCTF equipment and communication
verification and HFC response testing. These correspond respectively to component and
integration tests in accordance with standardized V&V procedures.
5.2.1

NPCTF Equipment and Communication Verification
To verify the components, the 4-20mA outputs were observed by both the HFC and the

NPCTF. This verified not only successful transmission, but also congruent measurement
between the two systems. This verification performed primarily through the HFC memory
editor application, part of the EWS (as discussed in section 4.1.3).
The HFC was configured only to recognize 4-20mA analog inputs as 0-100% of full
scale input [91], this caused proper range of the sensors to be crucial when fabricating the
safety algorithm. To test, two operating points were observed: one when the NPCTF was shut
down and another during steady operations. For both observed points, the value was recorded
from both the HFC’s memory and the NPCTF’s user interface. A linear progression was
assumed and the full range was deduced.
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Table 5.1: HFC to NPCTF Readings.
Signal
Short NPCTF HFC NPCTF HFC Theory
%
%
Max
Heater Current C2
0.0 A
22.6 A
45.10 50.08
0.050
Heater
T2
25.1⁰C 50.09 29.1⁰C 58.53 48.75
Temperature
Primary Loop P1
0.15
0.65
10.05
40.09 25.09
Pressure
PSI(g)
PSI(g)
HX Tank
P2
-0.1
-0.02 4.3
17.60 24.88
Pressure
PSI(g)
PSI(g)
Pressurizer
L3
4.2 %
3.59
50.8 % 50.83 99.3
Level
HX Tank
L4
-1.8 %
-1.61 64.6 % 59.44 108.7
Level
Primary Water F1
0.0
-0.33 5.9
62.49 9.42
Flow
l/min
l/min

Most
Likely
50 A

Sensor
Spec
50 A

50⁰C

50⁰C

25
PSI(g)
25
PSI(g)
100 %

25
PSI(g)
25
PSI(g)
100 %

100 %

100
l/min
10
l/min

10
l/min

From Table 5.1, it can be seen that the theoretical maxes stayed close to the sensor
specifications. Deviations were likely from slightly mistimed measurements and noise. Note
that the HFC’s memory is recorded in hexadecimal, scaling from 1999 (4mA) to 7FFF (20mA)
[91]. In Table 5.1, the HFC ‘%’ reading is shown after conversion.
The opposite direction of communication was verified as well. The memory editor was
used to set the digital outputs to ‘closed’, which could then be used to trip the NPCTF. This
proved the NPCTF could be tripped through an HFC signal.
5.2.2

HFC6000 Response Testing
The safety software on the HFC was incrementally tested after implementation. First,

AI and AO cards were tested for their interactions. Including the 199916 bias previously
mentioned, the HFC was allowed to read 4, 12, and 20mA signals from its own AO card into
its AI card. This was confirmed through cross checking the memory editor, the equation editor,
and the CQ4 editor.
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Testing of each subsection of the code is then performed. The subsections are first
written to the HFC one by one. Using the AO cards as inputs, the program is inspected using
the display LEDs. This verifies trip point are located where designed. Following, the entire
code is tested as a whole. The AO card is again used to isolate code segments of coding and
inspect boundaries. This coding is slightly altered so that the tripping subroutine can be
escaped.

5.3 AECB Standard Scenarios
The AECB was the precursor of the CNSC, existing until reorganization in 2000 under
the Nuclear Safety and Control Act [20]. The AECB functioned similarly to the CNSC but
was focused solely on nuclear power reactors.
The AECB released and upheld a number of regulatory documents, evaluated NPPs,
and gave operating licenses at their discretion [95]. In February of 1991, the AECB released
a body of regulations as an update to the previous iterations. Amongst these was the R-8:
Requirements for Shutdown Systems for CANDU Nuclear Power Plants [22].
This document outlined many mandatory safety requirements, including two diverse
and independent safety systems. It also specifies, in two tables, design basis events which the
safety systems must be capable of detecting and controlling. The first of these tables is
replicated in Table 5.1 [22]. Demonstration of capability of these design basis event was
therefore a licensing requirement.

115
Table 5.2: Replica of Table 1 of AECB R-8.
Item
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Failure
Failure of reactor control systems
Failure of normal electric power
Seizure of a primary heat transport system main pump
Failure of any feeder pipe in the primary heat transport system
Failure of an end fitting
Failure of a pressure tube and its associated calandria tube
Blockage of a fuel channel
Failure of a fuelling machine to replace a closure plug
Inadvertent opening of pressure relief or control valves on the primary heat
transport system or associated systems
Failure of steam generator tubes
Failure of feed water/steam systems
Failure of moderator system
Failure of service water system
Failure of any other equipment in reactor systems which, in the absence of
shutdown action, could result in damage to fuel in the reactor
The second table lists only “Failure of any pipe or header in any fuel cooling system”.

Other safety system requirements include careful documentation procedures following a
planned or unplanned shutdown, ability to prove that shutdown will not compromise integrity
of the fuel rod sheaths, damage equipment, or release radiation [22].
The standard CANDU design basis events as shown in Table 5.2, are to be used as for
the system’s test. As the final stage of V&V, this tests the safety system against its initial
requirement: To be a fully realized CANDU parallel system for the NPCTF. Unfortunately,
not all the scenarios are possible to simulate on the NPCTF. The NPCTF lacks a nuclear
reactor and thus does not utilize fuel channels or end fittings (items 5, 7, and 8). Similarly, the
heat exchanger functions differently than a steam generator. It thus does not have tubes to
rupture (item 10). However, the remaining failures have been designed into the NPCTF as
fault insertion scenarios [2].
The AECB document does not specify a rate of response.

The only explicit

requirements are preventing damage to fuel sheaths and release of radiation [22]. Performance
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requirements of the systems may be set by the licensee but must be explicitly stated,
documented, and then upheld with justified design reason. These quantified performance
requirements may later be compared against when determining the ongoing health of the RPSs.

5.4 Systems Testing and Simulated Faults
As previously discussed, the NPCTF is designed to safely simulate faults and does so in
a number of methods. The NPCTF may override an external controller to alter the states of
control valves. This allows it insert faults or simulate other unusual conditions. For example,
the set point of a valve may be altered to simulate the ‘jamming’. This ‘jam’ persists even
when the external controller commands a set point change, effectively simulating a mechanical
fault.
The NPCTF also possesses components for physically altering the system during live
operations [2]. The critical primary line LOCA is simulated in this way: a valve has been built
immediately preceding the heater which may be opened manually, ‘spilling’ coolant into the
lower collection tank.
Additionally, the NPCTF can also introduce sensor biases to the external controllers
[2]. This is done to simulate the failure of one or more sensors in the NPP. This scenario is
highly plausible fault for control systems. This should likewise be readily noticed by safety
systems for the danger it presents.
Faults may be dangerous for different reasons. The large LOCA on the coolant intake
pipe of the reactor is the most critical fault that requires the quickest response [6]. However,
the LOCA is easily detected as sudden spikes in heat, loss of pressure, and an uncontrollably
changing neutron economy are recognizable indicators. Faults such as the partial loss of the
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heat sink through a feed water pump failure are dangerous due to their effects manifesting
slowly [97]. Faults like this require comprehensive understanding of system parameters. Their
detection tests the accuracy of the safety system’s implemented logic.
The safety system must also be tested for its security. Though CANDU safety systems
must always err to safety, spurious trips are costly [42]. This risk is partially mitigated through
the 2oo3 voting logic, but false positives represent poorly designed safety system logic. To
test this, every operating procedures that is safe within the NPCTF has been performed in live
trial to ensure that the safety system is not inappropriately cautious.
5.4.1

Normal Operations
‘Normal Operations’ experimentation tests the system’s capability to accurately

recognize safe operations. Normal has here been defined as scenarios in which an error has
not occurred and no fault has been inserted. A safety algorithm is therefore expected to
produce no spurious trips during these experiments.
These tests assess the design logic which predicts the appropriate operating range for
all critical system parameters. It does this in real time, without operator guidance or control of
the NPCTF. The algorithm will monitor the system parameters, track their changes, and make
proper assumptions during the transitions.
Normal operations will be any of the nine states of operation. For reference, the nine
states of operation are in Table 5.2. It must be reminded that the investigation of NPCTF
conditions used three operating points. Operations will thus be limited to these.
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State
25⁰C, 30⁰C, 35⁰C
25⁰C->30⁰C, 30⁰C->35⁰C,
35⁰C->30⁰C,30⁰C->25⁰C,
25⁰C->35⁰C, 35⁰C->25⁰C

Table 5.3: States of Operation.
Type
Operating Point
Transition

Each of these nine states in Table 5.2 are tested by cycling between the three operating
points in approximately forty minute increments. The forty minute windows allow the heater
to settle into its new operating point before the next transition as the longest settling time (the
rise from 25⁰C to 35⁰C) is 30 minutes. An additional ten minutes has been added so that all
system parameters have totally ceased their transients. The total step-length is therefore 40
minutes, which every transition has been permitted for consistency.
5.4.2

Fault Insertion Methodology
As explained in Section 5.2: AECB Standard Scenarios, there are 15 standard CANDU

design basis events [22]. The safety system must therefore be able of detecting and signalling
a trip for each of these faults. This is the most critical testing procedure as it determines
whether the safety system could halt potential catastrophes. Though a spurious trip is costly
to the NPP operations, a missed fault is a potentially global event [98].
While the NPCTF is capable of testing many faults, time constraints limit the total
number of faults that can be reasonably inserted. Assessing the worst case scenarios is instead
assumed to umbrella other faults [99]. As the NPCTF lacks a reactor, it cannot simulate some
of the most dangerous faults: those that compromise the fuel channels. However, many of the
AECB design basis events possesses NPCTF parallels. Using the 14 items of AECB Table 1
of the R-8, fidelity to the V&V procedure of an NPP safety system is retained. These events
are listed in Table 5.2 with their equivalents on the NPCTF.
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Table 5.4: NPCTF Equivalents to AECB Design Events.
Item AECB Event
NPCTF Equivalent
1
Failure of Reactor Control System
C2 Drift
2
Failure of Normal Electrical Power
(Matter for ECCS System)
3
Seizure of Primary Heat Transport System Pump
Pump1 Failure
4
Failure of Any Feeder Pipe in Primary Loop
SV-1 Force Open
5
Failure of an End Fitting
LOCA
6
Failure of a Pressure Tube Associated With
Void (No Reactor)
Calandria
7
Blockage of Fuel Channel
Void (No Reactor)
8
Failure of A Fuelling Machine to Replace a Closure Void (No Reactor)
Plug
9
Inadvertent Opening of a Pressure Relief or Control CV-20 Force Open
Valves On Primary Loop
10
Failure of Steam Generator Tubes
Void (Steam Generator and
Primary Not Connected)
11
Failure of Feed water/Steam System
CV-18 Force Open
12
Failure of Moderator System
Void (No Reactor)
13
Failure of Service Water System
Pump3 Failure
14
Failure of Any Other Equipment Which, in The
Open to many other faults
Absence of Shutdown Action Could Result in
Damage to Fuel In The Reactor
Some notes must be stated for items in Table 5.3 that do not possess NPCTF equivalents
on the NPCTF. For event item 2, the failure of a normal electrical system implies that safety
must be created through back-up generating supplies. This test is primarily meant to ensure
that loss of power can still be handled through passive cooling, back-up generators, and other
designed safeguards to manage residual heat. Though the NPCTF does possess an emergency
core cooling system [2], this test has no bearing on the performance of the safety algorithm.
Event item 10, the failure of the steam generator tubes, is not able to be simulated with
NPCTF. However, another fault meant to disrupt the operation of the heat exchanger has been
included. This is the opening of CV-18, as parallel to item 11, failure of feed water/steam
system.
Finally, event item 14 is unspecific but left to the discretions of the engineers designing
the NPP. Additional faults have thus been added to the list in this item slot. These faults are
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amongst NPCTF designed faults and expand the variety of scenarios tested. Adding two faults
the NPCTF is capable of simulating for this item brings the total number of faults to nine; as
many faults as there are stages of operation.
Time restraints prevent every fault from being tested in every stage. The experiment
process requires a full start-up, stabilization, insertion of the fault, detection, shutdown, and
cooling (using the ECCS). The start-up and shutdown processes in the NPCTF (as with NPP)
are very time consuming. For this reason, each fault is inserted into three different stages, and
each stage is tested under three different faults. The faults are listed in Table 5.4 and the
organization of fault insertion is outlined in Table 5.5.

Fault AECB
Item
A
1
B
3
C
4
D
5
E
9
F
11
G
13
H
14
I
14

Table 5.5: Faults Inserted as Part of System Validation.
Event
C2 Failure
Pump1 Failure
CV-3 Force Open
LOCA
CV-20 Force Open
CV-18 Force Open
Pump3 Failure
CV-1 & CV-2 Force Close
CV-9 Open/CV-10 Force Close

This distribution of faults maximizes the variety of scenarios each fault is inserted into.
Each stage receives a unique configuration of three faults, while each fault is ideally placed
into settled operation, an upwards transition, and a downwards transition. When possible, the
upwards and downwards operating point stages include one large jump (25⁰C to 35⁰C or vice
versa) and one small jump. However, of the six transitional stages, four are small and two are
large. The coordination of fault insertion therefore attempts to maximize diversity to the extent
possible.
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Table 5.6: Organization of Fault Insertion.
Operating
Fault 1 Fault 2 Fault 3
Stage
A
B
C
25⁰C
D
E
F
30⁰C
G
H
I
35⁰C
A
E
G
25⁰C  30⁰C
B
F
H
30⁰C  35⁰C
B
C
D
25⁰C  35⁰C
C
G
I
35⁰C  30⁰C
D
H
I
30⁰C  25⁰C
A
E
F
35⁰C  25⁰C
For the testing involved, multiple fault scenarios are not considered. It cannot be
assumed that being able to detect both faults individually would cover the faults concurrently,
though the CNSC R-8 documents have not specified the requirement for dual-fault scenarios.
As such, it is then assumed that single fault scenarios are sufficient for full-system testing.
It is additionally assumed that the R-8 design basis events cover the ‘worst-case’
scenarios for the NPP. Other faults are therefore assumed to fall under the umbrella of these
scenarios, such that protection against these most significant faults is sufficient evidence for
protection against lesser occurences.
5.4.3

The Faults
Fault A: C2 Failure
Fault A simulates a failure of the reactor control system. This is any scenario in which

the controlling mechanisms of the reactor have failed to properly curtail a super criticality.
These faults are characterized by rapid growth of neutron economy. Neutronic propagation’s
exponential characteristic causes super criticalities to become more dangerous each moment it
persists.
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There several reasons why a reactor may begin to suddenly produce excess energy
[100]. Amongst the most common is the build-up of reactor toxins. Though toxins decrease
energy output, they are ‘burnt off’ slowly as they collect neutrons and are eventually made
radioactive [101]. Burn off may then conversely increase neutron activity. This should be
actively detected handled by reactor control system.
C2 denotes the current to the heating unit. This can be overridden with a value, or a
bias may be placed. In order to simulate a sudden and uncompensated neutron spike, the
NPCTF will manually alter the current for a brief period. After, the controller will be
readmitted to the heater. This spike will simulate a failure in the control or measurement of
neutron economy, both requiring active intervention.
Fault B: Pump1 Failure
Fault B, the failure of Pump1, simulates the seizure of the primary heat transport pump.
This fault played a major role in the Chernobyl cataclysm [102] and contributed to the eventual
meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi [103]. The primary pump keeps coolant running through the
reactor and without its continued operation the reactor becomes unable to shed heat. The major
danger of item 2 of Table 5.3 (loss of power) is also loss of the primary pump.
The NPCTF presents a number of modes that test system response to pump1 failure.
These range from decreases in performance to outright shutdowns. Using a conservative
approach, the primary pump will undergo a complete failure for this fault insertion. This can
be user performed from the control panel.
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Figure 5.1: Schematic for Pump1 Failure.
Figure 5.1 shows the schematic of a pump 1 failure. Pump1 powers the primary flow
which is controlled by CV-1 and CV-2. F1, and P1 measure primary loop flow and pressure
respectively, while T2_1/2/3 measure heater outlet temperature. Pump1 is fed from the heat
exchanger (simulating the steam generator) and pumps water back through the heater.
Fault C: CV-3 Force Open
Fault C simulates the failure of a feeder pipe in the primary loop. CV-3 is brings water
into the primary loop during start-up. This fault breaches the primary loop, resulting in several
system backlashes. These include pressure drops, pressurizer failures, and maladjusted flow
as coolant is drawn into the lower holding tank.
The NPCTF will likely attempt to compensate for this primary loop breach by invoking
the pressurizer to increase pressure. When the pressure of the primary loop fails to increase,
the pressurizer water levels and pressure will drop.
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Figure 5.2: Schematic for Fault C: CV-3 Force Open.
Figure 5.2 shows the location of valve CV-3. CV-3 connects the lower tank to the
primary loop to fill and empty the coolant during start-up procedures. Pump1 powers the
coolant flow that is controlled CV-1 and CV-2 and measured by F1. P1, T1, and T2_1/2/3
measure primary loop pressure, and heater intake and outlet temperatures respectively.
Fault D: LOCA
Table 5.3’s item 5: the failure of an end fitting is a LOCA. However, this has been
reformatted in the testing to increase the accident severity. A large LOCA immediately
entering the reactor represents the worst case scenario. This empties the reactor of coolant as
the water backflows and spills. Once the reactor is void of coolant, the now dry fuel sheaths
continue to be surrounded by moderator but lack heat dissipation. The large LOCA thus has
the capability to overheat and meltdown the reactor within moments [96]. This scenario is so
severe that the RPS’s speed is evaluated against this event [96].
The LOCA is simulated on the NPCTF through the release of FV-1 valve. This is a
manual valve that drains water into a lower holding tank, simulating the worst case scenario
LOCA. This should result in a sudden increase in flow (as water drains from the primary line),
a decline in pressure, and a pronounced and obvious spike of heater temperature.
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Figure 5.3: Schematic for Fault D: LOCA.
The flow valve FV-1 is located immediately before the heater in the primary line as
shown in Figure 5.3. Pump1 powers the coolant flow which is controlled by CV-1 and CV-2
and measured by F1. FV-1 is a manual release valve that leads into a lower collection tank.
P1, T1, and T2_1/2/3 measure primary loop pressure, and heater intake and outlet temperatures
respectively. FV-1 is opened fully in each trial for both experimental consistency and as a
‘worst case’ scenario.
Fault E: CV-20 Force Open
Fault E simulates the 9th Item in Table 5.3: The inadvertent opening of a pressure relief
or control valve on the primary loop. This has been simulated through CV-20. The inadvertent
opening of the pressure relief valve should cause a sharp decline in pressure on the primary
line. Like with the LOCA, this involves spillage of water, though its location dictates the
sudden rise in temperature is delayed. The fault will likely cause the same pressure loss and
subsequent overcompensation by the pressurizer of fault C.
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Figure 5.4: Schematic for Fault E: CV-20 Force Open.
The location of CV-20 is shown in Figure 5.4. CV-20 drains to the lower tank
immediately proceeding the three heater outlet temperature sensors, T2_1, T2_2, and T2_3.
Other major primary loop measurements are primary flow rate, primary temperature, and
heater intake temperature F1, P1 and T1 respectively. Similar to the LOCA in that coolant is
lost, this simulates the inadvertent opening of a pressure relief valve on the primary line.
However, because this fault is controlled through the NPCTF’s main control system, CV-20
can be opened consistently to the same degree. Therefore, CV-20 can be used to simulate a
steady loss of fluid (i.e. a leak) rather than a rupture that drains the primary line quickly.
Fault F: CV-18 Force Open
A forced CV-18 opening simulates item 11 on the AECB list: Failure of the feed
water/steam system. In this fault, water being transported out of the HX tank will drain faster
than pump2 can replenish it CV-25. This fault thus presents an overheating danger in NPPs as
it drains the steam generator and halts heat transportation.
CV-18 and CV-25 jointly control the level of the HX tank. This event may manifest
slowly, especially during steady operations when HX tank level is steady. Both the pressure
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and the level of the steam generator will be affected by the fault, allowing the safety system to
detect its presence.

Figure 5.5: Schematic for Fault F: CV-18 Force Open.
The control of HX tank water level is illustrated in Figure 3.5. Inventory control of the
HX tank is performed by air intake and outlet valves CV-21 and CV-5 respectively, along with
water intake valve CV-25 and outlet valve CV-18. The HX tank’s pressure and level are
measured at P2 and L4 respectively.
Fault G: Pump3 Failure
Pump3 failure as fault G simulates item 13: the failure of the service water system.
Pump3 controls the water flow of the chilling circuit. Initially, failure of the chilling circuit
causes drastic decreases in turbine efficiency as condenser fails to generate appropriate energy
gradients. As the secondary loop stagnates, the event becomes the dangerous loss of heat sink
scenario. Steam generators overheat first as their feed water warms. In turn, coolant no longer
sheds heat in the steam generator and returns to the reactor still hot, causing overheating.
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The chiller pump (pump3) failing will likewise cause rising temperatures in the primary
loop. Though secondary loop heat will rise more quickly, this is not a monitored parameter.
The current to the heater will attempt to compensate against rising temperatures, thus this fault
may be detected through heater current drift or heater temperature increase.

Figure 5.6: Schematic for Fault G: Pump3 Failure.
The schematic position of Pump3 is shown in Figure 5.6 as between the HX tank and
leading to the chiller in the chiller loop. The chiller temperature is measured by T6 and T7 at
intake and outlet respectively, while CV-34 controls flow on the secondary side, as measured
at F3 and powered by pump3. The HX tank’s sensors P2, L4, T5, and T3 measure pressure,
level, intake and outlet temperature respectively.
Fault H: CV-1 & CV-2 Force Close
The NPCTF possesses two available modes to control the flow of water coolant through
the primary loop. First, the current to pump1 can be altered to increase or decrease its power.
Second, two control valves, CV-1 and CV-2, can vary their position to manipulate flow rate.
The position of these two valves is shown in Figure 5.7. For the work of this thesis, the latter
option was chosen.
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CV-1 and CV-2 simultaneously being forced is fault H, within the open item 14 of the
AECB list. This represents steady loss of flow, complementing the sudden failure of pump1
in fault B. The safety algorithm is thus expected to detect this fault through flow rate. However
given the valve locations, pressure losses and rising temperatures will also occur.

Figure 5.7: Schematic for Fault H: CV-1 and CV-2 Force Close.
As shown in Figure 5.7, pump1 is the primary pump, CV-1 and CV-2 control the flow
in the primary, and F1, P1, and T1 measure the primary flow rate, primary pressure, and heater
inlet temperature respectively.
Fault I: CV-9 Open/CV-10 Force Close
Fault I is also part of item 14 on the AECB list. The fault is the forced opening of CV9 coupled with the closure of CV-10. These two valves control simulated steam flow in the
pressurizer (pressurized air in the NPCTF), which in turn maintains the pressure in the primary
loop. These can be seen in Figure 5.8.

130

Figure 5.8: Schematic for Fault I: CV-9 Open/CV-10 Close.
CV-9 and CV-10 are the air intake and outlet valves respectively, where CV-11 is the
liquid connection between the pressurizer and the primary line. P4 and L3 are the pressurizer
pressure and level respectively
With this mismatch, air will be able to flow into the pressurizer but will be unable to
flow out. This fault may be initially overlooked until the pressurizer is needed. However,
pressurizer level responds to operating point changes and suppresses normal permutations
during steady operations. The mismatch will likely cause pressurizer level to drift during
operations, resulting in trip.
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5.5 Experiment 1: Normal Operating Conditions
Normal operations testing determines whether the system is too conservative and will
generate spurious trips. Though it is preferable to produce false positives over false negatives,
a needlessly active system can cost a plant time, money, and cause system strain [42].
The test was performed through two five hour experiments. During the experiments,
the system was cycled through its three operating stages such that every transition occurred
once, creating six total transitions. Each transition was given 40 minutes to complete before
the next transition was begun. Both experiments were identical except for minor operator
timing differences.
The safety algorithm succeeded and produced no spurious trips. Between the two
experiments, more than 10 hours of operations were carried forth, strongly verifying the
security and discretion of the implemented system.
5.5.1

Heater-Independent Parameters
The four heater-independent parameters were be analyzed for operating ranges and

breaching characteristics observed during experimentation. The recorded data has been
interpreted using the Matlab simulations with results as follows.
Primary Line Pressure (P1)
The primary line pressure is bounded by 7.25 PSI(g) and 10.5 PSI(g). The overall
current/pressure relationship is shown below in Figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.9: Primary Pressure vs. Heater Current.
Further, the primary pressure spent the entire experiment between 8PSI(g) and
9.5PSI(g); utilizing only 1.5 PSI(g) of the 3.25 PSI(g) envelope. There were no breaches of
upper or lower boundaries observed during experiments. The time recording of both trials is
displayed together in Figure 5.10. This demonstrates that while there are remained transients
during operations, these remain well within the expected range.

133

Figure 5.10: Timeline of Primary Pressure during Normal Conditions Experiments.
HX Tank Pressure (P2)
The HX tank has pressure limits of 5.65PSI(g) and 3.2PSI(g) for maximum and
minimum pressure respectively. It is reminded that HX tank pressure, unlike the other heaterindependent parameters, does not utilize soft boundaries. As such, no breaches occurred during
the two trials. A statistical interpretation of the operating bounds for both trials is shown in
Figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.11: Operations of HX Tank Pressure.
The HX tank pressure remained between 4.78PSI(g) and 5.22PSI(g) for the first trial
and between 4.68 and 4.03PSI(g) for the second. Both these dichotomous operating ranges
were within the safe operating bounds. Even outliers stayed well within the appropriate bounds.
This was expected as HX tank pressure tends to change very slightly, even during the presence
of faults.
Pressurizer Level (L3)
The pressurizer level has bounds of 49.5% on the lower bounds and 51.5% for the upper
bounds. The water level of the pressurizer remained uncharacteristically steady during the two
trials. There occurred no breaches of the soft boundaries during both the first and the second
round of experimentation. The pressurizer level did respond to operating point changes,
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though the magnitude of these transients was less than typical. Display of the deviations into
the lower operating ranges is shown in Figure 5.12.

Figure 5.12: Breaching Characteristics for Lower Boundary of Pressurizer Level during
Normal Operations Experiment.
Pressurizer level, during the 10 hours of operation, had a maximum value of 50.67%
of the total level of the pressurizer tank, and a minimum level of 49.55% of the total tank level.
The level approached very near the soft boundaries but did not breach them during the time
observed.
Primary Flow Rate (F1)
The primary flow rate utilizes only a lower limit. This lower limit of 5.75 l/min saw
426 breaches between the two experiments, though the longest of which was between one and
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two seconds based on the operations recording. The total operating characteristics are shown
in Figure 5.13.

Figure 5.13: Breaching Characteristics Flow Rate Lower Boundary during Normal
Conditions Experiments.
The breaching characteristics for primary flow rate again demonstrate the noisiness of
the flow rate parameter. The 10 hours of operations saw an average of 35.5 breaches per hour,
approximately one breach every 100s. However, the soft boundary principle permitted this
feature. None of the 426 breaches persisted for three or more seconds to cause a spurious trip.
5.5.2

Heater-Dependent Parameters
The heater-dependent parameters required drastically different monitoring than the

others. Because their operating limits move with the operating point of the system, the
transitions greatly tested the safety system. Unlike the heater-independent parameters, these
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parameters a given slightly wider operating bounds though no soft limits. This is especially
important for heater temperature as reactor overheating is the primary danger of an NPP.
Breach of temperature bounds on the NPCTF are therefore always faults, even when no
abnormalities exist.
Heater Temperature (T2)
The safety system was able to properly calculate heater temperature bounds during the
experimentation. The heat made its transitions within the windows and times permitted. The
safety system demonstrated its capability to anticipate coming temperature changes through
the use of current spikes. This resulted in no spurious tripping. The heater temperature and its
theoretical boundary for the first trial is shown in Figure 5.14.

Figure 5.14: The Heat Boundary vs. Heater Temperature for First Normal Operations
Experiment.

138
As shown in Figure 5.14, the boundaries (striped in red) are able to use the current in
the heater (black) to accurately anticipate oncoming changes in operating conditions of the
heater temperature (blue). This demonstrates the calculated transition logic used in the safety
system. These transitions were performed correctly and the flagging logic’s capability was
demonstrated for each operating point change. The times for transition are shown in Table 5.6.
The differences between the two trials show clearly the wide variance of transition times that
must be accommodated by the safety system.
Table 5.7: Transition Times and Maximum Permitted for Temperature in Heater
During Normal Operations Conditions.
Transition
Time – 1st
Time – 2nd
Maximum
Experiment
Experiment
Allowed
175s
47s
240s
25⁰C -> 30⁰C
1130s
141s
1500s
30⁰C -> 35⁰C
1240s
330s
1800s
25⁰C -> 35⁰C
16s
19s
90s
35⁰C -> 30⁰C
55s
24s
150s
30⁰C -> 25⁰C
109s
164s
240s
35⁰C -> 25⁰C
These times have been calculated using the flagging of the theoretical flags of the safety
logic as simulated on Matlab, as no operating history can be drawn directly the HFC. These
characteristics again demonstrate two considerations from the design of the heater transition
coding. First, steps that decrease heater temperature are significantly quicker. Second, moving
from the center operating temperature (30⁰C) outwards is more timing consuming than the
reverse. Regardless, the maximum time limits for transition were not violated in any scenario.
The nearest was from 25⁰C to 30⁰C on the first trial, which at 175s still required 65s less than
maximally permissible.
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HX Tank Level (L4)
Like with heater temperature, the HX tank level bounds were continually re-evaluated
during operations. Testing of the HX tank level required both subsections of code dedicated
to its transition to be properly functioning. The safety system succeeded in calculating the safe
operating bounds during the live trials. The IRC, overshoot, and transitions were all correctly
included and the algorithm produced no false positives. The HX tank level and simulated
boundaries during the first trial’s operations are shown in Figure 5.15.

Figure 5.15: Level Boundary vs. HX Tank Level for First Normal Operating Conditions
Experiment.
In Figure 5.15, the HX tank level (green) stays between the bounds created by the
algorithm (dotted red) using input from the heater current (black). The IRC at the beginning
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of downwards steps is clearly seen in Figure 5.15. The flagging used by the safety algorithm
was able to correctly identify the stages of the transition and steps being taken.

5.6 Experiment 2: Fault Insertion
Capability to detect and respond quickly to dangerous conditions is the most important
aspect of a safety system. In order to test the implemented safety algorithm, the AECB
scenarios as outlined in section 5.2 were implemented as referenced in section 5.3. All but two
experiments provided successful results. 25 of 27 experiments ended with a trip as initiated
by the safety system, while two experiments provided a null response as the NPCTF’s own
safety system shut down operations first. The full summary of the trips are listed in Table 5.7.
Table 5.8: Trigger Parameter of Each Experimental Trip.
Operating Stage
25⁰C
30⁰C
35⁰C
25⁰C  30⁰C
30⁰C  35⁰C
25⁰C  35⁰C
35⁰C  30⁰C
30⁰C  25⁰C
35⁰C  25⁰C

Fault 1
A
D
G
A
B
B
C
D
A

Trip
-L3
T2
-F1
F1
T2
L3
T2

Fault 2
B
E
H
E
F
C
G
H
E

Trip
L3
L3
F1
L3
L4
L3
T2
F1
P1

Fault 3
C
F
I
G
H
D
I
I
F

Trip
P1
L4
L3
T2
F1
T2
F1
P1
L4

*'--' indicates an invalid trial
This strongly implicates success in the validation of the safety algorithm as
implemented on the HFC. Reorganizing this information into Tables 5.8 and 5.9 shows the
identifying parameter of each fault more clearly:
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Table 5.9: Trigger Parameter by Fault and Operating Point
Fault
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

Stage
25⁰C
25⁰C
25⁰C
30⁰C
30⁰C
30⁰C
35⁰C
35⁰C
35⁰C

Trip
-L3
P1
L3
L3
L4
T2
F1
L3

Stage
25⁰C  30⁰C
30⁰C  35⁰C
25⁰C  35⁰C
25⁰C  35⁰C
25⁰C  30⁰C
30⁰C  35⁰C
25⁰C  30⁰C
30⁰C  35⁰C
35⁰C  30⁰C

Trip
-F1
L3
T2
L3
L4
T2
F1
F1

Stage
35⁰C  25⁰C
25⁰C  35⁰C
35⁰C  30⁰C
30⁰C  25⁰C
35⁰C  25⁰C
35⁰C  25⁰C
35⁰C  30⁰C
30⁰C  25⁰C
30⁰C  25⁰C

Trip
T2
F1
T2
L3
P1
L4
T2
F1
P1

*'--' indicates an invalid trial
Neglecting tested operating state:
Table 5.10: Trigger Parameter by Fault
Fault
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

Trip
-L3
P1
L3
L3
L4
T2
F1
L3

Trip
-F1
L3
T2
L3
L4
T2
F1
F1

Trip
T2
F1
F1
L3
P1
L4
T2
F1
P1

*'--' indicates an invalid trial
The parameter that results in trip for each fault type is shown most clearly in figure
5.10. It can be seen that faults F, G, and H tripped through the same parameter on each trial.
Contrarily, faults C and I tripped by means of a different parameter on each insertion. Details
for each fault are as follows:
5.6.1

Fault A: Heater Current Failure
Fault A is the simulation of a failure by the reactor control system. This is the first item

on the AECB required scenarios and was simulated by an override of the NPCTF heater. It
was inserted into operating points: 25⁰C, 25⁰C 30⁰C, and 35⁰C 25⁰C.
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Fault A produced both of the null responses in the experiment. Rather than the
algorithm tripping the system in these scenarios, one of the NPCTF’s internal mechanisms
disabled the heater before a fault could be detected. As the NPCTF contains some safety
mechanisms that are unable to be supressed, it cannot be easily determined which was
responsible for prematurely shutting down operations. Most likely, the sudden increase in
current inadvertently activated the emergency core cooling system, which in turn shut down
the primary pump.

Figure 5.16: Result of Fault A when inserted during 35⁰C25⁰C Transition.
The only instance of the C2 error being correctly inserted is in Figure 5.16. The error
produced the expected results, being tripped by aberrant decline of the heater temperature
during transition. As demonstrated in Figure 5.16, after the transition begins and the heater
temperature begins to rapidly decrease, the fault is inserted and current suddenly rises. This
remains high and overheats the heater, preventing it from performing the downward step as
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expected. As the temperature behaved abnormally, the safety system recognized the presence
of an error and tripped the system.
5.6.2

Fault B: Pump1 Failure
Fault B is the simulation of a failure of the primary pump. This was done by cutting

power to the primary pump, representing item 3 on the AECB list. This was inserted into the
25⁰C, 30⁰C  35⁰C, and 25⁰C  35⁰C operating points.

Figure 5.17: Result of Fault B when inserted during 25⁰C35⁰C Transition.
One instance of the fault insertion is shown in Figure 5.17. Fault B was once detected
by a drop of pressure resulting in the pressurizer level dropping, and twice by the diminishing
flow in the primary line. The flow responds drastically, as demonstrated in Figure 5.17. In
this instance, the flow spent a few seconds decreasing in magnitude before breaching the
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bounds. Three seconds following, the soft boundaries had been breached long enough to
indicate a fault.
5.6.3

Fault C: CV-3 Open
Fault C is the opening of CV-3 on the primary line, representing item 4 on the AECB

list. This represents a failure of a feeder pipe on the primary loop. This fault was inserted into
the 25⁰C, 25⁰C35⁰C, and 35⁰C  30⁰C. Fault C tripped on a different parameter on each
insertion, tripping on P1, L3, and F1 on the stable, ascending, and descending operating points
respectively.
When inserted at the 25⁰C operating point, the CV-3 opening caused a sudden pressure
drop that resultingly tripped the system. However, during the 25⁰C35⁰C, the pressure was
maintained slightly better by the pressurizer, though its level consequently fell. The persistent
low level of the pressurizer resulted in the safety system tripping the NPCTF, as can be seen
in Figure 5.18.
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Figure 5.18: Result of Fault C when inserted during 25⁰C35⁰C Transition.
When inserted into the 35⁰C  30⁰C transition, the opening of CV-3 instead caused a
loss of flow. As the valve was opening it likely robbed flow from the primary line and
redirected increasing quantities into the lower tank. This particular trial is shown in Figure
5.19.
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Figure 5.19: Result of Fault C when inserted during 35⁰C30⁰C Transition.
All three trials demonstrate success of the safety system in identifying issues in the
primary loop as the fault was able to be detected from multiple parameters.
5.6.4

Fault D: LOCA
Fault D represents the infamous LOCA and item 5 on the AECB list. Fault D was

created by manually opening FV-1 as explained in section 5.2. Fault D was inserted into the
30⁰C, 25⁰C 35⁰C, and 30⁰C  25⁰C.

The LOCA trip parameters L3, T2, and L3

respectively.
Though temperature of the reactor is the primary concern, the loss of coolant tripped
on pressurizer in two of the three trials. This is seen in Figure 5.20
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Figure 5.20: Result of Fault D when inserted during 30⁰C Operating Point.
As water rushed from the primary line, the pressurizer would have attempted to
compensate. Because of the rupture, this attempt was ultimately unsuccessful and led to a loss
of water inventory and trip.
When the LOCA was inserted into the 25⁰C-35⁰C transition, the temperature of the
heater incited the trip. This was partially delayed by the heater’s control loop attempting to
slow the rate of overheating by decreasing the current, as shown in Figure 5.21. Despite the
heater control, the temperature quickly exceeded the boundaries and a trip was initiated.
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Figure 5.21: Result of Fault D when inserted during 25⁰C35⁰C Transition.
5.6.5

Fault E: CV-20 Force Open
Fault E, the opening of CV-20, represents item 9 on the AECB list: the inadvertent

opening of a pressure relief or control valve on primary loop. Fault E was inserted into the
30⁰C, 25⁰C  30⁰C, and 35⁰C  25⁰C set points. Fault E tripped based on L3 in the first two
trials, and P1 in the third. As CV-20 is a pressurizer error, it is logical to see the faults detected
through these parameters.
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Figure 5.22: Result of Fault E when inserted during 25⁰C30⁰C Transition.
The result when inserted into the 25⁰C  30⁰C is shown in Figure 5.22. The
pressurizer’s water level dropped as inventory loss in the primary line drained the coolant.
Consequently, while pressure was maintained, the level of the pressurizer caused the algorithm
to initiate a trip.
5.6.6

Fault F: CV-18: Force Open
Fault F is the opening of CV-18, meant to drain the heat exchanger. This simulates the

failure of the feed water/steam system and is item 11 on the AECB list. This was inserted into
the 30⁰C, 30⁰C 35⁰C, and 35⁰C  25⁰C set points. As CV-18 is an HX tank valve, it follows
that each fault was detected through the HX tank level, L4.
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During the insertions, outgoing water was maximized and the intake could not match
pace. The 35⁰C  25⁰C insertion interesting as the water level, rather than collapsing, caused
a trip due to its failure to produce its characteristic IRC. This is seen in Figure 5.23.

Figure 5.23: Result of Fault F when inserted during 35⁰C  25⁰C Transition.
The fault is initiated by the IRC failing to perform, as shown in Figure 5.23. This is due
to the IRC being simulated internally by the HX tank control loop. Because the intake and
outtake valves have been made faulty, this is not possible. When the IRC does not occur, the
safety system recognizes the behaviour as abnormal and initiates the NPCTF trip.
5.6.7

Fault G: Pump3 Failure
Fault G is the failure of Pump 3 in the chiller loop. This is the 13th item on the AECB

list and simulates the failure of the service water system. It was inserted into operating points:
35⁰C, 25⁰C  30⁰C, and 35⁰C  30⁰C. The failure of the service water system is a risk due
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to the loss of the heat sink. It thus follows that each insertion resulted on a trip based on
overheating in the primary loop.

Figure 5.24: Result of Fault G when inserted during 35⁰C30⁰C Transition.
The pump3 failure, inserted during a downwards transient as shown in Figure 5.24,
overheats the primary line. Though the temperature set point was lowering, the loss of the heat
sink is so severe that primary temperature rises above even its initial value. The moving
boundary of the safety algorithm are breached, immediately tripping the system.
5.6.8

Fault H: CV-1 & CV-2 Force Close
Fault H is the simultaneous closures of CV-1 and CV-2 on the primary line. This fault

was inserted according the 14th item on the AECB list. This the ‘any other’ requirement on the
list and was inserted into the 35⁰C, 30⁰C 35⁰C, and 30⁰C  25⁰C set points. The two valves
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closing diminished the coolant flow in the primary loop and manifested as a critically low flow
rate during each insertion. This can be seen in Figure 5.25.

Figure 5.25: Result of Fault H when inserted during 30⁰C25⁰C Transition.
With the closure of the two main flow controlling valves, the flow in the primary loop
steadily diminishes. Though the parameter is noisy, it never returned back into safe operating
regions to reset the counter. Thus, the safety system was forced to shut down the NPCTF.
5.6.9

Fault I: CV-9 Open/CV-10 Force Close
Fault I is the simultaneous opening of CV-9 and closure of CV-10. It is again part of

the 14th item on the AECB list, representing the ‘any other’ requirement. This was inserted
into the 35⁰C, 35⁰C  30⁰C, and 30⁰C  25⁰C set points. Fault I tripped on a different
parameter in each trial. The first, second, and third trials tripped on L3, F1, and P1 respectively.
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When Fault I began to overpressure the pressurizer by closing the air outlet and opening
the pressurized air inlet, the water level dropped, as shown in Figure 5.26. Pressure in the
pressurizer is not a tripping parameter in CANDU or the safety algorithm, but as pressure
increased the water level (L3) fell, causing the safety system to trip.

Figure 5.26: Result of Fault I when inserted during 35⁰C Operating Point.

5.7 Chapter Summary
The V&V process utilized has demonstrated the successful implementation of the RPS.
This implementation is compared against the initial design criteria, as presented in the
introduction. The evaluation is as follows:
1. The system must be capable of detecting all faults inserted without exception.
Specifically, these faults will be those outlined in CNSC regulatory document R-8
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9 faults from the CNSC document were inserted: Heater Current Failure, Pump
1 Failure, CV-3 Open, LOCA, CV-20 Open, CV-18 Open, Pump3 Failure, CV1/CV-2 Close, CV-9/CV-10 Open



Every fault was examined 3 times, in 3 different situations, with the exception
of the heater-current failure which had mistrial twice. This created 25 total test
trials



There were no faults missed, granting the implementation a 25/25 record, and
meeting the set criteria

2. The system must not be the cause of spurious trips. The NPCTF, as the system under
test, must be able to perform all permissible operations without interference from the
RPS


The system was tested through two trials where every possible step change was
performed. In total, this provided 10+ hours of fault free operation in which to
test the design’s discretion



The system once again achieved a perfect record. No spurious trips were
caused, allowing operations to carry-out smoothly

3. All trips must occur within 1s. This will be measured by the NPCTF’s internal log and
defined as occurring from the recorded bypass to the recorded moment of complete
cessation of heater operations


The 25 recorded faults each showed the breach and absolute shutdown of heater
operations within a single sample of one another



Though the fidelity of the recording makes high accuracy readings possible, this
implies that each shutdown was completed within 1s of the trip signal
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This meets the performance criteria for speed, once again demonstrating a
perfect record for this criteria
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6 Conclusions
6.1 Summary
An investigation of the operating characteristics of the NPCTF with the HFC6000 are
carried out first. This is accomplishes through nearly 50 hours of non-continuous operation.
The findings can be summarized as follows:
1. The NPCTF is chosen to have three discrete operating states: 25⁰C, 30⁰C, and 35⁰C
2. The critical parameters of CANDU, as short-formed to T2, P1, P2, L3, L4, and F1, are
shown to fall into two categories: heater-dependent (T2, L4) and heater-independent
(P1, P2, L3, and F1)
3. These parameters can be characterized by maximums, minimums, transition times, and
other relevant characteristics as explained.
4. The HX tank level, L4, is found to have large inverse response characteristics
These conclusions led to the foundation of the reactor protection system.

This

implementation has been carried out on a USNRC certified PLC unit, the HFC6000. The
implementation is first coded into Matlab, then translated into STL. The summary of the
implementation are as follows:
1. Three of the heater independent parameters (F1, P1, and L3) benefitted from the use of
soft boundaries. These boundaries used 3s timers (F1 lower, L3 upper and lower), and
2s timers (P1 upper and lower)
2. The software could be written into a single loop and a start-up routine. The single loop
is able to make calls to subroutines used calculate transient boundaries when necessary
3. The current to the heater is measured by a single subroutine. It makes use of spikes in
current to identify forthcoming transients and characterise them as much as necessary
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4. The transitions by heater-dependent parameters are handled by the called subroutines.
The heater temperature was handled by a single subroutine, while the HX tank level
was handled by two due to inverse response characteristics and overshoot
5. The total time of shutdown is calculated to be 489ms in worst case scenario. This is
beyond the resolution of the NPCTF recording devices, but sufficient for the
implementation
Finally, the validation process tested the implementation on the NPCTF using regular
operations and fault insertion scenarios. The simulated faults comply with CNSC standard
scenarios. The following findings have been made:
1. The system demonstrates appropriate judgement, as demonstrated through the normal
operations testing, producing no spurious trips in 10+ hours of operation
2. The system demonstrates high accuracy, detecting 25 of 25 faults, a perfect record
against the CNSC design basis accidents
3. The system has achieved the desired speed, and is able to shut down the NPCTF
within 1s of the theoretical trip signal for each design basis accident

6.2 Conclusions
This thesis started with the objective of designing, implementing, and testing a reactor
protection system. Based on the discussed summaries, all of the research objectives have been
met. The systematic approach discussed in the V&V process has provided the following
conclusions:
1. A relationship between a CANDU NPP and the NPCTF has been established
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2. A protection scheme has been designed based on the critical parameter parallels
between a CANDU NPP and the NPCTF
3. An RPS has been implemented using industrial grade safety PLC to operate on the
NPCTF
4. The designed RPS has been properly implemented and meets all necessary design
criteria though validation and verification process.

6.3 Future Work
The subsequent work will progress with the design and implementation of two
additional safety systems on the NPCTF. This permits the following advancements:


Creates comparisons for the HFC implemented safety system. Direct performance
comparisons in speed, accuracy, and discretion can only be made against systems
likewise designed for the NPCTF.



Permits use of 2oo3 voting logic. This both improves the overall safety design of the
NPCTF and increases fidelity to CANDU systems.



Improves the system through the use of redundancy and diversity, especially if
additional systems utilize different safety controllers.
Further, as the NPCTF is capable of being configured to mimic the I&C processes of

different NPPs, safety logic for each type of NPP can be different. Even though this thesis
concentrates on CANDU type of NPP, the similar work can also be done for other types of
NPPs.
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Appendix A:

Matlab Code

This appendix presents the simulated coding as written into Matlab. This coding is a functional
imitation of the HFC6000 code as discussed in Section 4.3: Description of Implemented Monitoring Software
and presented in Appendix B. For aid in referencing what each memory item is used for, refer to Appendix C:
HFC Items List
%A full simulation of the code as run on NPCTF recorded data
clean
%Open the files
experiment = 'experiment1.mat';
StartUp
%Extra Things
t=0;
tmax=length(C2);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Initialization%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while 1==1
%Start of the program
%Initialize Inputs/Outputs
BL=zeros(length(C2),26);
FL=zeros(length(C2),31);
CO=zeros(length(C2),14);
TI=zeros(length(C2),12);
DO=zeros(length(C2),16);
BL(:,9)=31.5; %T2max
BL(:,10)=28.5; %T2min
BL(:,14)=80; %L4max
BL(:,15)=60; %L4min
BL(:,25)= 5.65;%P2maX
BL(:,26)= 3.2;%P2miN
BL(:,12)= 51.5;%L3maX
BL(:,13)= 49.5;%L3miN
BL(:,16)= 5.75;%F1miN
BL(:,22)= 10.5;%P1maX
BL(:,23)= 7.25;%P1miN
BL(:,17)=C2(1); %C2n-1
BL(:,18)=0; %C2n-2
BL(:,19)=0; %C2n-3
BL(:,20)=0; %C2n-4
BL(:,21)=0; %C2n-5
break
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%StartUpLoop%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while t<tmax
%Read the AI
t=t+1;
AIRead
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%Test for start up count
if CO(t,4)>=120; %20
break
end
%If C2>25%, increment, else set count to 0
if BL(t,1)>12.5
CO(t+1,4)=CO(t,4)+1;
else
CO(t+1,4)=CO(t,4);
end
%If any of the absolute trips (T2 and C2) have defied their max
%FL(t,9)=(BL(t,1)>(BL(t,17)+3))||(BL(t,1)<BL(t,17)-3);
DO(t,1)=(BL(t,1)>45)||(BL(t,2)>BL(t,9)); %45 Amps or 36'C
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Operations%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while t<tmax
%Start of Loop2
t=t+1;
Carry
AIRead
DO(t,10)=1;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%C2Tracker%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while 1==1
%Do a long list of hand-me-downs
BL(t,21)=BL(t-1,20);
BL(t,20)=BL(t-1,19);
BL(t,19)=BL(t-1,18);
BL(t,18)=BL(t-1,17);
BL(t,17)=BL(t-1,1);
%Determine the spike direction
if BL(t,17)>BL(t,1)&&not(FL(t-1,9))
FL(t,10)=0; %So the direction will keep getting set until
FL(t,9 is set
else if BL(t,17)<BL(t,1)&&not(FL(t-1,9))
FL(t,10)=1;
end
end
%Is there a jump?
FL(t,9) = (((BL(t,17)2.5)>BL(t,1))||((BL(t,17)+2.5)<BL(t,1)))||FL(t,9);
%Is there drift?
FL(t,15)=(FL(t,12)&&(BL(t,17)<21)||BL(t,17)>23.5)||(FL(t,13)&&(BL(t,17)<24)
||(BL(t,17)>22.5))||(FL(t,14)&&(BL(t,17)<27)||(BL(t,17)>30.5))||not(FL(t,19
));
%ie. We're not escaping if we're in transit
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%if we drift, allow it only twice in a row
if FL(t,15)
CO(t,1)=CO(t-1,1)+1;
else
CO(t,1)=0;
end
if CO(t,1)>2
DO(t,1)=1;
break
end
%if you've drifted, you're not going to get a good settle reading,
%so bypass it
if FL(t,15)
FL(t,12)=FL(t-1,12);
FL(t,13)=FL(t-1,13);
FL(t,14)=FL(t-1,14);
break
end
%Increment the counters according to where settling is occuring
%25'C = 21<x<23.5
if
(BL(t,17)>21)&&(BL(t,17)<23.5)&&(BL(t,18)>21)&&(BL(t,18)<23.5)&&(BL(t,19)>2
1)&&(BL(t,19)<23.5)&&(BL(t,20)>21)&&(BL(t,20)<23.5)&&(BL(t,21)>21)&&(BL(t,2
1)<23.5);
CO(t,7)=CO(t,7)+1;
if CO(t,7) > 90
CO(t,7)=90;
end
else CO(t,7)=CO(t,7)-5;
end
%30'C = 24<x<27.5
if
(BL(t,17)>24)&&(BL(t,17)<27.5)&&(BL(t,18)>24)&&(BL(t,18)<27.5)&&(BL(t,19)>2
4)&&(BL(t,19)<27.5)&&(BL(t,20)>24)&&(BL(t,20)<27.5)&&(BL(t,21)>24)&&(BL(t,2
1)<27.5);
CO(t,8)=CO(t,8)+1;
if CO(t,8) > 90
CO(t,8)=90;
end
else CO(t,8)=CO(t,8)-5;
end
%35'C = 27<x<30.5
if
(BL(t,17)>27)&&(BL(t,17)<30.5)&&(BL(t,18)>27)&&(BL(t,18)<30.5)&&(BL(t,19)>2
7)&&(BL(t,19)<30.5)&&(BL(t,20)>27)&&(BL(t,20)<30.5)&&(BL(t,21)>27)&&(BL(t,2
1)<30.5);
CO(t,9)=CO(t,9)+1;
if CO(t,9) > 90
CO(t,9)=90;
end
else CO(t,9)=CO(t,9)-5;
end
%25'C Settling
if CO(t,7)>60

169
FL(t,12)=1;
else
FL(t,12)=0;
end
%30'C Settling
if CO(t,8)>60
FL(t,13)=1;
else
FL(t,13)=0;
end
%35'C Settling
if CO(t,9)>60
FL(t,14)=1;
else
FL(t,14)=0;
end
%Exit the current tracker
break
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Boundaries%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while 1==1
%The Non-Transitive Limits
BL(t,25)= 5.65;%P2maX
BL(t,26)= 3.2;%P2miN
BL(t,12)= 51.5;%L3maX
BL(t,13)= 49.5;%L3miN
BL(t,16)= 5.75;%F1miN
BL(t,22)= 10.5;%P1maX
BL(t,23)= 7.25;%P1miN
%Check for Spike Flag. If active, jump to HeatX
while FL(t,9)==1
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Start of Heat Transition%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while 1==1
%Receive the jump
DO(t,12) = 1;
%Stage 1
%First visit?
%Assume a step using direction flag
%25-30 if: Up, @25
FL(t,16) = (FL(t,10)&&FL(t,12)&&not(FL(t,19)))||FL(t,16);
%30-35 if: Up, @30
FL(t,17) = (FL(t,10)&&FL(t,13)&&not(FL(t,19)))||FL(t,17);
%35-30 if: Down, @35
FL(t,23) =
(not(FL(t,10))&&FL(t,14)&&not(FL(t,19)))||FL(t,23);
%30-25 if: Down, @30
FL(t,24) = (not(FL(t,10))&&
FL(t,13)&&not(FL(t,19)))||FL(t,24);
%Trip if up at 35, or down at 25
%JUMP L0011 IF ((FL(t,10 && FL(t,14) || (not(FL(t,10 &&
FL(t,12))&&not(FL(t,19
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%Set timers-even the big ones if they applied
if (FL(t,16) && not(FL(t,19)))%T2 25-30
TI(t,02)= 240.0;
end
if (FL(t,17)&&not(FL(t,19)))%T2 30-35
TI(t,03)= 1500.0;
end
if (FL(t,18)||FL(t,16))&&not(FL(t,19));%T2 25-35
TI(t,04)= 1800.0;
end
if (FL(t,23) && not(FL(t,19))) ;%T2 35-30
TI(t,05)= 90.0;
end
if (FL(t,24) && not(FL(t,19))) ;%T2 30-25
TI(t,06)= 150.0;
end
if (FL(t,25) || FL(t,23)) && not(FL(t,19)) ;%T2 35-25
TI(t,07)= 240.0;
end
if (FL(t,16) && not(FL(t,19))) ;%L4 25-30
TI(t,08)= 300.0;
end
if (FL(t,17) && not(FL(t,19))) ;%L4 30-35
TI(t,09)= 240.0;
end
if (FL(t,18)||FL(t,16))&&not(FL(t,19)) ;%L4 25-35
TI(t,10)= 420.0;
end
if (not(FL(t,10))&&not(FL(t,19))) %L4 IRC Delay
TI(t,12)=300;
end
%Set stage 1 flag
if not(FL(t,19))
FL(t,19)=1;
FL(t,12)=0;
FL(t,13)=0;
FL(t,14)=0;
FL(t,22)=0;
CO(t,7)=0;
CO(t,8)=0;
CO(t,9)=0;
end
%Build new bounds
%25-30
if FL(t,16)
BL(t,9) = 31.5 - (5/240/240)*(TI(t,02))*(TI(t,02))/3;
BL(t,10) = 28.5 - (4.5/240/240)*(TI(t,02))*(TI(t,02));
end
%30-35
if FL(t,17)
BL(t,9) = 35.5 - (4/1500/1500)*(TI(t,03))*(TI(t,03))/3;
BL(t,10) = 33.5 - (5/1500/1500)*(TI(t,03))*(TI(t,03));
end
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%25-35
if FL(t,18)
BL(t,9) = 35.5 - (9/1800/1800)*(TI(t,04))*(TI(t,04))/3;
BL(t,10) = 33.5 (9.5/1800/1800)*(TI(t,04))*(TI(t,04));
end
%Split Bounds Up: 25-30 + 25-35
if FL(t,16)&&not(FL(t,20))
BL(t,9) = 35.5 - (9/1800/1800)*(TI(t,04))*(TI(t,04))/3;
BL(t,10) = 28.5 - (4.5/240/240)*(TI(t,02))*(TI(t,02));
end
%35-30
if FL(t,23)
BL(t,9) = 31.5 + (4/90/90)*(TI(t,05))*(TI(t,05));
BL(t,10) = 28.5 + (5/90/90)*(TI(t,06))*(TI(t,05))/3;
end
%30-25
if FL(t,24)
BL(t,9) = 26.5 + (5/150/150)*(TI(t,06))*(TI(t,06));
BL(t,10) = 24 + (4.5/150/150)*(TI(t,06))*(TI(t,06))/3;
end
%35-25
if FL(t,25)
BL(t,9) = 26.5 + (9/240/240)*(TI(t,07))*(TI(t,07));
BL(t,10) = 24 + (9.5/240/240)*(TI(t,07))*(TI(t,07))/3;
end
%Split Bounds Down: 35-30 + 35-25
if FL(t,23)&&not(FL(t,20))
BL(t,9) = 31.5 + (4/90/90)*(TI(t,05))*(TI(t,05));
BL(t,10) = 24 + (9.5/240/240)*(TI(t,07))*(TI(t,07))/3;
end

%Test for settled C2
FL(t,20) = FL(t,12) || FL(t,13) || FL(t,14) || FL(t,20);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Stage 2%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%First visit?
%25-35 if: C2 Settles on 35, previously 25-30
FL(t,18) = (FL(t,14) && FL(t,16) && FL(t,20))||FL(t,18);
if FL(t,18)
FL(t,16)=0;
end
%35-25 if: C2 Settles on 25, previously 35-30
FL(t,25) = (FL(t,12) && FL(t,23) && FL(t,20))||FL(t,25);
if FL(t,25)
FL(t,23)=0;
end
%Test for settled T2
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%Increment if within final bounds
if (BL(t,2) < 26.5)&&(BL(t,2) > 24) && FL(t,12) &&FL(t,20)
CO(t,5)=CO(t-1,5)+1;
end
if (BL(t,2) < 31.5)&&(BL(t,2) > 28.5) && FL(t,13)
&&FL(t,20)
CO(t,5)=CO(t-1,5)+1;
end
if (BL(t,2) < 35.5)&&(BL(t,2) > 33.5) && FL(t,14)
&&FL(t,20)
CO(t,5)=CO(t-1,5)+1;
end
%Set Settled Flag if count higher than 50
FL(t,29) = (CO(t,05) > 50) && FL(t,9) && FL(t,20);
%Values at 25'C
if FL(t,12) && FL(t,29)
BL(t,9)=26.5;
BL(t,10)=24;
end
%Values at 30'C
if FL(t,13) && FL(t,29)
BL(t,9)=31.5;
BL(t,10)=28.5;
end
%Values at 35'C
if FL(t,14) && FL(t,29)
BL(t,9)=35.5;
BL(t,10)=33.5;
end
break
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Start of Level Transition%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while 1==1
if not(DO(t,15))
DO(t,15)=1;
end
%If Transition Down, go to level transition down
if FL(t,10)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Stage 1%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%If settled C2, flag stage 2
FL(t,22) = FL(t,12)||FL(t,13)||FL(t,14)||FL(t,22);
if FL(t,22)
FL(t,21)=0;
end
%Build new bounds:
%Give room for 10% Overshoot on up
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%25-30
if FL(t,16)
BL(t,14) = 88;
if not(FL(t,22))
BL(t,15) = 60;
end
end
%30-35
if FL(t,17)
BL(t,14) = 94;
if not(FL(t,22))
BL(t,15) = 70;
end
end
%25-35
if FL(t,18)
BL(t,14) = 94;
if not(FL(t,22))
BL(t,15) = 60;
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Stage 2%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Build new bounds
%25-30
if FL(t,16)&&FL(t,22)
BL(t,15) = (0070)-(10/300)*(TI(t,08));
end
%30-35
if FL(t,17)&&FL(t,22)
BL(t,15) = (0075)-(5/240)*(TI(t,09));
end
%25-35
if FL(t,18)&&FL(t,22)
BL(t,15) = (0075)-(15/420)*(TI(t,10));
end
%%Test for Settled L4
%Increment if within final bounds
%25-30
if (BL(t,5) > 70)&&(BL(t,5) <
80)&&FL(t,16)&&FL(t,22)%&&(TI(t,10)>(TI(t,8)/2))
CO(t,06)=CO(t,06)+1;
end
%30-35
if (BL(t,5) > 75)&&(BL(t,5) <
85)&&FL(t,17)&&FL(t,22)%&&(TI(t,10)>(TI(t,9)/2))
CO(t,06)=CO(t,06)+1;
end
%25-35
if (BL(t,5) > 75)&&(BL(t,5) <
85)&&FL(t,18)&&FL(t,22)%&&(TI(t,10)>(TI(t,10)/2))
CO(t,06)=CO(t,06)+1;
end
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%Set Flags if counter greater than 30
FL(t,30) = CO(t,06) > 30;
%%%Finished Stage
%25'C Setpoint
if FL(t,30)&&FL(t,12)
BL(t,14) = 75;
BL(t,15) = 60;
end
%30'C Setpoint
if FL(t,30)&&FL(t,13)
BL(t,14) = 80;
BL(t,15) = 70;
end
%35'C Setpoint
if FL(t,30)&&FL(t,14)
BL(t,14) = 85;
BL(t,15) = 75;
end
%Test that both are finished
%Clear Spike Flags
if FL(t,29)&&FL(t,30)
FL(t,9) = 0;
FL(t,10) = 0;
%Clear Stage Flags
FL(t,19) = 0;
FL(t,20) = 0;
FL(t,21) = 0;
FL(t,22) = 0;
%Clear Trans Type Flags
FL(t,16) = 0;
FL(t,17) = 0;
FL(t,18) = 0;
FL(t,23) = 0;
FL(t,24) = 0;
FL(t,25) = 0;
%Clear the settled counters
CO(t,5) = 0;
CO(t,6) = 0;
%CLear the settled flags
FL(t,29) = 0;
FL(t,30) = 0;
end
%Return to variable testing
else
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Level Transition Down%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
if not(DO(t,16))
DO(t,16)=1;
end
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%X Down Flag, NOT Stage 2 Flag, NOT Finished Flag
%%%Stage 1
%If First visit
%Record current L4 and start timer
if not(FL(t,21))
BL(t,7)=BL(t,5);
end
%Flag stage 1
if not(FL(t,21))
FL(t,21)=1;
end
%If time has passed, test if a cross has happened, flag
stage 2 if yes
if not(FL(t,22)) %Timer keeps resetting until it is
used
TI(t,11) = 600.0;
end
%Test for start of stage 2
FL(t,22) = ((TI(t,12)==0)&&(BL(t,5) <
BL(t,7)))||FL(t,22);
%Build New Limits
%35-30
if FL(t,23)&&FL(t,21)
BL(t,14) = 93;
BL(t,15) = 75;
end
%30-25
if FL(t,24)&&FL(t,21)
BL(t,14) = 88;
BL(t,15) = 70;
end
%35-25
if FL(t,25)&&FL(t,21)
BL(t,14) = 93;
BL(t,15) = 75;
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Stage 2%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%Test for Settled L4
%Increment if within final bounds
if (BL(t,5) > 60)&&(BL(t,5) < 75)&&FL(t,12)
CO(t,6)=CO(t,6)+1;
end
if (BL(t,5) > 70)&&(BL(t,5) < 80)&&FL(t,13)
CO(t,6)=CO(t,6)+1;
end
if (BL(t,5) > 75)&&(BL(t,5) < 85)&&FL(t,14)
CO(t,6)=CO(t,6)+1;
end
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%Set Flags if counter greater than xx
FL(t,30) = CO(t,06) > 300;
%Build New Bounds, with 20% Undershoot
%35-30
if (FL(t,23)&&FL(t,22))
BL(t,14) = (80)+(5/600)*(TI(t,11));
BL(t,15) = 63;
end
%30-25
if (FL(t,24)&&FL(t,22))
BL(t,14) = (70)+(10/600)*(TI(t,11));
BL(t,15) = 52;
end
%35-25
if (FL(t,25)&&FL(t,22))
BL(t,14) = (70)+(15/600)*(TI(t,11));
BL(t,15) = 52;
end
%If Finished With Transition
%25'C Setpoint
if FL(t,30)&&FL(t,12)
BL(t,14) = 75;
BL(t,15) = 60;
end
%30'C Setpoint
if FL(t,30)&&FL(t,13)
BL(t,14) = 80;
BL(t,15) = 70;
end
%35'C Setpoint
if FL(t,30)&&FL(t,14)
BL(t,14) = 85;
BL(t,15) = 75;
end
%Test that both are finished
%Clear Spike Flags
if FL(t,29)&&FL(t,30)
FL(t,9) = 0;
FL(t,10) = 0;
%Clear Stage Flags
FL(t,19) = 0;
FL(t,20) = 0;
FL(t,21) = 0;
FL(t,22) = 0;
%Clear Trans Type Flags
FL(t,16) = 0;
FL(t,17) = 0;
FL(t,18) = 0;
FL(t,23) = 0;
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FL(t,24) = 0;
FL(t,25) = 0;
%Clear the settled counters
CO(t,5) = 0;
CO(t,6) = 0;
%Clear the settled flags
FL(t,29) = 0;
FL(t,30) = 0;
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Return to variable testing%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
end
break
end
break
end
%Values at 25'C
if FL(t,12)&&not(FL(t,9))
BL(t,09)=26.5;%T2maX
BL(t,10)=24;%T2miN
BL(t,14)=75;%L4maX
BL(t,15)=60;%L4miN
end
%Values at 30'C
if FL(t,13)&&not(FL(t,9))
BL(t,09)=31.5;%T2maX
BL(t,10)=28.5;%T2miN
BL(t,14)=80;%L4maX
BL(t,15)=70;%L4miN
end
%Values at 35'C
if FL(t,14)&&not(FL(t,9))
BL(t,09)=35.5;%T2maX
BL(t,10)=33.5;%T2miN
BL(t,14)=85;%L4maX
BL(t,15)=75;%L4miN
end
break
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%The test and break%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
while 1==1
%First, all of the soft boundary counters
%F1miN Soft
if BL(t,6)<BL(t,16)
CO(t,3)=CO(t,3)+1;
else if BL(t,6)>BL(t,16)
CO(t,3)=0;
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end
end
%P1maX Soft
if BL(t,8)>BL(t,22)
CO(t,10)=CO(t,10)+1;
else if BL(t,8)<BL(t,22)
CO(t,10)=0;
end
end
%P1miN Soft
if BL(t,8)<BL(t,23)
CO(t,12)=CO(t,12)+1;
else if BL(t,8)>BL(t,23)
CO(t,11)=0;
end
end
%L3maX Soft
if BL(t,4)>BL(t,12)
CO(t,13)=CO(t,13)+1;
else if BL(t,4)<BL(t,12)
CO(t,13)=0;
end
end
%L3miN Soft
if BL(t,4)<BL(t,13)
CO(t,14)=CO(t,14)+1;
else if BL(t,4)>BL(t,13)
CO(t,14)=0;
end
end
%Flagging for timed or absolute breaches
FL(t,1)=BL(t,2)>BL(t,9); %T2maX
FL(t,2)=BL(t,2)<BL(t,10); %T2miN
FL(t,3)=BL(t,3)>BL(t,25); %P2maX
FL(t,3)=BL(t,3)<BL(t,26); %P2miN
FL(t,4)=CO(t,13)>3; %L3maX
FL(t,5)=CO(t,14)>3; %L3miN
FL(t,6)=BL(t,5)>BL(t,14); %L4maX
FL(t,7)=BL(t,5)<BL(t,15); %L4miN
FL(t,8)=CO(t,3)>3; %F1miN
FL(t,27)=CO(t,10)>2; %P1maX
FL(t,28)=CO(t,11)>3; %P1miN

DO(t,1)=FL(t,1)||FL(t,2)||FL(t,3)||FL(t,4)||FL(t,5)||FL(t,6)||FL(t,7)||FL(t
,8)||FL(t,27)||FL(t,28);
break
end
end
LevelTimer %Show how long the level transitions required
Diagnose %Display the states of flags for personal reference
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TransitionTimer %Show how long the temperature transitions required
ShowTrips %Show which parameteres (if any) initiated the trip
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Appendix B:

HFC Code

This code has been discussed in detail in Section 4.3: Description of Implemented Monitoring Software.
This appendix presents the actual coding as written to the HFC. For reference of what each memory item is used
for, refer to Appendix C: HFC Items List
;;Start of program
;Initialize Inputs/Outputs
AIC(BL,1,50); Input 1=C2
AIC(BL,2,100); Input 2=T2
AIC(BL,3,100); Input 3=P2
AIC(BL,4,100); Input 4=L3
AIC(BL,5,100); Input 5=L4
AIC(BL,6,100); Input 6=F1
AIC(BL,8,100); Input 8=P1
;The Shutdown
DO,01 R= DO,01 ;
;Reset Flags
FL,01 R= /FL,01;
FL,02 R= /FL,02;
FL,03 R= /FL,03;
FL,04 R= /FL,04;
FL,05 R= /FL,05;
FL,06 R= /FL,06;
FL,07 R= /FL,07;
FL,08 R= /FL,08;
FL,09 R= /FL,09;
FL,10 R= /FL,10;
FL,11 R= /FL,11;
FL,12 R= /FL,12;
FL,13 R= /FL,13;
FL,14 R= /FL,14;
FL,15 R= /FL,15;
FL,16 R= /FL,16;
FL,17 R= /FL,17;
FL,18 R= /FL,18;
FL,19 R= /FL,19;
FL,20 R= /FL,20;
FL,21 R= /FL,21;
FL,22 R= /FL,22;
FL,23 R= /FL,23;
FL,24 R= /FL,24;
FL,25 R= /FL,25;
FL,26 R= /FL,26;
FL,27 R= /FL,27;
FL,28 R= /FL,28;
FL,29 R= /FL,29;
FL,30 R= /FL,30;
;The Limits (ie. 'G')
BL,9= VA,63;T2maX
BL,10= VA,57;T2miN
BL,11= VA,22;P2maX
BL,12= VA,51;L3maX

BL,13= VA,49;L3miN
BL,14= VA,80;L4maX
BL,15= VA,60;L4miN
BL,16= VA,55;F1miN
BL,22= VA,38;P1maX
BL,23= VA,29;P1miN
BL,17= BL,1;C2n-1
BL,18= VA,00;C2n-2
BL,19= VA,00;C2n-3
BL,20= VA,00;C2n-4
BL,21= VA,00;C2n-5
;Declare all counters
CO,01=VA,00 ;C2 Counter for Wandering
CO,02=VA,00 ;P2 Soft Trip Counter
CO,03=VA,00 ;F1 Soft Trip Counter
CO,04=VA,00 ;C2 Counter for Start Up
CO,05=VA,00 ;T2 Settled Counter
CO,06=VA,00 ;L4 Settled
CO,07=VA,00 ;25C Settle
CO,08=VA,00 ;30C Settle
CO,09=VA,00 ;35C Settle
;Preset all Timers
TISC,02 = VATP,240.0
TISC,03 = VATP,1500.0
TISC,04 = VATP,1800.0
TISC,05 = VATP,90.0
TISC,06 = VATP,150.0
TISC,07 = VATP,240.0
TISC,08 = VATP,300.0
TISC,09 = VATP,240.0
TISC,10 = VATP,420.0
TISC,11 = VATP,600.0
TISC,12 = VATP,30.0
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Wait for Start- Up;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Start of Loop 1
L0001: DO,09 S= /DO,09
;Test for Start Up Count
JUMP L0002
IF
CO,04
=>
approximating a 40Hz Refresh Rate

VA,4800;

;If C2>25%, increase its counter, else set the count
to 0
INC CO,04 IF BL,1 > BL,50
;Jump to trip if absolute bounds are tripped
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JUMP L0011 IF ((BL,1 > VA,90) OR (BL,2
>BL,9))
;Return to top of loop
JUMP L0001
;;;;;;;;;;;;; Operations;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Start of Loop 2
L0002: DO,10 S= /DO,10
;;;Counter's Don't Go Below 0
CO,01 = VA,00 IF CO,01 < VA,00
CO,02 = VA,00 IF CO,02 < VA,00
CO,03 = VA,00 IF CO,03 < VA,00
CO,04 = VA,00 IF CO,04 < VA,00
CO,05 = VA,00 IF CO,05 < VA,00
CO,06 = VA,00 IF CO,06 < VA,00
CO,07 = VA,00 IF CO,07 < VA,00
CO,08 = VA,00 IF CO,08 < VA,00
CO,09 = VA,00 IF CO,09 < VA,00
;Nice Outsource to C2 Tracker
JUMP L0020
L0021: FL,31 S= /FL,31
;Outsource to Bounds Builder
JUMP L0006
L0012: FL,31 S= /FL,31
;Increment (or decrement) the soft bounds
INC CO,3 IF BL,6 < BL,16; F1<MIN
DEC CO,3 IF BL,6 > BL,16
INC CO,10 IF BL,8 > BL,22; P1>MAX
DEC CO,10 IF BL,8 < BL,22
INC CO,12 IF BL,8 < BL,23; P1<MIN
DEC CO,12 IF BL,8 > BL,23
INC CO,13 IF BL,4 < BL,12; L3>MAX
DEC CO,13 IF BL,4 > BL,12
INC CO,14 IF BL,4 < BL,13; L3<MIN
DEC CO,14 IF BL,4 > BL,13
;Check the formed bounds
FL,01=BL,02 > BL,09; T2>MAX
FL,02=BL,02 < BL,10; T2<MIN
FL,06=BL,05 > BL,14; L4>MAX
FL,07=BL,05 < BL,15; L4<MIN
FL,27=BL,03 > BL,25; P2>MAX
FL,28=BL,03 < BL,26; P2<MIN
;Check the Soft Bounds
FL,04= CO,13> VA,100; L3 COUNT MAX
FL,05= CO,14 > VA,100; L3 COUNT MIN
FL,08= CO,3 > V1,100; F1 COUNT MIN
FL,27= CO,10 > VA,70; P1 COUNT MAX
FL,28= CO,12 > VA,100; P1 COUNT MIN

;Trip under the extrardinary circumstances
JUMP L0011 IF FL,01 OR FL,02 OR FL,03 OR
FL,04 OR FL,05 OR FL,06 OR FL,07 OR FL,08 OR
FL,27 OR FL,28
;Back to the start of Operations Loop
JUMP L0002
;;;;;;;;;;;;C2 TRACKER;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Do at least one hand me down
L0020: BL,21 = BL,20
BL,20 = BL,19
BL,19 = BL,18
BL,18 = BL,17
BL,17 = BL,1
;Determine spike direction
FL,10 R= (BL,17 > BL,1) AND /FL,9
FL,10 S= (BL,17 < BL,1) AND /FL,9
;Is there a jump?
FL,9 = ((BL,17 - VA,5) > BL,1) OR ((BL,17 +
VA,5) < BL,1) OR FL,9
;Is there a drift?
FL,15 S= (BL,1 > VA,47) OR (BL,1 < VA,42) AND
/FL,9 AND FL,12
FL,15 S= (BL,1 > VA,55) OR (BL,1 < VA,48) AND
/FL,9 AND FL,13
FL,15 S= (BL,1 > VA,61) OR (BL,1 < VA,54) AND
/FL,9 AND FL,14
;If drift, allow it only for 2s (Assuming 35Hz) (70
Samples)
;Do the increment/ decrement thing
INC CO,1 IF FL,15
DEC CO,1 IF /FL,15
JUMP L0011 IF CO,1 > VA,1=70
;While there is drift, ignore the settle reading
INC CO,7 IF (BL,17 > VA,42) AND (BL,17 <
VA,47) AND (BL,18 > VA,42) AND (BL,18 <
VA,47) AND (BL,19 > VA,42) AND (BL,19 <
VA,47) AND (BL,20 > VA,42) AND (BL,20 <
VA,47) AND (BL,21 > VA,42) AND (BL,21 <
VA,47) AND /FL,15
CO,7 = CO,7 - VA,5 IF (BL,17 < VA,42) OR
(BL,17 > VA,47) OR (BL,18 < VA,42) OR (BL,18
> VA,47) OR (BL,19 < VA,42) OR (BL,19 >
VA,47) OR (BL,20 < VA,42) OR (BL,20 > VA,47)
OR (BL,21 < VA,42) OR (BL,21 > VA,47) AND
/FL,15
INC CO,8 IF
VA,55) AND
VA,55) AND
VA,55) AND

(BL,17
(BL,18
(BL,19
(BL,20

>
>
>
>

VA,48)
VA,48)
VA,48)
VA,48)

AND
AND
AND
AND

(BL,17
(BL,18
(BL,19
(BL,20

<
<
<
<
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VA,55) AND (BL,21 > VA,48) AND (BL,21 <
VA,55) AND /FL,15
CO,8 = CO,8 - VA,5 IF (BL,17 < VA,48) OR
(BL,17 > VA,55) OR (BL,18 < VA,48) OR (BL,18
> VA,55) OR (BL,19 < VA,48) OR (BL,19 >
VA,55) OR (BL,20 < VA,48) OR (BL,20 > VA,55)
OR (BL,21 < VA,48) OR (BL,21 > VA,55) AND
/FL,15
INC CO,9 IF (BL,17 > VA,54) AND (BL,17 <
VA,61) AND (BL,18 > VA,54) AND (BL,18 <
VA,61) AND (BL,19 > VA,54) AND (BL,19 <
VA,61)AND (BL,20 > VA,54) AND (BL,20 <
VA,61)AND (BL,21 > VA,54) AND (BL,21 <
VA,61) AND /FL,15
CO,9 = CO,9 - VA,5 IF (BL,17 < VA,54) OR
(BL,17 > VA,61) OR (BL,18 < VA,54) OR (BL,18
> VA,61) OR (BL,19 < VA,54) OR (BL,19 >
VA,61) OR (BL,20 < VA,54) OR (BL,20 > VA,61)
OR (BL,21 < VA,54) OR (BL,21 > VA,61) AND
/FL,15
;Declare the settle point
FL,12 = CO,7 > VA,120
FL,13 = CO,8 > VA,120
FL,14 = CO,9 > VA,120
FL,15 R= /FL,15
;Don't let the counters get too high
CO,7 = VA,180 IF CO,7 > VA,180
CO,8 = VA,180 IF CO,8 > VA,180
CO,9 = VA,180 IF CO,9 > VA,180
;Return from the subroutine
JUMP L0021
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;BOUNDARIES;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Start of Loop 6
;The Non-Transitive Limits
L0006: BL,25= VA,23;P2maX
BL,26=VA,13;P2miN
BL,12= VA,51;L3maX
BL,13= VA,49;L3miN
BL,16= VA,57;F1miN
BL,22= VA,42;P1maX
BL,23= VA,29;P1miN
;Check for Spike Flag. If active, jump to HeatX
JUMP L0003 IF FL,09
;Values at 25'C
BL,09=VA,53 IF FL,12;T2maX
BL,10=VA,48 IF FL,12;T2miN
BL,14=VA,75 IF FL,12;L4maX
BL,15=VA,60 IF FL,12;L4miN
;Values at 30'C

BL,09=VA,63 IF FL,13;T2maX
BL,10=VA,57 IF FL,13;T2miN
BL,14=VA,80 IF FL,13;L4maX
BL,15=VA,70 IF FL,13;L4miN
;Values at 35'C
BL,09=VA,71 IF FL,14;T2maX
BL,10=VA,67 IF FL,14;T2miN
BL,14=VA,85 IF FL,14;L4maX
BL,15=VA,75 IF FL,14;L4miN
;Return to operations
JUMP L0012
;;;;;;;Heat Stage 1;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Receive the jump
L0003: FL,31 S= /FL,31
;First Visit? Make a preliminary direction flag
;;25-30 if: Up, @25
FL,16 = FL,10 AND FL,12 AND /FL,19
;30-35 if: Up, @30
FL,17 = FL,10 AND FL,13 AND /FL,19
;35-30 if: Down, @35
FL,23 = /FL,10 AND FL,14 AND /FL,19
;30-25 if: Down, @30
FL,24 = /FL,10 AND FL,13 AND /FL,19
;Trip if up at 35, or down at 25
JUMP L0011 IF ((FL,10 AND FL,14) OR (/FL,10
AND FL,12)) AND /FL,19
;Set all timers that apply
TISC,02 = VATP,240.0 IF (FL,16 AND /FL,19) ;T2
25-30
TISC,03 = VATP,1500.0 IF (FL,17 AND /FL,19)
;T2 30-35
TISC,04 = VATP,1800.0 IF (FL,18 OR Fl,16 AND
/FL,19) ;T2 25-35
TISC,05 = VATP,90.0 IF (FL,23 AND /FL,19) ;T2
35-30
TISC,06 = VATP,150.0 IF (FL,24 AND /FL,19) ;T2
30-25
TISC,07 = VATP,240.0 IF (FL,25 OR FL,23 AND
/FL,19) ;T2 35-25
TISC,08 = VATP,300.0 IF (FL,16 AND /FL,19) ;L4
25-30
TISC,09 = VATP,240.0 IF (FL,17 AND /FL,19) ;L4
30-35
TISC,10 = VATP,420.0 IF ((FL,18 OR FL,16) AND
/FL,19) ;L4 25-35
TISC,12 = VATP,300.0 IF (/FL,10 AND /FL,19)
;Set the stage flags
FL,12 R= /FL,19
FL,13 R= /FL,19
FL,14 R= /FL,19
FL,22 R= /FL,19
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CO,7 = VA,00 IF /FL,19
CO,8 = VA,00 IF /FL,19
CO,9 = VA,00 IF /FL,19
FL,19 S= /FL,19
;Build the new bounds
;Up Bounds
;25-30
BL,9
=
VA,0063
(VA,0010/VA,2400/VA,2400)*(VA,2400TI,02)*(VA,2400-TI,03)*VA,7/VA,2 IF FL,16
BL,10
=
VA,0057
(VA,0009/VA,2400/VA,2400)*(VA,2400TI,02)*(VA,2400-TI,03) IF FL,16
;30-35
BL,9
=
VA,0071
(VA,0008/VA,15000/VA,15000)*(VA,15000TI,03)*(VA,15000-TI,03)*VA,7/VA,2 IF FL,17
BL,10
=
VA,0067
(VA,0010/VA,15000/VA,15000)*(VA,15000TI,03)*(VA,15000-TI,03) IF FL,17
;25-35
BL,9
=
VA,0071
(VA,0018/VA,18000/VA,18000)*(VA,18000TI,04)*(VA,18000-TI,04)*VA,7/VA,2 IF FL,18
BL,10
=
VA,0067
(VA,0019/VA,18000/VA,18000)*(VA,18000TI,04)*(VA,18000-TI,04) IF FL,18

;35-25
BL,9
=
VA,0053
(VA,0018/VA,2400/VA,2400)*(VA,2400TI,07)*(VA,2400-TI,07) IF FL,25
BL,10
=
VA,0048
(VA,0019/VA,2400/VA,2400)*(VA,2400TI,07)*(VA,2400-TI,07)*VA,7/VA,2 IF FL,25
-

-

;30-25
BL,9
=
VA,0053
(VA,0010/VA,1500/VA,1500)*(VA,1500TI,06)*(VA,1500-TI,06) IF FL,24
BL,10
=
VA,0048
(VA,0009/VA,1500/VA,1500)*(VA,1500TI,06)*(VA,1500-TI,06)*VA,7/VA,2 IF FL,24

+

;Split Bounds Down
BL,9
=
VA,0063
+
(VA,0008/VA,0900/VA,0900)*(VA,0900TI,05)*(VA,0900-TI,05) IF FL,23 AND /FL,20
BL,10
=
VA,0048
+
(VA,0019/VA,2400/VA,2400)*(VA,2400TI,07)*(VA,2400-TI,07)*VA,7/VA,2 IF FL,23
AND /FL,20

;Test for settled C2
FL,20 S= FL,12 OR FL,13 OR FL,14
-

-

-

;Split Bounds Up
BL,9
=
VA,0071
(VA,0018/VA,18000/VA,18000)*(VA,18000TI,04)*(VA,18000-TI,04)*VA,7/VA,2 IF FL,16
AND /FL,20
BL,10
=
VA,0067
(VA,0010/VA,15000/VA,15000)*(VA,15000TI,03)*(VA,15000-TI,03) IF FL,16 AND /FL,20
;Down Bounds
;35-30
BL,9
=
VA,0063
(VA,0008/VA,0900/VA,0900)*(VA,0900TI,05)*(VA,0900-TI,05) IF FL,23
BL,10
=
VA,0057
(VA,0010/VA,0900/VA,0900)*(VA,0900TI,05)*(VA,0900-TI,05)*VA,7/VA,2 IF FL,23

+

+

+

+

+

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Heat Stage 2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;If first visit, check for innaccurately chosen steps
;25-35 if: C2 Settles on 35, previously 25-30
FL,18 S= FL,12 AND FL,16 AND FL,20
FL,16 R= FL,18
;35-25 if: C2 Settles on 25, previously 35-30
FL,25 S= FL,14 AND FL,23 AND FL,20
FL,23 R= FL,25
;Test for settled T2
;Increment if within final bounds
INC CO,05 IF (BL,2 < VA,52) AND
VA,49) AND FL,12
INC CO,05 IF (BL,2 < VA,62) AND
VA,58) AND FL,13
INC CO,05 IF (BL,2 < VA,70) AND
VA,68) AND FL,14
;Decrement if within final bounds
DEC CO,05 IF ((BL,2 > VA,52) OR
VA,49)) AND FL,12
DEC CO,05 IF ((BL,2 > VA,62) OR
VA,58)) AND FL,13
DEC CO,05 IF ((BL,2 > VA,70) OR
VA,68)) AND FL,14

(BL,2 >
(BL,2 >
(BL,2 >

(BL,2 <
(BL,2 <
(BL,2 <

;Set Settled flag if count is greater than xx
FL,29 = (CO,05 > VA,400) AND FL,9 AND FL,20
;Static bounds if settled
;Values at 25'C
BL,09=VA,53 IF FL,12 AND FL,29;T2maX
BL,10=VA,48 IF FL,12 AND FL,29;T2miN
;Values at 30'C
BL,09=VA,63 IF FL,13 AND FL,29;T2maX
BL,10=VA,57 IF FL,13 AND FL,29;T2miN
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;Values at 35'C
BL,09=VA,71 IF FL,14 AND FL,29;T2maX
BL,10=VA,67 IF FL,14 AND FL,29;T2miN

BL,15 = VA,60 IF FL,30 AND FL,12

;Continue to level transition

;30'C Setpoint
BL,14 = VA,80 IF FL,30 AND FL,13
BL,15 = VA,70 IF FL,30 AND FL,13

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Level Up;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Jump to Level Down if it is a down spike
JUMP L0004 IF /FL,10

;35'C Setpoint
BL,14 = VA,85 IF FL,30 AND FL,14
BL,15 = VA,75 IF FL,30 AND FL,14

;Check for the settled current
FL,22 S= FL,12 OR FL,13 OR FL,14

;If both are done with, do a total reset of flags and
timers
FL,9 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,10 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
;Clear stage flags
FL,19 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,20 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,21 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,22 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
;Clear Trans Type Flags
FL,16 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,17 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,18 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,23 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,24 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,25 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
;Clear Settle Counters
CO,5 = VA,00 IF FL,29 AND FL,30
CO,6 = VA,00 IF FL,29 AND FL,30

;Build new bounds
;25-30
BL,14 = VA,88 IF FL,16
BL,15 = VA,60 IF FL,16 AND /FL,22
;30-35
BL,14 = VA,94 IF FL,17
BL,15 = VA,70 IF FL,17 AND /FL,22
;25-35
BL,14 = VA,98 IF FL,18
BL,15 = VA,70 IF FL,18 AND /FL,22
;;;;Stage 2 for Level Up
;Do the timing bounds
;25-30
BL,15
=
(VA,0070)(VA,0010/VA,3000);*(VA,3000-TITM,08)
IF
(FL,16 AND FL,22)
;30-35
BL,15
=
(VA,0075)(VA,0005/VA,2400)*(VA,2400-TITM,08)
IF
(FL,17 AND FL,22)
;25-35
BL,15
=
(VA,0075)(VA,0015/VA,3000)*(VA,4200-TITM,08)
IF
(FL,18 AND FL,22)
;Test for Settled L4
INC CO,06 IF ((BL,5 > VA,60) AND (BL,5 <
VA,75) AND FL,12 AND FL,22)
INC CO,06 IF ((BL,5 > VA,70) AND (BL,5 <
VA,80) AND FL,13 AND FL,22)
INC CO,06 IF ((BL,5 > VA,75) AND (BL,5 <
VA,85) AND FL,14 AND FL,22)
;Set flag if counter higher than 600 (30s)
FL,30 = CO,06 > VA,600
;Static Bounds
;25'C Setpoint
BL,14 = VA,75 IF FL,30 AND FL,12

;Jump out if the settling hasn't happened
JUMP L0012 IF /FL,29 OR /FL,30
;Else, reset these too
FL,29 R= FL,29
FL,30 R= FL,30
;Return to Operations
JUMP L0012
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Level Down 1;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Receive jump from level up
L0004: FL,31 S= /FL,31
;If the first visit
;Record the current L4 and start timer
BL,7 = BL,5 IF /FL,21
;Set stage 1 flag
FL,21 S= /FL,21
;If time has passed, test if a cross has happened, flag
stage 2
TISC,11 = VATP,600.0 IF /FL,22
FL,22 S= (TITO,12 AND (BL,5 < BL,7))
;Build the new limits
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;35-30
BL,14 = VA,95 IF FL,23 AND FL,21
BL,15 = VA,75 IF FL,23 AND FL,21
;30-25
BL,14 = VA,95 IF FL,24 AND FL,21
BL,15 = VA,70 IF FL,24 AND FL,21
;35-25
BL,14 = VA,95 IF FL,25 AND FL,21
BL,15 = VA,75 IF FL,25 AND FL,21
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;Level Down 2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Test for settled L4
INC CO,06 IF ((BL,5 >
VA,75) AND FL,12 AND
INC CO,06 IF ((BL,5 >
VA,80) AND FL,13 AND
INC CO,06 IF ((BL,5 >
VA,85) AND FL,14 AND

VA,60) AND (BL,5 <
FL,22)
VA,70) AND (BL,5 <
FL,22)
VA,75) AND (BL,5 <
FL,22)

;Set finished flag if counter greater than 10500 (5
minutes and 35Hz)
FL,30 = CO,6 > VA,10500
;Build new bounds, accounting for undershoot
;35-30
BL,14
(VA,80)+(VA,0005/VA,6000)*(VA,6000TITM,11) IF (FL,23 AND FL,22)
BL,15 = VA,55 IF (FL,23 AND FL,30)

=

;30-25
BL,14 = (VA,70)+(VA,0010/VA,6000)*(VA,6000TITM,11) IF (FL,24 AND FL,22)
BL,15 = VA,45 IF (FL,24 AND FL,30)
;35-25
BL,14 = (VA,70)+(VA,0015/VA,6000)*(VA,6000TITM,11) IF (FL,25 AND FL,22)
BL,15 = VA,45 IF (FL,25 AND FL,30)
;Static Bounds
;25'C Setpoint
BL,14 = VA,75 IF FL,30 AND FL,12
BL,15 = VA,60 IF FL,30 AND FL,12
;30'C Setpoint
BL,14 = VA,80 IF FL,30 AND FL,13
BL,15 = VA,70 IF FL,30 AND FL,13
;35'C Setpoint
BL,14 = VA,85 IF FL,30 AND FL,14
BL,15 = VA,75 IF FL,30 AND FL,14

;If both are done with, do a total reset of flags and
timers
FL,9 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,10 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
;Clear stage flags
FL,19 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,20 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,21 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,22 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
;Clear Trans Type Flags
FL,16 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,17 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,18 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,23 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,24 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
FL,25 R= FL,29 AND FL,30
;Clear Settle Counters
CO,5 = VA,00 IF FL,29 AND FL,30
CO,6 = VA,00 IF FL,29 AND FL,30
;Jump out if the settling hasn't happened
JUMP L0012 IF /FL,29 OR /FL,30
;Else, reset these too
FL,29 R= FL,29
FL,30 R= FL,30
;Return to Operations
JUMP L0012
;;;;;;;;;;;;;Tripped Loop;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;Start of Loop 11
L0011: DO,01 S= /DO,01;
;Display Error
DO,09= FL,01;
DO,10= FL,02;
DO,11= FL,03;
DO,12= FL,04;
DO,13= FL,05;
DO,14= FL,06;
DO,15= FL,07;
DO,16= FL,08;
JUMP L0011
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Appendix C:

HFC Items List

BLOCK

ITEM

FLAG

ITEM

1

C2

5

L3 Min

2

T2

6

L4 Max

3

P2

7

L4 Min

4

L3

8

F1 Min

5

L4

9

Spike

6

F1

10

Spike Up

7

L4 X Start

11

L4 Trans

8

P1

12

Set point 25

9

T2 Max

13

Set point 30

10

T2 Min

14

Set point 35

11

--

15

C2 Drifting

12

L3 Max

16

X 25->30

13

L3 Min

17

X 30->35

14

L4 Max

18

X 25->35

15

L4 Min

19

X Stage 1 (Heat)

16

F1 Min

20

X Stage 2 (Heat)

17

C2 n-1

21

X Stage 1 (Level)

18

C2 n-2

22

X Stage 2 (Level)

19

C2 n-3

23

X 35->30

20

C2 n-4

24

X 30->25

21

C2 n-5

25

X 35->25

22

P1 Max

27

P1 Max

23

P1 Min

28

P1 Min

24

Holding

29

T2 Settled

25

P2 Max

30

L4 Settled

26

P2 Min

31

Loop Catch

FLAG

ITEM

COUNT

ITEM

1

T2 Max

1

C2 Wander

2

T2 Min

2

--

3

P2 Max

3

F1 Soft Down

4

L3 Max

4

C2 Start Up
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COUNT

ITEM

TIMER

ITEM

Default Time

5

T2 Settled

10

L4 Trans 25->35

420

6

L4 Settled

11

L4 Trans Down

600

7

25'C Settle

12

L4 Rebound Wait 300

8

30'C Settle

9

35'C Settle

10

P1 Soft Up

11

---

12

P1 Soft Down

13

L3 Soft Up

14

L3 Soft Down

LOOP

ITEM

0

Initialization

1

Start Up

2

Operations

3

Heat Transition

4

L4 Transition Down

6

Bounds Builder

11

Trip

12

Return from Bounds

19

Bypass C2 because of drift

20

C2 Tracker routine

21

Return from C2 Tracker

TIMER

ITEM

1

---

2

T2 Trans 25->30

240

3

T2 Trans 30->35

1500

4

T2 Trans 25->35

1800

5

T2 Trans 35->30

90

6

T2 Trans 30->25

150

7

T2 Trans 35->25

240

8

L4 Trans 25->30

300

9

L4 Trans 30->35

240

Default Time
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